Colgate v. Compagnie Francaise du Telegraphe de Paris a New York
Decision Date | 30 January 1885 |
Citation | 23 F. 82 |
Parties | COLGATE v. COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DU TELEGRAPHE DE PARIS A NEW YORK. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Betts Atterbury & Betts, for complainants.
Blatchford Seward, Griswold & Dacosta, for defendants. C. A. Seward and Chas. M. Dacosta, of counsel.
The complainant has filed a bill of discovery in aid of a pending action at law in this court, herein he is the plaintiff brought against the defendant to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent for an invention. The subject of the patent is an improvement in electrical conductors for submarine telegraphic purposes. The bill avers that the defendant operates a cable telegraph under water, extending from the coast of France to some point on or near Cape Cod Massachusetts, and also operates lines of telegraph wire, including a number of river and water crossings in the United States, and employs the plaintiff's invention in such lines of cable telegraph; that in the suit at law the defendant, in its answer, has pleaded non-infringement of said letters patent; that the complainant is unable to prosecute his action at law without a full discovery of the method of insulation of the said lines of cable telegraph, for the reason that such lines are under water and under the control of the defendant, and in localities unknown to the defendant, and are not open to his inspection; and that he cannot prove with accuracy and completeness the damages that he has suffered by reason of the infringement without the discovery by the defendant of the locality and length of said lines, the number of the conducting wires composing said lines, and without the inspection of certain contracts in defendant's possession which disclose the mode and materials of the construction of its cables; all of which matters and things are solely within the knowledge of the defendant, and unknown to the complainant. The defendant has demurred to the bill, and the main points made by the demurrer are-- First, that the defendant, as a corporation, cannot be compelled to make a discovery; and, second, that the court should refuse to entertain the bill, because, under sections 724, 858, Rev. St., and the existing practice at law, discovery is no longer necessary, but the plaintiff can obtain in the suit at law all necessary evidence by an examination of the officers of the defendant and by compelling a production of all books or writings containing pertinent evidence.
Undoubtedly, a corporation cannot be compelled to answer under oath to a bill in equity. It answers only under the seal of the corporation. It is for this reason the practice has obtained of making the officers of the corporation parties to the bill and requiring them to answer the interrogatories. This, however, does not excuse a corporation from answering, and the complainant is entitled to an answer from a corporation as well as from an individual, although the value of the answer as evidence may not be worth the expense of the experiment. Although no officer or agent is made a party to the bill, it is still the duty of the corporation to cause diligent examination to be made, and give in its answer all the information derived from such examination; and if it alleges ignorance without excuse, a disposition on its part to defeat and obstruct the course of justice may be inferred which will justify the court in charging it with the costs of the suit. Attorney General v. Burgesses of East Retford, 2 Mylne & K. 35. There is nothing, therefore, in the fact that the defendant is a corporation to defeat the complainant's right to maintain a bill of discovery.
Under the existing practice in courts of law in this state, a plaintiff can obtain the evidence of a defendant upon the trial by examining him as a witness, and can obtain a production of books and papers both before and upon the trial. He can also compel a sworn answer to his complaint, and thus require the defendant to admit or deny under oath all the material allegations of act in his complaint. The practice which thus prevails is the practice of the federal courts also, by force of sections 724, 858, 914, Rev. St. He cannot obtain the testimony of the defendant before the trial in an action pending in this court, although he can do so in the state courts, because section 861 of the Revised Statutes, as construed in Beardsley v. Littell, 14 Blatchf. 102, requires such testimony, unless taken de bene esse or by commission, to be taken in the presence of the court and jury at the trial. See, also, Easton v. Hodges, 7 Biss. 324.
The jurisdiction in equity for discovery originated in the absence of power in courts of law to compel a discovery by their own process, either by means of the oath of a party or by the production of deeds, books, and writings in his possession or control. But it does not follow, because courts of law now have power to extend such relief, that a court of equity should forego the exercise of an ancient and well-settled jurisdiction. No principle is more vigorously asserted by courts of equity than that they will not yield a jurisdiction once legitimately exercised because an enlargement of the ordinary powers of courts of law has rendered a resort to equity no longer necessary. There can be no ebb and flow of jurisdiction dependent upon external changes. Being once legitimately vested in the court, it must remain there until the legislature shall abolish or limit it; for without some positive act the just inference is that the legislative pleasure is that the jurisdiction shall remain upon its old foundations. Story, Eq. Sec. 64. Accordingly, it has been frequently held that a court of equity should not refuse to entertain a bill for discovery, although, by the enlargement of the jurisdiction and remedies exercised by courts of law, similar relief could be obtained by the complaint in his action at law. Lovell v. Galloway, 17 Beav. 1; British Empire Shipping Co. v. Somes, 3 Day & J. 433; Shotwell's Adm'r v. Smith, 20 N.J.Ch. 79; Cannon v. McNab, 48 Ala. 99; Millsaps v. Pfeiffer, 44 Miss. 805.
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