Coley v. City Of Statesville

• Citation: 28 S.E. 482, 121 N.C. 301
• Case Date: December 14, 1897
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

28 S.E. 482
121 N.C. 301

COLEY
v.
CITY OF STATESVILLE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 14, 1897.

Trial — Submission of Issues — Action for Wrongful Death — Evidence — Burden of Proof—Instructions—Sufficiency of Objections — Municipal Corporations — Liability for Arrest and Treatment of Prisoners— Negligence—Proximate Cause.

1. Where the issues submitted are such as enable the parties to present every phase of the contention, no objection thereto can be sustained either for issues submitted or for refusing to submit other or different issues.

2. Where 13 instructions duly numbered (out of 16 asked) were given at defendant's request, an exception "to the above special instructions given at the request of defendant" was a sufficient exception to each instruction, and not invalid as a "broadside" exception.

3. A city is not liable for arrests made by its policeman for violation of its ordinances, and the commitment to prison of the person arrested, even if the officer is negligent, acts under a mistake, or uses violence in making the arrest and commitment, but is liable only for failure or neglect to provide a prison so furnished as to afford reasonable comfort and protection from suffering and injuries to health, and for failure to exercise ordinary care in procuring necessaries for prisoners and supervising its subordinates.

4. In an action against a city for the death of plaintiff's intestate caused by defendant's negligence, it appeared that deceased was arrested for intoxication, and imprisoned, and died in the prison about three hours afterwards. Held, that it was proper to charge that if deceased had some disease of the heart, and on the evening of his arrest indulged too freely in liquors, and thereby caused his own death, and such disease and use of liquor were the proximate cause of his death, plaintiff could not recover.

5. And it was proper to charge that if deceased was diseased in his kidneys, and had some heart trouble, and became intoxicated on said evening, and thereby brought on syncope or coma, as testified to by the physicians, and such excessive drinking was the proximate cause of his death, plaintiff could not recover.

6. It was also proper to charge that if deceased's death was caused by some fatal malady or disease, and he would have died in one place as well as another, and he did die of said disease as the proximate cause of death, the jury should find for defendant; and if his death was caused by a disease and by his own acts, to wit, excessive drinking, combined, and such disease and excessive drinking were the proximate cause of his death, the jury should find for defendant

7. In an action against a city for arresting plaintiff's decedent, and confining him in a filthy cell, thereby causing death, where the only evidence was as to the size and ventilation, and there was no evidence as to unwholesome condition or as to any want of attention, an instruction that under such facts plaintiff could not recover was proper.

[28 S.E. 483]

8. The court properly charged that the burden of proof was on plaintiff to sustain both the issue as to whether deceased's death was caused by defendant's negligence and as to the damages sustained by plaintiff.

9. The measure of damages for death caused by negligence is the "present value" of the net income of deceased, ascertained by deducting the cost of living and expenditures of deceased from his gross income; and, in determining what a man's life is worth, the jury should consider his habits, whether a sober or drinking man, and his condition of health.

10. The court may, in his instructions, tell the jury what the mortuary table in the Code (section 1352) states the expectancy of a man of deceased's age to be, without the statute being put in evidence.

11. Notice to the chief of police of a city of the improper condition of a prison of such city is not notice to the city.

12. The first requisite of proximate cause is the doing or omitting to do an act which a man of ordinary prudence could foresee might naturally or probably produce the injury complained of; and the second requisite is that such act or omission did actually cause the injury.

Appeal from superior court, Iredell county; Coble, Judge.

Action by M. R. Coley, administratrix of the estate of James Ooley, deceased, against the city of Statesville, to recover for the death of plaintiff's intestate, caused by defendant's negligence. The intestate was arrested by the police officers of defendant city for being intoxicated, as claimed by them, and placed in prison, where he was found dead three or four hours afterwards. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The plaintiff tendered the following issues: "(1) Was the death of the plaintiff's intestate caused or accelerated by the unwholesome condition of the prison of the city of Statesville, occasioned by the negligence of the said city to provide a prison suitable for the health and comfort of the prisoners? (2) What damage, if any, has the plaintiff sustained thereby?" In lieu of these issues, the court submitted the following issues: "(1) Was the death of plaintiff's intestate due to the negligence of defendant, as alleged in the complaint? (2) What damage, if any, has the plaintiff sustained thereby?" Plaintiff excepted because the court failed to submit her first issue in terms as above set forth, and the plaintiff excepted to the first issue submitted by the court as above set out.

The defendant prayed for the instructions following, which were given with modifications, and, as modified, are as follows:

"(1) The defendant is not answerable In damages for arrests made by policemen for violations of the ordinances of the town, and for the lawful commitment to prison made under such arrests; and if you find, therefore, that J. P. Coley, the intestate of the plaintiff, was upon the streets or in a public place In the town on the evening of the 12th of June in an intoxicated condition, or in such condition that to all appearances he seemed to be intoxicated, and the town police, having their attention called to his condition, thereupon took the deceased into custody, and carried him to the calaboose, to detain him until sober enough to be taken before the mayor, and discharged according to law, and the said Coley was allowed to remain in the calaboose for this purpose, and, while thus confined, died in the calaboose, the defendant In this case is not liable In damages to the plaintiff, except and unless his death was caused by the condition and defective construction of the calaboose itself.

"(2) When the defendant town, through its policemen, causes the arrest of persons engaged in violating its ordinances, the town is discharging a governmental function, —a duty and power conferred on it by its charter, —and in this respect acts in the same way that the state acts through and by its sheriff when he makes arrests for violation of the state laws;...