Coleman v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.

Citation671 F.2d 980
Decision Date03 March 1982
Docket NumberNo. 80-1283,80-1283
PartiesJohn COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN ELECTRIC CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

John F. Chambers, Ripple, Chambers & Steiner, Detroit, Mich., C. Douglas Lovett, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

David R. Getto, Robert F. Riley, Dice, Sweeney & Sullivan, Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

Before KEITH, Circuit Judge, WEICK, Senior Circuit Judge, and ALLEN *, District Judge.

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal challenges the propriety of an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denying a Motion to Amend Judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff-appellant, John Coleman, argues that the district court should not have reduced his jury award by the percentage of his contributory negligence. Specifically, Coleman contends that, as a matter of Michigan law, contributory negligence should not diminish recovery where the absence of an adequate safety device was the proximate cause of injuries sustained. We agree. For the reasons below, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

This personal injury action arises from the injuries which John Coleman sustained while he was working on the premises of the defendant, Western Electric Co., Inc. ("Western Electric"). On February 26, 1976, Coleman's arm was crushed as he helped Western Electric employees unload four reels of telephone cable at Western Electric's warehouse. The following facts are relevant to this appeal.

John Coleman was a truck driver who had been employed by Trans-Con Trucking ("Trans-Con"), a Michigan trucking company, for over 40 years. On February 26, 1976, Trans-Con directed Coleman to deliver some telephone cable to Western Electric.

The telephone cable which Coleman delivered was contained on four large reels. Each reel was approximately 7 feet in diameter, 41/2 feet wide, and weighed between 5,000 and 7,000 pounds. Coleman transported these reels in an enclosed tractor-trailer truck. Three of the reels were placed in the trailer so that they could be rolled from the front of the trailer to its rear entrance. The fourth reel was placed so that it could roll from one side of the trailer to the other. This fourth reel was placed immediately inside the rear door of the trailer.

Coleman arrived at Western Electric's warehouse around 9 a.m. Norman Kwatis, a supervisor at Western Electric, instructed Coleman to back his truck into a dock for unloading. Coleman backed the truck into the dock and discovered that the trailer was between 4 and 6 inches lower than the dock. Coleman pointed out the height differential between the trailer and the dock to Kwatis, and requested the use of another dock, equipped with a levelator. 1

On February 26, 1976, at least two of the levelators at Western Electric's warehouse were broken. Coleman was informed that the docks with operational levelators would be occupied for several hours. Kwatis asked Coleman to assist Mark Javor, another Western Electric employee, in unloading the reels without a levelator. 2

Kwatis demonstrated a procedure which would enable the reels to be unloaded without using a levelator. Although Coleman had delivered dozens of shipments of cable to Western Electric's warehouse over the years, he had never assisted in nor witnessed the unloading of cable without using a levelator. Javor was also unaware of this procedure.

A forklift was used to unload the reel nearest the rear door of the trailer. Because this reel had been loaded so that it could roll from one side of the trailer to the other, the forklift remained on the dock and lifted this reel off the trailer.

The remaining three reels, however, could not be unloaded by using the forklift. These reels had been loaded so that they could roll the length of the trailer. The weight of the reels and the width of the trailer prevented Coleman, Javor and Kwatis from repositioning the reels in the trailer. Moreover, the forklift could not negotiate the height differential between the trailer and the dock. Javor allegedly suggested that the remaining three reels be rolled to the rear of the trailer, and then lifted out by using chains and a forklift. Kwatis rejected this suggestion. Instead, he instructed Coleman and Javor to unload the reels manually.

Coleman, Kwatis and Javor attempted to remove the first of the three remaining reels. 3 The three men employed a manual procedure which combined their strength and the momentum of a rolling reel. They would roll the reel up to the dock and allow the reel to bounce off the dock. The momentum created by bouncing the reel off the dock would cause it to bounce off one of the remaining reels. The momentum created by bouncing the reel against the stationary reel would enable the men to bounce the reel against the dock with greater force. This bouncing procedure was repeated several times before the three men could unload the first remaining reel. Kwatis took a coffee break after one reel had been unloaded using this method. However, he allegedly instructed Javor and Coleman to unload the remaining two reels.

Coleman's injury occurred while he and Javor attempted to unload one of the remaining reels. Coleman and Javor repeated the bouncing procedure discussed previously. As Coleman stood in the trailer facing the rear door, the stationary reel began to roll toward the door. Apparently Coleman was unaware that this reel was approaching him from the front of the trailer. The reel which had been stationary collided with the reel which Javor and Coleman were attempting to unload. This collision crushed Coleman's arm and injured his back.

A jury of the United States District Court returned a verdict for Coleman, and awarded him damages of $400,000. However, the jury also found that Coleman was 65% contributorily negligent. The district court, relying on Michigan's comparative negligence rules, entered a judgment for Coleman of $140,000. This judgment was 35% of the jury's award for damages.

Coleman filed a motion to amend the judgment, claiming that the district court's reduction of the jury award was erroneous under Michigan law. Specifically, Coleman argued that under Michigan law contributory negligence cannot reduce the recovery where the plaintiff's injury was caused by the absence of, or a defect in, safety equipment. The district court denied Coleman's motion to amend the judgment. Coleman perfected this appeal.

On appeal, Coleman argues that the district court erred as a matter of Michigan law by reducing the jury's award by the amount of contributory negligence attributed to him. We agree.

The district court reasoned that Coleman failed to provide any authority for his claim that, as a matter of Michigan law, comparative negligence should not be considered in the instant case. The court noted that the Michigan Supreme Court had not addressed this issue. Thus, the district court refused to amend the judgment and reinstate Coleman's award of $400,000.

The district court was correct in applying Michigan law in this diversity action. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). It is well settled under Michigan law that a worker's contributory negligence does not bar recovery where the absence of an adequate safety device is the proximate cause of the worker's injury. Tulkku v. Mackworth Rees, 406 Mich. 615, 281 N.W.2d 291 (1979); and Funk v. General Motors Corp., 392 Mich. 91, 220 N.W.2d 641 (1974).

In Funk, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court held that contributory negligence does not bar a plaintiff's recovery if the trier of fact finds that the employer's breach of a commonlaw duty to provide safety equipment is the cause in fact of plaintiff's injury. In holding that contributory negligence would not bar a plaintiff's recovery, the Funk court recognized that workers have little discretion in deciding whether to work in dangerous situations or areas. Specifically, the court stated:

"Workmen such as the present plaintiff, who ply their livelihoods on ladders and scaffolds, are scarcely in a position to protect themselves from accident. They usually have no choice but to work with the equipment at hand, though danger looms large." Funk, supra at 113 (220 N.W.2d 641), quoting Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 318-319, 83 N.E.2d 133, 135 (1948).

In Tulkku v. Mackworth Rees, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Funk and extended its rationale to products liability cases. The court in Tulkku held:

"contributory negligence is no bar to recovery where evidence has been presented of defendant's causal negligence in the design or manufacture of a safety device." Tulkku, supra at 623, 281 N.W.2d 291.

The Tulkku court adopted the fundamental policy rationale on which Funk was based. The court also affirmed another policy consideration articulated in Funk :

"The policy behind the law of torts is more than compensation of victims. It seeks also to encourage implementation of reasonable safeguards against risks of injury." Funk, supra, 104, 220 N.W.2d 641. (Emphasis added). " Tulkku, supra at 621, 281 N.W.2d 291.

There were two important legal developments during the appeal of Tulkku, supra. First, the Michigan Supreme Court replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence with a form of comparative negligence. Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979). Second, the Michigan legislature substituted comparative negligence for contributory negligence in products liability actions. Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.2945. In deciding Tulkku, however, the Michigan Supreme Court expressly declined to consider the effect of Placek, supra, or the new legislation. 4

The district court denied Coleman's motion to amend the judgment because the Michigan Supreme Court had not addressed the effect of Placek on Funk and Tulkku. The general rule in diversity cases is...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • July 29, 1983
    ...(Appeal of American Airlines, Inc.); Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir.1982); Coleman v. Western Electric Co., 671 F.2d 980, 983-84 (6th Cir. 1982); American Triticale, Inc. v. Nytco Services, Inc., 664 F.2d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir.1982); Mott v. Mitsubishi International......
  • State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hiermer, C2-87-350.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • October 26, 1988
    ...Clutter, supra at 1153. McPherson v. Cleveland Punch and Shear Co., 816 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting, Coleman v. Western Electric Co., 671 F.2d 980 (6th Cir.1982)). II. On August 14, 1986, John D. Penn filed suit against Rockwell International Corporation and Ronald W. Hiermer, Pen......
  • Sours v. General Motors Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • September 19, 1983
    ...(citations omitted). Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1153 (6th Cir.1981). See also Coleman v. Western Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 980, 983-84 (6th Cir.1982); 1A Moore's Federal Practice p 0.307-0.309, at 3077-3134 (2d ed. GM challenges the jury verdict in four respects. First,......
  • Lukas ex rel. Miller Energy Res., Inc. v. McPeak
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • January 8, 2014
    ...Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the law “as expressed by the highest court of the state.” Coleman v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 671 F.2d 980, 983 (6th Cir.1982), citing Clutter v. Johns–Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir.1981) This is because the highest court of the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT