Coleman v. Target Stores

Decision Date28 November 1983
Docket NumberNo. 2-583A148,2-583A148
Citation456 N.E.2d 723
PartiesAdam M. COLEMAN, Appellant (Claimant Below), v. TARGET STORES, Appellee (Employer Below), and The Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Howard N. Bernstein, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Robert K. Johnson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee the Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div.

Michael J. Hebenstreit, Indianapolis, for appellee Target Stores.

STATON, Judge.

Target fired Adam Coleman, a night maintenance man and prosecuted him for conversion, a class A misdemeanor. The deputy awarded to Coleman unemployment benefits after he was acquitted of the conversion charge. Target successfully appealed the award to the Appeals Referee (Referee). Later, the Review Board (Board) adopted the Appeal Referee's decision. Coleman contends that because he neither admitted to or was convicted of conversion the Indiana Employment Security Division (Division) did not have jurisdiction to hear Target's appeal of his award of benefits.

Affirmed.

Coleman contends that neither the Referee nor the Board had jurisdiction to determine whether he was discharged for just cause with the same evidence which the trial court found to be insufficient to convict him of conversion. He asserts that the Division's acceptance of Target's appeal from the award of benefits is an unconstitutional encroachment upon the powers of the judiciary. Further, Coleman asserts that once Target chose to prosecute him for conversion, it lost access to administrative review.

The Indiana Employment Security Act (Act) grants to Target the right to appeal a deputy decision first to the Referee and then to the Board. The statutory provision which grants an appeal to a Referee from a deputy decision reads in pertinent part:

"22-4-17-2 [52-1542a]. Examination and determination of claims--Notice--Requests for review--Hearings--Correction of errors.--

"(a) When an individual files an initial claim the division shall promptly make a determination of his status as an insured worker ... Unless the individual, within twenty days after such determination was mailed to his last known address, or otherwise delivered to him, asks a hearing thereon before a referee, such determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith.

"(b) The division shall promptly furnish each employer in the base period whose experience or reimbursable account is potentially chargeable with benefits to be paid to such individual with a notice in writing of his benefit liability ... Unless the employer within twenty days after such notice of benefit liability was mailed to his last known address, or otherwise delivered to him, asks a hearing thereon before a referee, such determination shall be final and benefits paid shall be charged in accordance therewith.

* * *

* * *

"(e) In cases where the claimant's benefit eligibility or disqualification is disputed, the division shall promptly notify the claimant and the employer ... unless the claimant or such employer within twenty days after such notification was mailed to his or its last known address, or otherwise delivered to him or it, asks a hearing before a referee thereon, such decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith. With respect to notice of disputed administrative determination or decision ... unless such claimant or employer within twenty-five days after such notification was mailed ... asks a hearing before a referee thereon, such decision shall be final ... If such hearing is desired the request therefor shall be filed with the board in writing within the prescribed periods ... In the event a hearing is requested by an employer or the division after it has been administratively determined that benefits should be allowed to a claimant, entitled benefits shall continue to be paid to said claimant unless said administrative determination has been reversed by a due process hearing...

* * *

* * *

"(h) Notice to the employer and the claimant that the determination of the division is final if a hearing is not requested shall be prominently displayed on the notice of the determination which is sent to the employer and the claimant. [Acts 1947, ch. 208, Sec. 1802, p. 673; 1953, ch. 177, Sec. 22, p. 626; 1955, ch. 317, Sec. 10, p. 971; 1965, ch. 190, Sec. 11, p. 348; 1969, ch. 300, Sec. 5, p. 1256; 1971, P.L. 355, Sec. 42, p. 1376; 1972, P.L. 174, Sec. 2, p. 844; 1977; P.L. 262, Sec. 27, p. 1115.]"

IC 1983, 22-4-17-2 (Burns Code Supp.) (section 2) (emphasis added). The provisions which grant an appeal from a Referee decision to the Board read in pertinent part:

"22-4-17-3 [52-1542b]. Hearing before referee--Ruling on finding of deputy--Notice of decision--Appeal.--Unless such request for hearing is withdrawn, a referee, after affording the parties a reasonable opportunity for fair hearing, shall affirm, modify or reverse the findings of fact and decision of the deputy. The parties shall be duly notified of such decision and the reasons therefor, which shall be deemed to be the final decision of the review board, unless within fifteen days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision, an appeal is taken by the board or the director or by any party adversely affected by such decision to the review board. [Acts 1947, ch. 208, Sec. 1803, p. 673; 1957, ch. 299, Sec. 4, p. 795.]"

IC 1974, 22-4-17-3 (Burns Code Ed. (section 3).

