Coleman v. Percy
| Decision Date | 03 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-615,77-615 |
| Citation | 292 N.W.2d 615,96 Wis.2d 578 |
| Parties | Phillip B. COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. Donald PERCY, Individually, and as Secretary, Department of Health and SocialServices, State of Wisconsin, and Ralph C. Collins, Individually, and as ViceChairman, Parole Board, Department of Health and Social Services, State ofWisconsin,Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Elizabeth Alexander, Asst. State Public Defender, argued for appellant-petitioner; Richard L. Cates, State Public Defender, and Howard B. Eisenberg, former State Public Defender, on brief.
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., and Edward S. Marion, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants-respondents.
The issue on this appeal is whether a prison inmate who entered into a Mutual Agreement Program (MAP) "contract" with the Department of Health and Social Services (Department) for discretionary parole may bring an action in the Dane county circuit court for a declaratory judgment and money damages on the claim that the Department breached its contractual obligation to release him on the date specified in the MAP agreement. We affirm the decision and judgment of the courts below dismissing the inmate's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Department's refusal to parole a prisoner on the date set in a MAP agreement, like the refusal to grant any other type of discretionary parole, is reviewable by a writ of certiorari and does not afford a proper basis for bringing a civil action for breach of contract.
MAP operates through an agreement between the inmate and the Department. The MAP manual consistently refers to the agreement as a "contract." 1 An inmate must meet certain eligibility requirements and conditions to qualify for the program. He may not have a felony detainer or a pending felony court action which may result in an increased sentence; he must be within three years of the mandatory release date; and the contract must have a duration of at least ninety days from the date of negotiation. An inmate who signs a waiver of the right to participate in MAP, or one who has a contract cancelled, or who is unsuccessful in negotiating a contract must wait ninety days before making another application for MAP. And finally, the parole board may refuse to negotiate a contract based on parole criteria.
An inmate who qualifies for the program initiates the process by preparing a proposal which usually covers training, work, education, treatment and behavior goals, all in consideration for a specific parole date. The purpose of the MAP program is explained in the manual as follows:
The petitioner, Phillip Coleman, entered into a MAP agreement with the Department on November 30, 1976, while serving time as a maximum security prisoner at the Wisconsin State Reformatory in Green Bay. Pursuant to the MAP contract, the Department agreed to grant Coleman a discretionary parole on September 2, 1977, if he satisfied the stated conditions, two of which were that he achieve and maintain a medium security classification by February 2, 1977, and a minimum security classification by June 29, 1977.
Coleman achieved a medium security classification by the required date and was transferred to the correctional institution at Fox Lake. However, as a result of a disturbance at the institution on June 13, 1977, Coleman was reclassified maximum security and transferred back to the state reformatory at Green Bay. A MAP panel subsequently cancelled Coleman's MAP contract based on his failure to maintain the medium security classification agreed upon in the contract. The cancellation was made pursuant to a provision in the contract providing that, upon an inmate's failure to satisfy the conditions, "the contract may be declared cancelled."
Coleman sought review of the cancellation before the MAP review committee, the first step in the review procedure specified in the MAP agreement and manual. After that step proved unsuccessful, the State Public Defender contacted the supervisor of the MAP program on behalf of Coleman and argued that the Department abused its discretion by cancelling Coleman's contract. The public defender argued that Coleman did not participate in the disturbance at Fox Lake and therefore did not violate the terms of his contract. The supervisor upheld the cancellation of Coleman's contract. The supervisor stated that Coleman's role in the Fox Lake disturbance, as described by the MAP review committee, demonstrated that the cancellation was reasonable. Coleman appealed the supervisor's decision to the secretary of the Department, whose designee also upheld the cancellation.
On March 7, 1978, Coleman commenced a civil action in the Dane county circuit court demanding (1) a declaration that the Department 2 had breached the contract; (2) specific performance of the contract, including release from prison; and (3) damages of $25 for every day he was imprisoned after September 2, 1977, the date set in the contract for his discretionary parole. Because Coleman was released on parole during the pendency of the trial court action, the judge ruled that Coleman's request for specific performance was moot, but nevertheless allowed the action to proceed as to the other two demands.
