Collaborative v. Dir. of the Dep't of Unemployment Assistance & Another

• Decision Date: 04 May 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-P-436,15-P-436
• Citation: 76 N.E.3d 265,91 Mass.App.Ct. 436
• Parties: CAPE COD COLLABORATIVE v. DIRECTOR OF the DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & another.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

91 Mass.App.Ct. 436

76 N.E.3d 265

CAPE COD COLLABORATIVE

v.DIRECTOR OF the DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & another.¹

No. 15-P-436

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable..

Argued January 7, 2016.

Decided May 4, 2017.

David A. Guberman, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Kevin F. Bresnahan, Quincy, for the plaintiff.

Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Maldonado, JJ.

MALDONADO, J.

In this case, we consider whether Stephanie Hennis, a full-time bus driver for the Cape Cod Collaborative (collaborative),² is entitled to partial unemployment compensation benefits for the three days she did not work and was not paid during the week ending Saturday, November 24, 2012, which included the Thanksgiving recess.Because we conclude that G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c ), does not bar the payment of such benefits in the circumstances of this case, we reverse the judgment of the Barnstable Division of the District Court Department (District Court), which reached a contrary conclusion.

1.Statutory framework.We begin with a brief overview of the Unemployment Insurance Law, G. L. c. 151A, so as to put the underlying facts in context.The fundamental purpose of the statute is to "afford benefits to [individuals] who are out of work and unable to secure work through no fault of their own."Connolly v. Director of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 460 Mass. 24, 25, 948 N.E.2d 1218(2011), quoting fromLeBeau v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Employment & Training, 422 Mass. 533, 538, 664 N.E.2d 21(1996).We are required to construe G. L. c. 151A"liberally in aid of its purpose, which purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and [her] family."G. L. c. 151A, § 74, as appearing in St. 1990, c. 177, § 340.

With respect to employees of educational organizations, however, the Legislature has carved out certain exceptions to the general availability of unemployment compensation benefits.As pertinent here, G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c ), as appearing in St. 1977, c. 720, § 29, provides that, with respect to services performed for an educational institution, "benefits shall not be paid to any individual on the basis of such services for any week commencing during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if such individual performs such services in the period immediately before such vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform such services in the period immediately following such vacation period or holiday recess"(emphasis added).A "week" is defined as "seven consecutive days beginning on Sunday."G. L. c. 151A, § 1(t ), as appearing in St. 1941, c. 685, § 1.

2.Factual and procedural background.The essential facts of this case are not in dispute.Since April 27, 2009, Hennis has been employed by the collaborative as a school bus driver, transporting students to and from their educational programs.She typically works approximately forty-five hours per week, one shift in the morning and another shift in the afternoon, from Monday through Friday.Under the terms of Hennis's employment, she did not receive holiday pay for time off when school was not in session.³In 2012, Thanksgiving was on Thursday, November 22.During that week of Thanksgiving, schools were closed on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.Consequently, Hennis worked only two days, for approximately fifteen hours.The collaborative did not pay her for the remaining three days when schools were closed, even though she was ready and available for work.Following the Thanksgiving recess, Hennis resumed her regular schedule as a school bus driver for the collaborative.

Not having been paid for the three days she did not work, Hennis filed an application for unemployment compensation benefits for the week ending Saturday, November 24, 2012.The Department of Unemployment Assistance(department) approved her claim, stating that Hennis was partially unemployed, seeG. L. c. 151A, § 1(r )(1), and not subject to any statutory disqualification where the collaborative was unable to provide her a full-time schedule of work for the week ending November 24, 2012.

The collaborative appealed the determination and requested a hearing before a review examiner, at which its personnel coordinator asserted that, pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 28A, employees of the collaborative were precluded from collecting unemployment compensation benefits during school vacations and any days not included in their contracts.The review examiner affirmed the department's decision, finding that § 28A(c ) did not preclude Hennis from collecting unemployment compensation benefits because she had worked Monday and Tuesday during the week ending November 24, 2012, and § 28A(c ) bars claims only "for any week which begins during a vacation week"(emphasis supplied).SeeG. L. c. 151A, § 1(t )(defining "Week" as "seven consecutive days beginning on Sunday");G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c )("[B]enefits shall not be paid to any individual on the basis of ... services for any week commencing during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess"[emphasis supplied]).

Pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 1(r )(1), as appearing in St. 1976, c. 473, § 2, "an individual shall be deemed to be in partial unemployment if in any week of less than full-time weekly schedule of work [s]he has earned or has received aggregate remuneration in an amount which is less than the weekly benefit rate to which [s]he would be entitled if totally unemployed during said week; provided, however, that certain earnings as specified in [ G. L. c. 151A, § 29(b ),] shall be disregarded."Having determined that Hennis was precluded from receiving total unemployment benefits, the review examiner considered whether she had experienced a period of partial unemployment under the statute.Given that Hennis's gross earnings for this particular week were less than her weekly benefit rate plus her disregarded earnings, the review examiner determined that Hennis was partially unemployed during that week and, therefore, was eligible to receive partial unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 29(b ).⁴

The collaborative appealed the review examiner's decision to the department's board of review (board) in accordance with G. L. c. 151A, § 40.The board denied the application for further review, thereby rendering the review examiner's decision the final decision of the board for purposes of judicial review.SeeG. L. c. 151A, § 41(c ).

The collaborative then filed a complaint for judicial review in the District Court.Relying on G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c ), it alleged that, because Hennis performed services for the collaborative during the period immediately before the Thanksgiving recess, and had a reasonable assurance of performing services for the collaborative immediately following the Thanksgiving recess, she was not eligible to receive partial unemployment compensation benefits for the week ending November 24, 2012.⁵In the collaborative's view, the board erred when it determined that G. L. c. 151A, § 28A, was not applicable to the facts of this case.

Following a hearing, a judge of the District Court reversed the board's decision.He found that, because the day before and after Thanksgiving must be considered a customary vacation period or holiday recess, the language of § 28A(c ) precluded Hennis from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.The judge stated that it should have been clear to Hennis that she would not be working over the Thanksgiving recess and, consequently, would not be getting paid for those days.Further, he continued, any suggestion that § 28A(c ) was not applicable because the vacation period did not begin on Sunday of the relevant week would constitute a tortured interpretation of the statute.⁶The department filed the present appeal.

3.Standard of review.Our review of the board's decision is governed by the standards set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).SeeG. L. c. 151A, § 42.The board's decision "may only be set aside if the court determines that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law."Coverall N. America, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 447 Mass. 852, 857, 857 N.E.2d 1083(2006).We"give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.However, where an agency determination is based on a question of law, we review the matter de novo.SeeRaytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 364 Mass. 593, 595, 307 N.E.2d 330(1974).

4.Discussion.The department contends that G. L. c. 151A, § 28A(c ), does not disqualify Hennis from receiving unemployment compensation benefits for the week ending November 24, 2012, because the week commenced before, not during, the Thanksgiving recess.We agree.

"It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that ‘statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result.’ "Boston Hous. Authy. v. National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 162, 935 N.E.2d 1260(2010), quoting fromSullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110(2001).Although "[t]he duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts ... the details of legislative policy, not spelt out in the statute, may appropriately be determined, at least in the first instance, by an agency charged with administration of the statute."

Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc., 347 Mass. 337, 344, 198 N.E.2d 281(1964).SeeAttorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 450 Mass. 311, 319, 878 N.E.2d 554(2008).The party challenging an agency's interpretation of a...