Coleman v. New York City Transit Authority

Decision Date09 June 1975
Citation371 N.Y.S.2d 663,332 N.E.2d 850,37 N.Y.2d 137
Parties, 332 N.E.2d 850 John J. COLEMAN, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Stuart Riedel, John G. de Roos, Helen R. Cassidy and John A. Murray, for appellant.

Benjamin H. Siff, New York City, Ivan Tantleff, Brooklyn, Thomas R. Newman and Charles Kramer, New York City, for respondent.

COOKE, Judge.

Plaintiff, aged 20 and claiming to have been mugged and thrown upon the subway tracks at the Canal Street station, suffered amputation of both legs below the knees while lying upon the tracks and when struck by defendant's train.

First, there was a trial on the issue of liability only, resulting in a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The interlocutory judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Appellate Division, one Justice dissenting. Then followed a separate trial on the issue of damages in which a verdict of $1,800,000 was rendered. Defendant now appeals from an order of the Appellate Division which unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, the Supreme Court judgment entered May 29, 1973, in favor of plaintiff, and granted a new trial on the issue of damages, unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the verdict to $930,000 and to entry of an amended judgment accordingly, in which event, the judgment as amended and reduced, was to be affirmed. Plaintiff so stipulated.

Where a motorman of a subway train sees a person lying on the tracks abutting a subway station platform, from such a distance and under such other circumstances as to permit him, in the exercise of reasonable care, to stop before striking the person, the motorman's failure to avoid the accident may be found to be negligence (Noseworthy v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 76, 78--79, 80 N.E.2d 744, 745; Clarke v. City of New York, 295 N.Y. 861, 67 N.E.2d 261; Brennan v. City of New York, 277 App.Div. 854, 98 N.Y.S.2d 23; Mikorski v. City of New York, 270 App.Div. 769, 59 N.Y.S.2d 457, mot. for lv. to app. den. 270 App.Div. 819, 60 N.Y.S.2d 295). With this general rule in mind and aside from testimony as to the actual occurrence of the tragedy, considerable proof was submitted as to the locale of the accident, sight distances and stopping capabilities of subway trains.

The platform in question, at the Canal Street subway station of the IND Division, was used by downtown travelers and ran in a generally northerly and southerly direction for a length of 660 feet. Adjacent to it and to the west were the southbound local tracks. As a train proceeding south comes into the Canal Street station, at a point 44 feet south of the north end of the station, it approaches a transition or easement curve, based on a 1,000 foot radius, it being described as a slight curve to the left. While Joseph Sigreti, defendant's motorman, was operating a four-car train from the right side of the lead car along these southbound local rails, plaintiff was run over by the first half of the front vehicle and was removed from underneath that car, at a point 320 feet south from the north end of the station.

During the liability trial, evidence was adduced relevant to the crucial question as to whether Sigreti, who admittedly saw plaintiff lying across the tracks, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have halted the train before impact. On the one hand, there was submitted testimony of: the plaintiff that he was unable to get up but saw the train at the beginning of the station about 300 to 400 feet distant; Marshall, a Transit Authority engineer familiar with the station, that upon entering the station from the north one could see clearly 320 feet to the point where plaintiff was extricated from beneath the train; Doty, a former motorman for defendant and a paid expert called by plaintiff, that a motorman entering the station could see approximately 500 feet of the tracks ahead; and Patrolman Lilley of the Transit Police Department, who came to the scene minutes after the accident, that the lighting conditions of the platform and tracks on the downtown side of the station were good and that a person could see from one end of the platform to the other. While Sigreti had testified that his train had dynamic brakes and that he had entered the station at 30 miles per hour, Doty stated that in his opinion a four-car train equipped with such brakes and traveling at that speed could be stopped in 'approximately 100, 135 to 150 feet', if the emergency brakes were immediately applied. On the other hand, McCafferty, a trainmaster and former motorman instructor employed by defendant, opined that such a train could be stopped in an emergency in 294 feet, including the 44 feet traveled during reaction time. A car is 60 feet long. Sigreti testified that, upon entrance into the station, one is able to first see the full length of the station when between a car and a half to two car lengths into the station, at which approximate point he first noticed plaintiff's body on the tracks. He also related that in making his normal Canal Street stop he would have proceeded between 120 and 180 feet further south beyond plaintiff's extended form. However, on an examination before trial, Sigreti testified that '(a)s I entered the station I (saw this) person lying right across the--' and that, at that time, said person was 'around 300 feet' from the front of the train. On the day of the occurrence, the motorman filed a report reading in part: 'Out of 168th Street. Entering Canal Street station. Noticed male laying across tracks'; and, when interviewed one week later, told a detective that 'as he approached the station, he saw Mr. Coleman lying across the tracks'.

