Coleman v. Quarterman

• Decision Date: 18 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-70005.,05-70005.
• Citation: 456 F.3d 537
• Parties: Christopher COLEMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

456 F.3d 537

Christopher COLEMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-70005.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 18, 2006.

Patrick F. McCann, Law Offices of Patrick F. McCann, Houston, TX, for Coleman.

Jeremy Craig Greenwell, Austin, TX, for Quarterman.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before GARZA, DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:

Convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, Christopher Coleman petitions for a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") from the district court's denial of federal habeas corpus relief. Because we find that reasonable jurists could not debate the propriety of the district court's decisions regarding Coleman's multiple alleged constitutional errors, we deny Coleman's application for a COA.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On the night of December 13, 1995, Christopher Coleman and two other men were driving together around Houston, Texas. They stopped on a dead-end street and waited. Soon after, another car arrived and parked behind the car in which Coleman was riding. This second car carried four people: the driver, Jose Luis Garcia-Castro; his girlfriend, Elsie Prado; Prado's brother, Heimar Prado Hurtado; and Prado's three-year-old son, Danny Giraldo. Coleman and the two other men got out of their car and approached the second vehicle, where one of Coleman's companions spoke to Hurtado. Then, standing close to the passenger side of the car, Coleman opened fire on the occupants of the second vehicle.

When police arrived, they found Hurtado, Garcia-Castro, and Giraldo dead and Prado seriously injured. Prado survived her injuries and told police that she would never forget the shooter's face. She picked Coleman's picture from a photo spread nine days after the shooting. A week later, police arrested Coleman in Lawrenceburg, Tennessee.

Two Houston police officers traveled to Tennessee to transport Coleman back to Texas. Upon arriving at the Lawrenceburg police station, the Houston officers read Coleman the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Coleman waived his rights. After roughly three hours of being interviewed by the officers, Coleman gave a recorded statement in which he admitted being present when the murders occurred; he did not admit to being the actual shooter.

In June 1997, a Texas state jury convicted Coleman of capital murder and sentenced him to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Coleman's conviction and sentence, Coleman v. State, No. 72,895 (Tex.Crim.App. May 5, 1999), and denied his initial state application for a writ of habeas corpus, Ex Parte Coleman, No. 48,523-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr. 18, 2001). A second state habeas application was dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Ex Parte Coleman, No. 48,523-02 (Tex.Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2002). In September 2004, the federal district court denied Coleman's federal habeas application and refused to grant a COA on any of Coleman's claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Coleman filed his federal habeas petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Accordingly, the petition is subject to the requirements imposed by AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Under AEDPA, Coleman must obtain a COA before he can appeal the district court's denial of habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). See also Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ("[U]ntil a COA has been issued federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners."). The district court refused to grant Coleman a COA, so Coleman's only alternative is to petition this court directly for a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

"To determine whether a COA should be granted requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits." Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 870 (5th Cir.2005). Coleman must make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), such "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). "The question is the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the resolution of that debate." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029.

"A federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029. Accordingly, "a federal court's review of a claim adjudicated in a state court is deferential." Summers, 431 F.3d at 868.

Under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d), a federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 588-89 (5th Cir.2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The statute permits a federal habeas court to assess only the state court's decision, not the propriety of its analysis and reasoning. Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir.2003). Furthermore, under AEDPA, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A federal habeas petitioner "has the burden of rebutting this presumption with clear and convincing evidence." Hughes, 412 F.3d at 589 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). A credibility determination by the state habeas court also is afforded deference. Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d 306, 326 (5th Cir.2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Coleman requests a COA on fifteen separate claims. We review the claims in turn.

A. Claim One

Coleman brings a facial challenge to the Texas death penalty system. Specifically, Coleman points to the fact that Special Issue No. 3 in his case, the mitigation special issue,¹ does not contain a burden of proof and contends that, therefore, jurors could have believed that he was required to prove mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. Coleman suggests that the ambiguity prevented the jury from properly considering his mitigating evidence in violation of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) ("Penry II").

The district court noted that Coleman raised this claim for the first time on a successive state habeas that had been dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Accordingly, because the basis of the claim was reasonably available at the time of his first state habeas application, the district court found that the claim was procedurally defaulted and that even if Coleman could demonstrate cause for his default,² he suffered no prejudice. We agree.

"`Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal court may not consider a state prisoner's federal habeas claim when the state based its rejection of that claim on an adequate and independent state ground.'" Thacker v. Dretke, 396 F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir.) (quoting Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 846 (5th Cir.1996)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 80, 163 L.Ed.2d 100 (2005). Texas's abuse of the writ doctrine is a valid state procedural bar foreclosing federal habeas review. Kunkle v. Dretke, 352 F.3d 980, 988-89 (5th Cir.2003). Furthermore, assuming that Coleman could show cause for his default, he is unable to show any resultant prejudice because his challenge necessarily fails: "[N]o Supreme Court or Circuit precedent constitutionally requires that Texas's mitigation special issue be assigned a burden of proof." Rowell v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 370, 378 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 103, 163 L.Ed.2d 117 (2005). Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court's decision to deny habeas relief on this claim.

B. Claims Two, Three, and Four

For his next three claims, Coleman contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000), implicitly overrules twenty years of Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence, including McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), and requires that a hearing be held to determine if the decision to seek the death penalty and the Texas clemency process are unconstitutionally infused with racial considerations, in violation of the equal protection clause. The district court concluded that these claims were procedurally defaulted, since they were first raised on a successive state habeas that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Alternatively, the district court reasoned that Bush v. Gore did not announce a rule applicable to criminal cases, and if it did, that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), barred its retroactive application to Coleman's case.

Reasonable jurists would not find the district court's resolution of these claims debatable. In two unpublished decisions, this court previously has discussed Bush v. Gore's utter lack of implication in the criminal procedure context. See Wyatt v. Dretke, 165 Fed.Appx. 335 (5th Cir.2006) (unpublished); Hughes v. Dretke, 160 Fed. Appx. 431 (5th Cir.2006) (unpublished). We adopt the reasoning of those persuasive opinions and, likewise, conclude that the question is beyond debate.

C. Claim Five

Coleman argues that the time limit Texas imposes on filing a habeas petition in a capital case...