Coleman v. Meeks
| Decision Date | 28 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14 - 1065 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | KEITH COLEMAN, Petitioner, v. BOBBY L. MEEKS, Respondent. |
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss the Case (ECF No. 17) be granted and that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Keith Coleman (ECF No. 2) be dismissed as moot, or, in the alternative, denied.
Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") filed by Petitioner Keith Coleman pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He contends that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), which is the agency responsible for implementing and applying federal law concerning the computation of federal sentences, see, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 309 (1992), should award him prior custody credit for the time he spent serving his state sentence from October 1, 2009, the date of his arrest by the Pittsburgh Police Department, through October 1, 2013, the date he was released by state authorities to the exclusive custody of the United States. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be dismissed as moot, or, in the alternative, denied.
On October 1, 2009, Coleman was arrested by the Pittsburgh Police Department and subsequently charged with Carrying a Firearm Without a License at case number CP-02-CR-0016919-2009 in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 7-2 at ¶ 3.) That same day, a Petition on Supervised Release was filed in this Court, requesting the issuance of a bench warrant for Coleman's arrest for violating the conditions of his Supervised Release at case number 2:06-CR-00027-001. As a result, a warrant was issued for Coleman's arrest on October 7, 2009. Id. at ¶ 4.
On January 11, 2011, Coleman was sentenced to a 3 to 6 year term of confinement in CP-02-CR-0016919-2009. Id. at ¶ 5. He was received at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") to begin his 3 to 6 year term of imprisonment on January 28, 2011. Id. at ¶ 6.
On March 21, 2011, this Court issued a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum from the Pennsylvania DOC. Id. at ¶ 7. On April 29, 2011, while still in state custody, Coleman was "borrowed" from the Commonwealth pursuant to the federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Id. at ¶ 8.
On April 29, 2011, Coleman was sentenced in 2:06-CR-0027-001 to a 24-month term of imprisonment for violating the conditions of his Supervised Release, and the sentence was ordered to run consecutive to Coleman's state term of incarceration in CP-02-CR-0016919-2009. Id. at ¶ 9. After sentencing on April 29, 2011, the United States Marshals Service returned Coleman to the custody of the Commonwealth, placing the federal judgment and commitment as a detainer, and thereby satisfying the federal writ. Id. at ¶ 10.
On February 21, 2013, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated Coleman's sentence and remanded his case for resentencing. He was subsequently sentenced to a 2 to 4 year term of imprisonment on May 1, 2013. The minimum expiration date of his 2 year term was October 1, 2011, and the maximum expiration date of the 4 year term was October 1, 2013. Id. at ¶ 6.
On September 17, 2013, while still in state custody, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County granted Coleman's petition for post-conviction relief in CP-02-CR-0016919-2009 and ordered a new trial. Id. at ¶ 15. Shortly thereafter, on October 8, 2013, Coleman was released to the "exclusive" custody of the United States Marshals, Western District of Pennsylvania, on their detainer to begin service of his federal sentence. Id. at ¶ 11.
On August 12, 2014, Coleman filed the instant Petition in this Court, claiming that he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the time he spent serving his state sentence from the date of his arrest on October 1, 2009, through October 1, 2013, the date he completed his state sentence and was released to the "exclusive" custody of the United States Marshals. Id. at ¶ 14.
On October 27, 2014, Respondent requested a stay of these proceedings pending the outcome of Coleman's state criminal trial.1 (ECF No. 7.) The stay was granted on November 18, 2014, pending the outcome of Coleman's re-trial and sentencing in CP-02-CR-0016919-2009. (ECF No. 10.)
Instead of proceeding to trial, Coleman decided to plead guilty in CP-02-CR-0016919-2009, and, on April 21, 2014, the trial court again imposed a 2 to 4 year sentence, specificallynoting that Coleman should be given credit against his state sentence for the time he spent in custody from October 1, 2009, through October 1, 2013. (ECF No. 17 at ¶ 6.)
Because Coleman's state proceedings had concluded, Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen and Dismiss this Case on May 6, 2015. (ECF No. 17.) The stay was lifted by Order dated May 7, 2015. (ECF No. 18.)
Coleman was released from the custody of the BOP on May 12, 2015.
A prisoner may seek federal habeas relief only if he is in custody in violation of the constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982); Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991). The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is held in custody. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir.1977). The writ supplies the mechanism by which prisoners may challenge the length of their custodial term. Fields v. Keohane, 954 F.2d 945, 949 (3d Cir.1992); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir.1991). The remedy is to free an inmate from unlawful custody.
However, Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases or controversies. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806, 810-11 (3d Cir. 1989)("Federal courts, having jurisdiction only to decide actual cases and controversies, are 'without the power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them'") (citation omitted). Therefore, a case becomes moot when there is no viable legal issue left to resolve. See Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). If developments occur during the course of a case which render the court unable to grant a party the relief requested, the case must be dismissed as moot. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Co., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).
Generally, a petition for habeas corpus relief becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). In this case, the Court takes judicial notice that Coleman was released from the custody of the BOP on May 12, 2015. As such, there is no longer a live case or controversy, and, consequently, the Petition is now moot. However, for the reasons that follow, Coleman would not be entitled to the relief he seeks even if this matter was not moot.
Respondent, whose Motion to Dismiss was filed prior to Coleman's release from BOP custody, submits that the Petition should be dismissed because Coleman has already received credit against his state sentence for the time he seeks, and 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) prevents the BOP from awarding double credit.
A federal prisoner's sentence calculation is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585, Calculation of a term of imprisonment. Paragraph (a) of the statute governs the date upon which a prisoner's sentence commences and paragraph (b) governs credit for time spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences. Thus, in any computation of a federal sentence, two separate decisions must be made: (1) when the federal sentence commences and (2) to what extent the defendant can receive credit for time spent in custody prior to commencement of his or hersentence. Chambers v. Holland, 920 F. Supp. 618, 621 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 100 F.3d 946 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Dutton v. U.S. Attorney General, 713 F.Supp.2d 194, 199 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). BOP policies regarding sentence computation are set forth in Program Statement 5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual (PS 5880.28).2
The date upon which a federal sentence commences is controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), which provides as follows:
(a) Commencement of sentence. - A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a).
The BOP has interpreted § 3585(a) such that it will not commence a federal sentence earlier than the date on which it was imposed. See PS 5880.28, Chapt. 1, Page 13 (). See also Rashid v. Quintana, 372 F. App'x 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, a federal sentence cannot commence prior to the date it is pronounced, even if made concurrent with a sentence already being served. Rashid, 372 F. App'x at 2, n.7; Peterson v. Marberry, Civil No. 07-56, 2009 WL 55913 at *3-5 (W.D. Pa. Jan.5, 2009) ().
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