Coleman v. Saul
| Decision Date | 19 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-109F |
| Parties | JEAN COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
DECISION and ORDER
(consent)
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH HILLER, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
KENNETH R. HILLER,
AMY C. CHAMBERS, and
IDA M. COMERFORD, of Counsel
Special Assistant United States Attorneys, of Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel
601 East 12th Street
Room 965
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
On June 19, 2018, the parties to this action, consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to proceed before the undersigned. (Dkt. 9). The matter is presently before the court on motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Plaintiff on August 13, 2018 (Dkt. 13), and by Defendant on November 13, 2018 (Dkt. 19).
Plaintiff Jean Coleman ("Plaintiff"), brings this action under the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying Plaintiff's application filed with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), on June 12, 2014, for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits under Title II of the Act ("SSDI" or "disability benefits"). AR2 at 65, 143-44. Plaintiff alleges she became disabled on March 11, 2014, AR at 143, 212 based on bulging discs, depression, diabetes II, epilepsy, back pain, neuropathy, left foot drop, chronic day time sleepiness, high cholesterol, sleep apnea, trouble concentrating, and highly disorganized. AR at 216. Plaintiff's application initially was denied on October 7, 2014. AR at 65-81. At Plaintiff's timely request, on April 4, 2017, a hearing ("the administrative hearing"), was held in Jamestown, New York, by videoconferencing before administrative law judge Timothy Belford ("the ALJ"), located in Lawrence, Massachusetts. AR at 28-64. Appearing and testifying at the administrative hearing were Plaintiff, represented by non-attorney D.J. Moore, with Plaintiff's mother, Anna Coleman, and vocational expert ("VE") James Sarno ("VE Sarno") also appearing and testifying. Id.
On June 14, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's claim. AR at 7-27 ("the ALJ's decision"). Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council which, on November 24, 2017, issued a decision denying Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. AR at 1-6. On January 23, 2018, Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
On August 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 13) ("Plaintiff's Motion"), attaching the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 13-1) ("Plaintiff's Memorandum"). On November 13, 2018, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 19) ("Defendant's Motion"), attaching Commissioner's Brief in Support of the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and in Response to Plaintiff's Brief Pursuant to Local Standing Order on Social Security Cases (Dkt. 19-1) ("Defendant's Memorandum"). On December 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Response to the Commissioner's Brief in Support and in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 20) ("Plaintiff's Reply"). Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.
Based on the following, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED; Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Jean Coleman ("Plaintiff" or "Coleman"), born September 20, 1968, was 45 years old as of March 11, 2014, her alleged disability onset date ("DOD"), and 48 as of the April 7, 2017 administrative hearing. AR at 32, 212. Plaintiff graduated from college with a bachelor's degree in Human Resource Management, AR at 32, 216, had previous work experience as a human resources assistant and as a cashier, AR at 44, 216, 310, and continued to work, part-time, as a cashier through the date of administrative hearing.4 AR at 39, 217. As of the date of the administrative hearing, Plaintiff lived with her elderly mother, who performed most of the household chores, including shoveling snow, AR at 46, 57, 500, and occasionally socialized with friends, including a new boyfriend, AR at 46, and enjoyed shopping, watching television, and reading. AR at 229. Plaintiff had a driver's license and would drive herself and her mother to shop and to senior activities which Plaintiff encouraged her mother to attend. AR at 46-47, 228. Plaintiff assisted her mother with grooming, making appointments, and also takes care of her pet cats. AR at 226. Plaintiff received much of her regular medical care, including physical and psychological, through Olean Medical Group ("OMG"), and attended physical therapy at Olean Physical Therapy Professionals, PLLC.
A claimant is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act and entitled to disability benefits when she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1); 1382c(a)(3)(A). A district court may set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, a district court "is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Id. It is not, however, the district court's function to make a de novo determination as to whether the claimant is disabled; rather, "the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn" to determine whether the SSA's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Id. "Congress has instructed . . . that the factual findings of the Secretary,5 if supported by substantialevidence, shall be conclusive." Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
The applicable regulations set forth a five-step analysis the Commissioner must follow in determining eligibility for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. See Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1986); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1982). If the claimant meets the criteria at any of the five steps, the inquiry ceases and the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. The first step is to determine whether the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") during the period for which the benefits are claimed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). The second step is whether the applicant has a severe impairment which significantly limits the physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, as defined in the relevant regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). Third, if there is an impairment and the impairment, or its equivalent, is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the regulations ("Appendix 1" or "the Listings"), and meets the duration requirement,6 there is a presumption of inability to perform SGA and the claimant is deemed disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382a(c)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). As a fourth step, however, if the impairment or its equivalent is not listed in Appendix 1, the Commissioner must then consider the applicant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding the limitations posed bythe applicant's collective impairments, see 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e)-(f), and 416.920(e)-(f), and the demands of any past relevant work ("PRW"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e). If the applicant remains capable of performing PRW, disability benefits will be denied, id., but if the applicant is unable to perform PRW relevant work, the Commissioner, at the fifth step, must consider whether, given the applicant's age, education, and past work experience, the applicant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c) and 416.960(c). The burden of proof is on the applicant for the first four steps, with the Commissioner bearing the burden of proof on the final step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4); Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008).
In the instant case, the ALJ found Plaintiff meets the disability insured status requirements through June 30, 2020, AR at 12, has not engaged in SGA since March 11, 2014, her alleged disability onset date, id., suffers from the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, obesity, an affective disorder, and an anxiety disorder, id. at 12-13...
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