In opposition to the Department's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Coleman argued that he was entitled to seek a declaratory judgment and damages because no remedies were specifically excluded by the contract. Coleman reasoned that the Department breached the MAP contract by making it impossible for him to satisfy his contractual obligations when it reclassified him maximum security.
The trial court dismissed Coleman's complaint, holding that the MAP contract indicated that certiorari was intended by the parties to be the exclusive manner of judicial review available to resolve MAP contract disputes. 3 The court reasoned that the concept of "review" was significantly different than an original action for declaratory relief or contract damages in that a reviewing court must defer to the agency's findings unless, in the language of the MAP contract, they are "arbitrary and capricious."
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Coleman's action, but employed a different rationale to reach that result. 4 Although neither Coleman nor the Department had questioned their authority to specify in the MAP contract the manner and venue for judicial review of contract disputes, the court of appeals ruled that they lacked the authority to do either.
The court of appeals reasoned that the MAP agreement was not an ordinary arms-length contract between private parties and that the remedies available for its alleged breach must be considered in the context of discretionary parole. The court held that the Department's refusal to honor the release date promised in the MAP contract was essentially a refusal to grant discretionary parole and that such a refusal was reviewable only by certiorari, not because of the parties' intent or because of anything stated in the MAP contract, but because this court ruled in State v. Goulette, 65 Wis.2d 207, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974), that common law certiorari is the appropriate method for reviewing refusals to grant discretionary parole. The court of appeals stated further that the Department lacks authority to specify by contract the manner in which to review a decision by it to grant or deny discretionary parole.
As a final point, the court of appeals noted that the MAP agreement specified that judicial review should be sought in the Dane county circuit court. The court of appeals held that the Department and Coleman also lacked the authority to specify venue. The court pointed out that pursuant to sec. 801.50(9m), Stats., an action to review parole refusal by certiorari must be brought in the county in which the inmate was last convicted.
In the exercise of our appellate discretion, we granted Coleman's petition for review.
Both parties argue on review that the court of appeals erred in holding that they lacked the authority to prescribe by contract the manner of, and venue for, judicial review of MAP disputes. The parties argue that the entire basis of MAP is contractual and that the freedom to contract for specific negotiated objectives is the keystone to the program's existence.
The parties both acknowledge that in State v. Goulette, supra, this court held that the refusal to grant discretionary parole is reviewable by common law certiorari 5 because no other remedy is provided by statute. They also concede that a MAP agreement may properly be viewed, as did the court of appeals, in the context of discretionary parole. 6 They argue, however, that Goulette does not stand for the proposition that the Department cannot contract with prison inmates through the MAP process for the same or other remedies. Although agreeing with each other regarding their authority to establish remedies by contract, the parties disagree as to what procedures they in...
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Lassa v. Rongstad, 2004AP377.
...¶ 101 It matters not that Rongstad sought to preserve certain of his appellate rights by way of stipulation. See Coleman v. Percy, 96 Wis.2d 578, 587, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980) ("It follows, therefore, that the [parties] lacked authority to create by contract a greater right of judicial review ......
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Lassa v. Rongstad, 2006 WI 105 (Wis. 7/13/2006)
...¶ 101 It matters not that Rongstad sought to preserve certain of his appellate rights by way of stipulation. See Coleman v. Percy, 96 Wis. 2d 578, 587, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980) ("It follows, therefore, that the [parties] lacked authority to create by contract a greater right of judicial review......
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Nowell v. City of Wausau
...218 Wis.2d 572, 577–78, 581 N.W.2d 552 (Ct.App.1998) (citing Coleman v. Percy, 86 Wis.2d 336, 272 N.W.2d 118 (Ct.App.1978), aff'd,96 Wis.2d 578, 292 N.W.2d 615 (1980); State ex rel. Gaster v. Whitcher, 117 Wis. 668, 94 N.W. 787 (1903)). 4.Wisconsin Stat. § 125.12(2)(ag) states that a compla......
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Irby v. Macht
...the hearings are not recorded and the record may be incomplete. The scope of certiorari review is limited. Coleman v. Percy, 96 Wis.2d 578, 588-89, 292 N.W.2d 615, 621 (1980). Last, and most important, certiorari review does not permit the award of damages. Coleman v. Percy, 86 Wis.2d336, 3......