Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist.

• Decision Date: 25 September 2007
• Docket Number: Docket No. 06-1732-cv(XAP).,Docket No. 06-1466-cv(L).
• Citation: 503 F.3d 198
• Parties: Elzie Deshawn COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Peter Copeletti, Individually and as Principal of Newburgh Free Academy High School, and Board of Education of the City of Newburgh School District, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

503 F.3d 198

Elzie Deshawn COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Peter Copeletti, Individually and as Principal of Newburgh Free Academy High School, and Board of Education of the City of Newburgh School District, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.^*

Docket No. 06-1466-cv(L).

Docket No. 06-1732-cv(XAP).

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: March 7, 2007.

Decided: September 25, 2007.

Stephen Bergstein, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, Chester, New York (Ostrer Rosenwasser, LLP, Chester, New York, Law Offices of Michael H. Sussman, Goshen, New York, on the brief) for plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant.

Mark C. Rushfield, Shaw & Perelson, LLP, Highland, New York for defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.

Before: WINTER, WALKER and STRAUB, Circuit Judges.

Judge STRAUB concurs in the judgment of the Court and files a separate concurring opinion.

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

In this case, a disabled child was subject to discipline by his school district that entitled him to several administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq., but the exhaustion of which would likely have prohibited him from graduating with his class and, incidently, kept him from participating in extracurricular activities. The principal question we are presented with, simply stated, is whether, under the circumstances of this case, he should have been excused from exhausting his administrative remedies under the IDEA and allowed to go directly into federal court so that, if successful, he could enjoin the school district's disciplinary action without missing graduation.

Plaintiff Elzie Deshawn Coleman, a child with a disability, filed an action alleging that Newburgh Enlarged City School District, Peter Copeletti, individually and as principal of Newburgh Free Academy High School ("NFA"), and the Board of Education of the City of Newburgh School District (collectively, "Defendants") violated his rights under the IDEA. In particular, Coleman challenged the disciplinary process that led to his suspension from NFA and moved for a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate him immediately for the pendency of his administrative appeals. Defendants, in opposing the motion, argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Coleman had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him under the IDEA. The district court for the Southern District of New York (Stephen C. Robinson, Judge) rejected Defendants' argument on the basis that exhaustion would be futile because Coleman was scheduled to graduate less than two months following the disciplinary hearing and granted Coleman's motion in an opinion and order dated May 17, 2004. See Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 319 F.Supp.2d 446 (S.D.N.Y.2004). Soon thereafter, the district court awarded Coleman $28,431.52 in attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA's fee-shifting provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

On appeal, Defendants contend, inter alia, that the district court's award of attorneys' fees was improper because its determination in Coleman's underlying action that exhaustion would be futile was error. We agree. The district court should have dismissed Coleman's complaint. We therefore reverse its award of attorneys' fees.

BACKGROUND²

Coleman attended NFA as a disabled student pursuant to an individualized education program ("IEP") implemented under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). On April 20, 2004, Coleman, an accomplished high school track athlete, was involved in an altercation with another student at NFA. He was removed from the school, arrested by the Newburgh Police Department,³ and promptly suspended for five days pending a disciplinary hearing.

Upon prior notice, the disciplinary hearing was held on April 28, 2004 before a designated hearing officer, Edmund V. Caplicki, Jr. Caplicki found that (a) Coleman had engaged in a physical altercation with another student on school grounds; (b) a crowd grew as a result of that altercation; (c) a series of subsequent altercations broke out in the school between other students; and (d) intervention by the Newburgh Police Department was required. Based upon Caplicki's findings, Dr. Annette Saturnelli, the acting superintendent of schools, extended Coleman's suspension for five more days pending the Committee on Special Education's ("CSE") hearing as to whether Coleman's conduct was a manifestation of his disability and the penalty phase of the disciplinary hearing before Caplicki.

On May 3, 2004, the CSE held its "manifestation hearing" and determined that Coleman's conduct was not attributable to his disability. From this determination, Coleman had a right to a series of administrative reviews — first to a due process hearing, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(3); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 201.11(a)(3), before an impartial hearing officer ("IHO") appointed by the local board of education, see 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(j), and then to a second hearing before a state review officer ("SRO") of the New York Education Department, see 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(k); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g). Moreover, Coleman enjoyed the right to have the due process hearing conducted on an expedited basis. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(B) ("[T]he State or local educational agency shall arrange for an expedited hearing, which shall occur within 20 school days of the date the hearing is requested and shall result in a determination within 10 school days after the hearing."); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 201.11(c) ("An expedited due process hearing shall be completed within 15 business days of receipt of the request for a hearing," except in the event the IHO grants a specific extension of time at the request of a party, and a decision shall be rendered "within five business days after the last hearing date, but in no event later than 45 calendar days after receipt of the request for a hearing, without exceptions or extensions.").⁴ But these administrative reviews, as it turns out, were never pursued.

Caplicki then heard the penalty phase of the disciplinary hearing and, on May 4, 2004, issued a written report and recommendation (the "Report and Recommendation") that Coleman be (a) suspended for the balance of the 2003-2004 school year with the opportunity to receive home tutoring and instruction; (b) allowed to attend 2004 summer school and return to school for the 2004-2005 school year if additional credits were needed to earn his high school diploma; and (c) placed on probationary status if he attended the summer program or returned to school during the 2004-2005 school year. The same day, Dr. Saturnelli wrote a letter to Coleman in which she adopted the Report and Recommendation in full and ordered that Coleman be suspended from school for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year and receive his IEP in an interim alternative education setting ("IAES").⁵

Coleman sued Defendants in New York State Supreme Court on April 30, 2004. His complaint sought a temporary restraining order to allow him to return to classes at NFA and participate in extracurricular activities. Defendants removed Coleman's action to federal court. On May 6, Coleman renewed his request for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, and the district court heard argument.

Also on May 6, Coleman appealed Dr. Saturnelli's guilt and penalty decisions to the Board of Education. The Board upheld the actions of Dr. Saturnelli and rejected Coleman's appeal to that body in its entirety. Coleman's counsel reported this development to the district court on May 11.

Defendants moved to dismiss Coleman's complaint on the basis that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Coleman had failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies including, for instance, appealing further to an IHO and then to an SRO. The district court found that it had jurisdiction over the litigation because exhaustion would be futile under the circumstances — namely, that before Coleman could fully exhaust, he would miss graduating with his class and, incidentally, participating in extracurricular activities. The district court then granted Coleman's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered that he "immediately be reinstated at NFA and that he be allowed to attend classes and to participate in extracurricular activities." Coleman, 319 F.Supp.2d at 457. Defendants appealed to this court and sought an emergency stay. On June 3, 2004, a panel of this court denied the stay, finding that Defendants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. Within a few weeks of that decision, on June 24, Coleman graduated from NFA. It followed that Defendants, by stipulation and agreement with Coleman withdrew their appeal as moot on July 7, 2004.

On July 12, days after Defendants' decision to withdraw their appeal, Coleman moved in the district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) for attorneys' fees in the amount of $54,218.03. Defendants opposed the application through a Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court awarded Coleman $28,431.52 in attorneys' fees. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to Coleman because the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See, e.g., McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 100 (2d Cir.2001) ("It . . . follows that where we lack subject matter jurisdiction, we also lack jurisdiction to award attorney's fees.").

I. The Jurisdictional Label

Before turning to the merits, we pause to consider whether this appeal should be characterized as one involving jurisdictional limitations.

The IDEA's so-called exhaustion requirement is grounded in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), which provides a...