Coleman v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.

Decision Date18 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. CIV-96-1835-PHX-ROS.,CIV-96-1835-PHX-ROS.
Citation997 F.Supp. 1197
PartiesMichael J. COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION CO., a Delaware corporation; John and Jane Does I-X, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Richard James Harris, Law Offices of Richard J. Harris, Mesa, AZ, for Michael J. Coleman.

Anthony J. Hancock, Terrance L. Sims, Byrne, Beaugureau, Shaw, Zukowski & Hancock, Phoenix, AZ, for Southern Pacific Transportation Company, John Does I-X, Jane Does I-X, Defendants.

ORDER

SILVER, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

On July 17, 1996, Plaintiff Michael J. Coleman commenced this action against Southern Pacific Transportation Company, a Delaware corporation, in the Superior Court in Maricopa County alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Plaintiff's verified allegations are as follows.

On or about September 11, 1994, Defendant ran an advertisement that it was hiring train crew members.1 (Compl. ¶ 6.) The advertisement stated that the applicants were required to have good vision and perfect color perception.2 Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff had good vision and perfect color perception.3 Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff applied for the job and was eventually offered employment with Defendant as a train crew member. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant's representatives informed Plaintiff that the train crew member position would lead to a mandatory promotion to locomotive engineer.4 Id. ¶ 10. After the employment offer was made and accepted, Defendant requested that Plaintiff undergo a physical examination by Defendant's physician. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff disclosed to Defendant's physician that he had vision in one eye only.5 Id. ¶ 12. Defendant subsequently told Plaintiff that his lack of vision in one eye disqualified him from employment with Defendant.6 Id. ¶ 13. Defendant revoked its offer of employment. Id. ¶ 14. Defendant did not conduct any additional tests to determine whether Plaintiff could perform the duties of the job for which he was hired. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff was at all times relevant able to perform the essential duties of the job for which Defendant offered him employment. Id. ¶ 16.

On August 9, 1996, Defendant removed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

On August 15, 1996, Defendant filed an Answer. Defendant admitted the following allegations that: (1) on or about September 11, 1994, Defendant ran an advertisement that it was hiring train crew members; (2) the advertisement stated that the applicants were required to have good vision and perfect color perception; (3) Defendant required Plaintiff to undergo a physical examination by Defendant's physician; and (4) Defendant subsequently told Plaintiff that his lack of vision in one eye disqualified him from employment with Defendant.

On May 15, 1997, Defendant moved for summary judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to protection under the ADA because he does not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Defendant argues that the issue of whether Plaintiff has a disability can be resolved as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff's monocular vision (i.e., vision in only one eye) does not substantially limit him in any major life activity such as working. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 4.) Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff has a physical impairment (i.e., lack of vision in his right eye) and that Defendant refused to hire him as a switchman because of his impairment. Id. at 3-4.

On July 15, 1997, Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant's summary judgment motion and filed a Cross-motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of whether he has a disability.7

On August 11, 1997, Defendant filed a reply in support of its summary judgment motion and a response to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On September 8, 1997, Plaintiff filed a reply in support of its cross-motion.

Oral argument on Defendant's motion was conducted on February 17, 1998.

DISCUSSION

The issue presented is whether Plaintiff suffers from a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA.

The ADA's general rule states as follows:

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). The term "disability" is defined in the ADA as follows:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(2) (emphasis added).

I. Physical or Mental Impairment that Substantially Limits One or More of the Major Life Activities
A. Physical Impairment

It is undisputed that Plaintiff has a physical impairment because he has no sight in his right eye. (Coleman Aff. ¶¶ 2, 4.) The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations indicate that a physical impairment includes any physiological disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting "special sense organs." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).

B. Substantially Limits One or More of the Major Life Activities

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's monocular vision did not significantly restrict him from the major life activity of working. In particular, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's impairment did not significantly restrict him from a "class of jobs" utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities and did not significantly restrict him from a "broad range of jobs in various classes." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 8.) In contrast, Plaintiff claims that his monocular vision substantially limits his major life activity of seeing.