"22-4-17-5 [52-1542d]. Review board--Appointment--Terms--Transfer of Proceedings from referee--Notice--Hearings.--Any claim pending before a referee, and all proceedings therein, may be transferred to and determined by the review board upon its own motion, at any time before the referee announces his decision. Any claim pending before either a referee or the review board may be transferred to the board for determination at the direction of the board. If such review board deems it advisable to procure additional evidence, it may direct the taking of such additional evidence, within such time as it shall fix.

"Any proceeding so removed to the review board shall be heard by a quorum thereof in accordance with the requirements of section 1803 [22-4-17-3] hereof. The review board shall notify the parties to any claim upon which it renders a decision of such decision, together with its reasons therefor. [Acts 1947, ch. 208, Sec. 1805, p. 673; 1965, ch. 190, Sec. 12, p. 348.]"

IC 1974, 22-4-17-5 (Burns Code Ed.) (section 5). Sections 2, 3, and 5 provide an eligible party with a right to appeal. Compliance with time factors and application forms are the only limitations on that right.

The Division used its authority to promulgate 640 IAC 1-11-1 (rule 1) and 640 IAC 1-11-7 (rule 7) which provide an "interested party" with a right to appeal a denial or award of benefits. 1 General Electric Co. v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1959), 129 Ind.App. 684, 692-97, 160 N.E.2d 208, 213-14. Rule 1 reads in pertinent part:

"640 IAC 1-11-1 Request for hearing before a referee; requirements; notice.

Authority: IC 22-4-19-1; IC 22-4-19-2

Affected: IC 22-4-17-2

"Sec. 1. Presentation of Appeal. Any interested party in the claim of an employee shall be entitled to a hearing before a referee relative to the merits of the claim.

An 'interested party' shall mean and include: (a) any claimant for benefits; (b) any employer whose account may be affected by the adjudication of the claim; (c) any employer in the claimant's base period; (d) any employer who has made an offer of work to the claimant or to whose employment claimant has been furnished a referral; (e) the claimant's last or separating employer."

640 IAC 1-11-1. Pursuant to this rule, Target has a right to appeal because it qualifies as an "interested party" under either definition 1(b) or 1(e). General Electric, supra at 213-14. Rule 7 provides a party with the right to appeal to the Board:

"640 IAC 1-11-7 Appeals to review board

Authority: IC 22-4-19-1; IC 22-4-19-2

Affected: IC 22-4-17-3; IC 22-4-17-5

"Sec. 7. Appeals to Review Board. Within fifteen (15) days after the date of notification or mailing of the decision of the referee, either party may appeal to the Review Board...."

640 IAC 1-11-7. General Electric, supra at 213-14. Therefore, unless this right to appeal is terminated by a deputy award pursuant to IC 1983, 22-4-15-6 (Burns Code Supp.) (section 6) the Referee and the Board had jurisdiction to review the merits of Coleman's claim for unemployment benefits.

Section 6 does not deny an "interested party" the right to appeal acquired under sections 2, 3, and 5. Section 6 reads as follows:

"22-4-15-6 [52-1539f]. Discharge for gross misconduct--'Gross misconduct' defined--Benefits held in abeyance.--Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article, no benefit rights or extended benefit rights accrue nor are any benefits or extended benefits payable to any individual based upon wages earned from any employer prior to the day upon which the individual was discharged for gross misconduct in connection with work. 'Gross misconduct' includes a felony or misdemeanor committed in connection with work but only if the felony or misdemeanor is admitted by the individual or has resulted in a conviction. Benefits or extended benefits shall be held in abeyance pending the result of any criminal proceedings. [Acts 1947, ch. 208, Sec. 1507, p. 673; 1953, ch. 177, Sec. 19; 1971, P.L. 355, Sec. 40; 1978, P.L. 2, Sec. 2215; 1980, P.L. 158, Sec. 8.]"

IC 1983, 22-4-15-6 (Burns Code Supp.). Tailored to Coleman's situation, this section merely requires the deputy to postpone his denial or award of benefits until the trial court renders a judgment on the claimant's criminal prosecution; if convicted, the claimant is automatically denied benefits. However, it does not say that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Appeal of Associated Sign & Post, Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 26 Noviembre 1985
    ...only those rules and regulations which fall within the scope of that enabling legislation. Van Allen, at 1213; Coleman v. Target Stores (1983), Ind.App., 456 N.E.2d 723, 726 n. 1; Shultz v. State (1981), Ind.App., 417 N.E.2d 1127, 1136; Gallagher, at 1368. In addition, an agency's rules mus......
  • Lake Monroe Regional Waste Dist. v. Waicukauski
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 16 Diciembre 1986
    ...defense which prohibits a tribunal from considering an issue which has been litigated in a prior hearing. Coleman v. Target Stores (1983), Ind.App., 456 N.E.2d 723, 728. The doctrine of res judicata has evolved as a matter of public policy. Fairness to the parties and economy of time are th......
  • Cain v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 26 Mayo 2015
  • Goodson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 30 Mayo 2001
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT