Coleman v. Steel City Crane Rentals, Inc.
Decision Date | 19 July 1985 |
Parties | Evan D. COLEMAN v. STEEL CITY CRANE RENTALS, INC., and Steel City Erection Company, Inc. ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY v. Evan D. COLEMAN; Steel City Erection Company, Inc.; Steel City Crane Rentals, Inc. 83-744, 83-785. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Clarence M. Small, Jr. of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for appellant Evan D. Coleman (83-744).
Hobart A. McWhorter, Jr. and Joseph B. Mays, Jr. of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for appellant Illinois Central Gulf RR Co. (83-785).
Jack B. Porterfield, Jr., Larry W. Harper & Stanley K. Smith of Porterfield, Scholl, Bainbridge, Mims & Harper, Birmingham, for appellees Steel City Crane Rentals & Steel City Erection Co. (83-744 & 83-785).
Clarence M. Small, Jr. of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for appellee Evan D. Coleman (83-785).
These are appeals by defendant Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company (ICG) and plaintiff Evan Coleman from jury verdicts against ICG and in favor of defendants Steel City Erection Company, Inc., and Steel City Crane Rentals, Inc. The lawsuit resulted when plaintiff was injured by a tree limb broken off by a crane owned by the Steel City defendants and leased to ICG to clear the wreckage of a train derailment. We affirm.
On October 1, 1978, a train derailed near Tuscaloosa. Plaintiff, a car and wrecker foreman employed by ICG, was one of the workmen sent to remove the wreckage. The evidence disclosed that four groups of workmen are needed to clean up after a derailment: carmen, a track crew, a train crew, and a crane crew. ICG owned a crane and employed a crane crew, but at the time of the derailment they were in Meridian, Mississippi. Therefore, ICG contacted the Steel City defendants and leased a crane and crew for the operation. During the work, the boom of the crane struck and broke off a tree limb, which fell approximately 40 feet onto plaintiff's head. Plaintiff incurred medical expenses and suffered permanent physical impairment as a result of the injury.
Plaintiff brought suit against ICG and the Steel City defendants, alleging four counts of negligence. ICG cross-claimed against the Steel City defendants seeking indemnity, and Steel City Erection Company cross-claimed against ICG seeking indemnity. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court granted ICG's motion for directed verdict on the cross-claim filed by Steel City Erection Company. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the Steel City defendants and in favor of plaintiff and against ICG in the amount of $500,000. ICG and plaintiff filed motions for new trial, which were not ruled upon within 90 days.
On appeal, ICG argues that the verdict against it was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, and thus that it was entitled to a new trial. ICG also maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to give various written charges to the jury. Plaintiff appealed the verdict and judgment in favor of the Steel City defendants solely to retain them as defendants in the event his verdict and judgment against ICG were reversed.
ICG maintains that the jury verdict against it and in favor of the Steel City defendants is against the preponderance of the evidence because the jury necessarily found that the members of the crane crew employed by the Steel City defendants became the "loaned servants" of ICG, making ICG liable for their negligence. ICG contends that the trial court should have decided as a matter of law that the crane operators were servants of the Steel City defendants, not of ICG, at the time of the accident.
In determining whether an employee has become a loaned servant the ultimate test is: Whose work was the employee doing and under whose control was he doing it. Dumas v. Dumas Brothers Manufacturing Co., 295 Ala. 370, 378, 330 So.2d 426, 432 (1976). It is not the actual exercise of control which is determinative but rather the reserved right to control the employee. United States Steel Corp. v. Mathews, 261 Ala. 120, 123, 73 So.2d 239, 242 (1954). Where the work of the employee is part of a large undertaking, mere suggestions as to details necessary for a cooperative effort must be distinguished from actual authoritative direction and control. 261 Ala. at 124, 73 So.2d at 242.
In the present case, there was considerable evidence taken on this issue. The crane crew was employed and paid by Steel City, which in turn billed ICG for the services. Steel City decided which of its employees to send on any particular assignment. If ICG was dissatisfied in the work, it could dismiss the entire crew, but only Steel City could fire one of its employees. The employees testified that they were working for Steel City and assisting the railroad in clearing the tracks. There was evidence that the positioning of the crane and the movement of the boom were decisions left entirely to the crane crew without direction from the railroad supervisors. However, there was also evidence that ICG employees specified the way in which the line was to be cleared, the location where the crane crew should begin working, the order of the cars to be put back on the tracks, and the time when the crane crew could leave the site. Railroad employees hooked the crane to the cars and signaled when the crane should lift the car. One of Steel City's crane operators testified as follows:
There was also evidence from which the jury could infer that the ICG employees worked with the Steel City crane crew in the same manner they would have worked with the ICG crane crew that was unavailable at that time.
Although the question is a close one, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that ICG employees went beyond suggestions for a cooperative effort and exercised supervisory control over the actions of the Steel City crane crew. If reasonable persons can reach different conclusions on the question of whether a servant of one employee has temporarily become the servant of another, it is a question of fact for the jury. United States Steel Corp. v. Mathews, 261 Ala. at 123, 73 So.2d at 241-42. A jury...
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