The EEOC regulations define the term "major life activities" as follows:

Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (emphasis added). The term "substantially limits" is generally defined in the EEOC regulations as follows:

(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or

(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). Factors to consider in determining whether a disability has substantially limited a major life activity include:

(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;

(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and

(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). "The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j). "The determination of whether the individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." Id.; Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir.1996) ("Under EEOC regulations, we are not to consider mitigating measures in determining whether an individual is disabled."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1349, 137 L.Ed.2d 506 (1997).

1. The Nature and Severity of the Impairment

One of the factors to consider in determining whether a disability has substantially limited a major life activity is the nature and severity of the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). As stated above, Plaintiff is blind in his right eye. (Coleman Aff. ¶ 2.) As a result of his partial blindness, Plaintiff avers in his sworn affidavit that he is "unable to see out of both eyes or see peripherally from both eyes or perceive depth three-dimensionally." (Coleman Aff. ¶ 4.) Defendant admits Plaintiff's averments. (Def.'s Response to Pl.'s Statement of Additional Facts ("SOAF") ¶ 23.) Plaintiff has also proffered evidence that he has been denied certain employment opportunities as a direct result of his monocular vision. (Coleman Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.) In particular, Plaintiff avers that he was denied a position as a nuclear propulsion specialist in the United States Navy as a result of his monocular vision. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff also avers that he was denied entry into the United States Air Force because of his monocular vision. Id. ¶ 7. Defendant admits Plaintiff's averments. (Def.'s Response to Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 46-47.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that his monocular vision has otherwise limited him in that restrictions have been placed on his Arizona commercial driver's license. (Coleman Aff. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff avers that the State of Arizona prevents him from transporting passengers and certain amounts of hazardous material because of his monocular vision. Id. ¶ 8. Once again, Defendant admits Plaintiff's allegations. (Def.'s Response to Pl.'s SOAF ¶¶ 48-49.)

The loss of peripheral vision and depth perception are serious consequences affecting one's ability to see. It is undisputed that the average person in the general population has both peripheral vision and depth perception. Defendant's Director of Medical Services Department, Patricia A. Boynton, testified at her deposition that peripheral vision and depth perception are attributes of vision. (Boynton...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Fierro v. Mesa Verde Enters., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • August 14, 2007
    ...approve of the use of such altered testimony that is controverted by the original testimony. See, e.g.,Coleman v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. , 997 F.Supp. 1197, 1205 (D. Ariz. 1998) (discrediting deposition testimony directly contradicted by errata sheet); S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless, L.L......
  • Ebc Inc v. Clark Bldg. Sys. Inc
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • August 18, 2010
    ...1084, 1090-91 (D.S.D.2003); Summerhouse v. HCA Health Servs. of Kan., 216 F.R.D. 502, 504-08 (D.Kan.2003); Coleman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 997 F.Supp. 1197, 1201 (D.Ariz.1998); S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless LLC, 156 F.R.D. 529, 535-36 Rios v. Welch, 856 F.Supp. 1499, 1502 (D.Kan.1994); Bar......
  • Borngne ex rel. Hyter v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • July 1, 2021
    ...it found "tactical" and "a bit too convenient"); Wyeth v. Lupin Ltd.., 252 F.R.D. 295, 296-97 (D. Md. 2008); Coleman v. S. Pac. Trans. Co., 997 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (D. Ariz. 1998); Rios v. Bigler, 847 F. Supp. 1538, 1546-47 (D. Kan. 1994) ("The court will only consider those changes which c......
  • Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Goldstone
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • May 10, 2016
    ...approve of the use of such altered testimony that is controverted by the original testimony. See, e.g., Coleman v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 997 F. Supp. 1197, 1205 (D. Ariz. 1998)(discrediting depositiontestimony directly contradicted by errata sheet); S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless, L.L.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Discovery
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases. Volume 1-2 Volume 2 - Practice
    • May 1, 2023
    ...(8th Cir. 2004); Summerhouse v. HCA Health Servs. of Kansas , 216 F.R.D. 502, 504-08 (D. Kan. 2003); Coleman v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. , 997 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (D. Ariz. 1998); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. , 156 F.R.D. 529, 535-36 (D.D.C. 1994); Rios v. Welch , 856 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (D.......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT