Coley v. Clinton

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before STEPHENSON; McMILLIAN
• Citation: Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1980)
• Decision Date: 16 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-2043,79-2043
• Parties: Floyd F. COLEY, Ralph Steed, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Appellants, v. Bill CLINTON, Governor of the State of Arkansas; Gail S. Huecker, Commissioner of the Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services (Department of Human Services); Pat Hamilton, Administrator of the Arkansas State Hospital; Dr. James S. Beckman; Dr. Larry Killough; Virginia Robinson; Darrell Williams; Blanche Choate, Members of the State Hospital Board, Appellees.

Page 1364

635 F.2d 1364

Floyd F. COLEY, Ralph Steed, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Appellants, v. Bill CLINTON, Governor of the State of Arkansas; Gail S Huecker, Commissioner of the Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services (Department of Human Services); Pat Hamilton, Administrator of the Arkansas State Hospital; Dr James S. Beckman; Dr. Larry Killough; Virginia Robinson Darrell Williams; Blanche Choate, Members of the State Hospital Board, Appellees.

No. 79-2043.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 16, 1980.

Decided Dec. 16, 1980.

Griffin J. Stockley, Thomas J. Ginger, argued, James R. Cromwell, Central Arkansas Legal Services, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff-appellant Floyd F. Coley.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., David L. Williams, Jackson Jones, Asst. Attys. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for defendants-appellees.

Before STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge, KUNZIG, ^* Court of Claims Judge, and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, two former inmates of an Arkansas state hospital, appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing their complaint and refusing to certify this lawsuit as a class action. Appellants sought to represent a class consisting of all those criminal defendants committed to the Arkansas state mental hospital when found incompetent to stand trial or when acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect. On behalf of themselves and the class, appellants challenged, as violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, the procedures for commitment to and release from the state hospital and the automatic confinement, in Rogers Hall, a maximum security building, of criminal defendants committed to the state hospital.

The district court ¹ abstained from ruling on the procedures for commitment and release, found that confinement of appellants under the conditions existing in Rogers Hall did not violate due process or equal protection, refused to certify this lawsuit as a class action, and granted limited relief.

On appeal appellants urge that the district court should not have abstained from ruling on commitment and release procedures, but should have certified the plaintiff class, reached the merits, and found confinement under the conditions in Rogers Hall was unconstitutional. Thus, appellants ask this court not only to reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings, but also to certify it as a class action and to decide the merits of the case.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's decision to abstain from ruling on the commitment and release procedures, modify in one respect the limited relief granted by the district court, vacate the district court's ruling on the constitutionality of confinement under the conditions in Rogers Hall, vacate the district court's decision not to certify the case as a class action, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Appellant Floyd F. Coley was charged with a felony under the laws of Arkansas, acquitted in an Arkansas court by reason of insanity, and committed to the state hospital on August 4, 1977. Appellant Ralph Steed was charged with a misdemeanor under the laws of Arkansas, found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the state hospital on August 9, 1977. Appellants in 1978 brought this class action against a number of state officials for a declaratory judgment that certain Arkansas statutes were unconstitutional and for injunctive relief. Appellants specifically sought to change the state's procedures for commitment and release of criminal defendants and to halt the practice of automatically confining all such inmates under the restrictive conditions in Rogers Hall. Appellants sought a preliminary injunction and in July, 1978, the district court held a hearing on the matter. In December, 1979, the district court issued its decision in this complex case, as discussed above. Appellants timely filed this appeal, and we have jurisdiction over the denial of preliminary injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). ²

I. Commitment and Release Procedures

The first prong of appellant's lawsuit challenges the Arkansas procedures for commitment and release of criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial or acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect. Appellants argue that these procedures violate their equal protection rights because of differences in treatment between criminal defendants and others committed involuntarily to the state mental hospital under the Arkansas Mental Health Acts. The parties to this appeal appear to assume that Arkansas commitment procedures for criminal defendants differ from the procedures governing involuntary commitment of persons other than criminal defendants. Compare Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 41-601 to 617 (1977 & Cum.Supp.1979) (commitment and release procedures applying specifically to criminal defendants), with id. §§ 59-1401 to 1424 (Cum.Supp.1979) (commitment and release procedures applying to persons involuntarily committed to mental institutions).

A difference in treatment between criminal defendants and other persons in the Arkansas involuntary commitment procedures is critical to appellants' claims that criminal defendants, under a separate commitment and release procedure, receive less favorable treatment than other persons in violation of federal constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. We cannot agree that the relevant Arkansas statutes are at all clear in regard to such differences in treatment, and we affirm the district court's decision to abstain because further interpretation of those statutes by the state courts is required before any decision of the federal constitutional claims.

A. The Arkansas Statutes

The 1975 Arkansas Criminal Code revision was apparently drafted to put the commitment and release decision for criminal defendants in the hands of the state circuit court with jurisdiction of the criminal proceeding. Prior to 1975, for example, the Criminal Code apparently provided for commitment by the circuit court of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-613, (commentary) (1977). The Mental Health Act of 1971 had until 1975 provided for the director of the state hospital to accept criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity upon certification by the circuit court, Mental Health Act of 1971, No. 433, ch. 3, §§ 11, 12, 1971 Ark. Acts 987 (repealed 1979) (formerly codified at Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 59-411, 412 (1971)), and for the director of the state hospital to release such persons when "restored to reason" like any other state hospital inmate, Mental Health Act of 1971, No. 433, ch. 3, §§ 9, 13, 1971 Ark. Acts 987 (repealed 1979) (formerly codified at Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 59-409, 413 (1971)). However, the 1975 Criminal Code revision appears to have made it mandatory for the circuit court in which the defendant's criminal trial occurred to make the release decision. ³ Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-613 (1977). The drafters of the 1975 revision explained,

This section, dealing with release from the hospital of persons committed under § 41-612 (relating to commitment of defendants acquitted on grounds of mental disease or defect), makes a sharp departure from prior authority. Under pre-existing Arkansas law, the decision as to whether to release patients falling into this legal category was left to the director of the state hospital .... (This section) places the release decision in the hands of the circuit court from which the defendant was committed. The (drafting) Commission rejected the argument that the release procedures ... (for such defendants) should be exactly the same as the release procedures for persons hospitalized under the civil commitment statutes.

Id. commentary. Thus, the 1975 Criminal Code revision appeared to abrogate the applicability of the release procedures in § 13 of the Mental Health Act of 1971, No. 433, ch. 3, 1971 Ark. Acts 987 (repealed 1979) (formerly codified at Ark.Stat.Ann. § 59-413 (1971)). But the 1975 Criminal Code revision did not repeal § 13, which was repealed instead by the 1979 Mental Health Law revision. Mental Health Act of 1979, No. 817, ch. 2, § 2, 1979 Ark. Acts 1774, 1794.

In 1979 the Arkansas legislature enacted a comprehensive revision of the statutes governing commitment to and release from mental institutions, expressly finding "that the laws relating to ... involuntary commitments of mentally ill patients and patients' rights are in urgent need of clarification and codification." Mental Health Act of 1979, No. 817, ch. 1, § 1, 1979 Ark. Acts 1774. By its terms therefore the Mental Health Act of 1979 clarifies and codifies the law relating to involuntary commitments generally, and on its face the 1979 Act appears to cover commitments through the criminal justice system as well as through the probate courts. Furthermore, § 2 of the Mental Health Act of 1979, No. 817, ch. 2, 1979 Ark. Acts 1774, 1794, repealed §§ 9, 11-13 of the Mental Health Law of 1971, No. 433, ch. 3 (formerly codified at Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 59-409, 411-413 (1971)), which had previously governed the admission into the state mental hospital of persons committed pursuant to criminal proceedings. Thus, the legislature expressed some intention that the 1979 Act would affect the commitment and release proceedings involving criminal defendants.

Indeed, on its face the 1979 Mental Health Act appears to overlap the coverage of the Criminal Code for defendants acquitted by reason of insanity. The 1979 Mental Health Act provides in part:

If a person is transported to a hospital ... then the hospital ... may detain such person for initial evaluation and treatment provided:

... An original petition (for civil commitment) is filed (in probate court):

In any event, a hearing pursuant to Section 9 of this Act (§ 59-1409) must be...