Appellant ascribes various reasons for reversal, chiefly the following instruction to the liability jury, to which exception was taken: 'Now, in this case the plaintiff is an interested witness because he seeks to recover. The witnesses, all employees, including Sigreti, even though he's no longer in the employ of the Transit Authority, is an interested witness because he's charged with the negligence. Therefore, he's an interested witness when he comes in and denies his conduct and his act. The expert of the Transit Authority is an interested witness because he works for the Transit Authority.' Under the common law, a person was incompetent to testify, if interested in the event, on the supposed ground that he or she was unworthy of belief (2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 576; 5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., par. 4512.02) but, for the most part and under statute, interest as a disqualification has been abolished (CPLR 4512; but see CPLR 4502, 4519). This abolition left untouched the relevancy of all facts which bear on the probable partiality of the witness by reason of his interest in the event of the suit (3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev., 1970), § 966), such an interest in a cause being a circumstance available for impeachment (King v. New York City & Hudson Riv. R.R. Co., 72 N.Y. 607, 611; Registered Country Home Bldrs. v. Lanchantin, 10 A.D.2d 721, 198 N.Y.S.2d 767; Christensen v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 283 App.Div. 1088, 131 N.Y.S.2d 546).

The scope of the circumstances of interest that may be employed to discredit witnesses has not been definitely circumscribed, but it is clear that it is not confined to financial bases alone (Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106, 111, 81 N.E.2d 40, 42; Wohlfahrt v. Beckert, 92 N.Y. 490, 496; Hoes v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 5 App.Div. 151, 155, 39 N.Y.S. 40, 42; 3 Bender's New York Evidence, § 147.05, subd (2); 3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn, rev. 1970), § 966). It is firmly established, for example, that an actor in the transaction at issue, having a motive to shield himself from blame, would be an interested witness, even though not a party to the action (Lee v. City Brewing Corp., 279 N.Y. 380, 384, 18 N.E.2d 628, 630; Gaffney v. New York Cons. R.R. Co., 220 N.Y. 34, 37, 114 N.E. 1047, 1048; Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 134 N.Y. 418, 422, 31 N.E. 870, 871). Thus, Sigreti, who was the only witness who testified directly as to the point from which he first saw plaintiff lying on the tracks, was an interested witness.

The mere employer-employee relationship existing between a party and a witness, either at the time of the incident in suit or at the time of trial, does not make the employee an interested witness although it may give rise to bias (Noseworthy v. City of New York, 298 N.Y. 76, 79, 80 N.E.2d 744, 745, Supra; Della Croce v. City of New York, 3 A.D.2d 920, 162 N.Y.S.2d 703; Hoffman v. Florida East Coast Hotel Co., 187 App.Div. 146, 151, 175 N.Y.S. 387, 390, 391). The bias of a witness in favor of the party calling him may be shown by evidence of family, business or close social relationships to affect his credibility (People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 94--95, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829--830, 257 N.E.2d 16, 19; Keet v. Murrin, 260 N.Y. 586, 184 N.E. 104; People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 85, 34 N.E. 730, 733--734), and it is for the same purpose that it is competent to show the interest of a witness in the case. Although distinct, bias and interest of witnesses are closely related as methods of impeachment (see Ryan v. Dwyer, 33 A.D.2d 878, 307 N.Y.S.2d 565; NY PJI (2d ed) 1:92; Richardson, Evidende (Prince--10th ed), §§ 493, 503).

Defendant contends that, with the exception of motorman Sigreti, it was error to charge in effect that all employees were interested. Other than Sigreti and McCafferty, the testimony of the employees dealt, for the most part, with undisputed matters such as dimensions of the platform, visibility, point of impact, observations as to plaintiff's physical condition and statements made by Sigreti. Although the court characterized McCafferty as interested and Doty as not interested, to which latter portion exception was not taken, each testified that the stopping distance of a train proceeding at 30 miles per hour was under 300 feet. Although they differed as to...

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