Coleman v. State
| Decision Date | 15 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | ED 109394 |
| Parties | Leroy W. COLEMAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
For Appellant: Kevin L. Schriener, 141 N. Meramec Ave., Ste. 314, Clayton, MO 63105.
For Respondent: Daniel N. McPherson, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.
Leroy W. Coleman, Jr. ("Movant") appeals from the motion court's judgment denying his Rule 29.151 amended motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. According to Movant, the motion court clearly erred because his trial counsel was ineffective (1) in failing to seek dismissal of the charges on the basis that Movant's right to a speedy trial had been violated; (2) in improperly advising Movant regarding the State's burden of proof, which resulted in Movant's decision to not testify; and (3) in failing to investigate and call three witnesses at trial. The judgment is affirmed.
On February 21, 2016, after carjacking a Mercedes in Sauget, Illinois, Movant, Tony Bailey, Jerrod Corley and John Stith drove the vehicle to a bar in St. Louis. Cornelius Stallings was at the bar that evening, accompanied by his girlfriend, Emma Wallace, and by Earl Henderson and Marinda Feagin. Around 1:30 a.m., Stallings and his companions left the bar, and Stallings drove them in his vehicle. Wallace sat in the front passenger seat, and Henderson and Feagin were in the backseat.
Movant, who believed that Stallings had been involved in the death of his cousin, left the bar around the same time with Corley, Bailey and Stith. Corley drove them in the carjacked Mercedes. As they were traveling on Interstate 270, Movant saw Stallings's vehicle and said something to the effect of "there go the dude that had something to do with [my cousin] getting killed." Movant then said to Bailey, "[Y]ou know what time it is[?]," and Bailey responded "[Y]eah." Corley pulled the Mercedes alongside Stallings's vehicle, and Bailey fired shots at it. Wallace was killed, and Stallings, Henderson and Feagin were injured. At trial, Stallings testified that Movant also shot at his vehicle. Bailey, who testified on behalf of the State, admitted that he and Stith shot at the vehicle but denied that Movant had also fired shots, although he acknowledged he was not watching Movant during the shooting.
The jury convicted Movant of one count of first-degree murder, three counts of first-degree assault, one count of unlawful use of a weapon and five counts of armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole for first-degree murder and consecutive terms of 20 and 15 years for the various remaining counts. This Court affirmed Movant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Coleman , 580 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).
Movant sought post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. Appointed counsel filed an amended motion, which the motion court denied without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.
Appellate review of a motion court's denial of post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of "whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous." Forrest v. State , 290 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Mo. banc 2009) ; Rule 29.15(k). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, "there is ‘a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.’ " Forrest , 290 S.W.3d at 708 (quoting Goodwin v. State , 191 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Mo. banc 2006) ). The movant bears the burden of proving all allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Meiners v. State , 540 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Mo. banc 2018).
To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a movant must: "(1) allege facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) raise factual matters that are not refuted by the file and record; and (3) raise allegations that resulted in prejudice." Johnson v. State , 406 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. banc 2013). Rule 29.15(h) mandates that an evidentiary hearing "shall not be held" in circumstances where "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief."
"A movant bears a heavy burden when attempting to show that counsel was ineffective." Giammanco v. State , 416 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel did not demonstrate the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would have exercised in a similar situation; and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As a general matter, prejudice occurs when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If a movant fails to satisfy either the performance prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, his or her claim fails, and it is not necessary for a reviewing court to address the other prong. Bradley v. State , 292 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009).
In his first point on appeal, Movant contends the motion court clearly erred in denying his amended motion because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to dismiss the claims against him on the basis that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. We disagree.
"The right to a speedy trial guarantees to a criminal defendant that the State will move fast enough to assure the defendant of the early and proper disposition of the charges against him." Giammanco , 416 S.W.3d at 839 (quoting State v. Bell , 66 S.W.3d 157, 164 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001) ). "Deprivation of the right to a speedy trial is not considered per se prejudicial to a defendant." Id. When considering whether a defendant has been deprived of his or her right to speedy trial, we consider four factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) : "(1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Giammanco , 416 S.W.3d at 839. Courts use these factors to "engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Barker , 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. A finding of any one of the four factors is neither necessary nor sufficient to find a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Id.
The first factor, the length of the delay, "is a triggering mechanism." State v. Sisco , 458 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Mo. banc 2015). "Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors." Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Missouri courts have held that a delay greater than eight months is "presumptively prejudicial." Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 313 (). "The delay in bringing a defendant to trial is measured from the time of a formal indictment or information or when actual restraints are imposed by an arrest." Id. The fact that the delay is presumptively prejudicial does not raise a presumption of prejudice under the fourth Barker factor. Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) ; State v. Atchison , 258 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008). Instead, "it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger" inquiry into the remaining factors. Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686.
Here, the parties agree the delay is presumptively prejudicial because Movant's trial began 19 months after he was arrested. Accordingly, we proceed to analyze the remaining factors.
The Barker Court explained how the circumstances of a case affect the analysis of the second factor, the reason for the delay:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted); Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 313-14. While "delays attributable to the defendant weigh heavily against the defendant," delays that are jointly requested by the parties are neutral factors in the analysis. Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting State v. Greenlee , 327 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) ); see also State v. Vickers , 560 S.W.3d 3, 16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).
Movant did not allege that any of the delay was caused by a deliberate effort by the State to hamper his defense. He conceded in his amended motion that he was responsible for two continuances that resulted in 179 days of delay. Those delays weigh heavily against Movant. See Sisco , 458 S.W.3d at 314. The remaining 405 days of delay, which were either clearly attributable to the State or were caused by "unexplained or neutral reasons," weigh against the State, but not heavily. See id. Overall, this factor weighs in Movant's favor.
The third factor is the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial. Although there is no bright-line rule as to when a defendant must assert the right to a speedy trial, we consider "the timeliness of the assertion and the frequency and force of a defendant's objections." Id. at 316. Here, Movant asserted his speedy trial right early and often. This factor weighs in Movant's favor.
The fourth and most important factor is...
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