Collazo–rosado v. Univ. of P.R.

• Decision Date: 23 March 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–1113 (DRD).
• Citation: 775 F.Supp.2d 376,269 Ed. Law Rep. 509
• Parties: María J. COLLAZO–ROSADO, Plaintiffv.UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO and Marisol Gómez–Mouakad in her personal and official capacities, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

775 F.Supp.2d 376
269 Ed. Law Rep. 509

María J. COLLAZO–ROSADO, Plaintiff
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO and Marisol Gómez–Mouakad in her personal and official capacities, Defendant.

Civil No. 10–1113 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 23, 2011.

[775 F.Supp.2d 378]

Emil J. Rodríguez–Escudero, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, San Juan, PR, Jorge Martinez–Luciano, Pedro Ortiz Alvarez Law Offices, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff.Julio Nigaglioni–Arrache, Lopez Mulero, Colon Rodríguez & Nigaglioni Law Office, Angel M. Cintron–Garcia, Cintron & Laboy P.S.C Attorneys at Law, Mayra M. Gonzalez–Reyes, Raquel M. Dulzaides, Jimenez, Graffam & Lausell, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

[775 F.Supp.2d 379]

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ, District Judge.I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff María J. Collazo–Rosado's (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) claims are founded upon the retaliation provision (Title V) of the American with Disabilities Act (hereinafter “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., as well as upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. (Docket No. 1).

Pending before the Court is Defendant's University of Puerto Rico (hereinafter “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 16) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. (Docket No. 16). The motion has been fully briefed by the parties. ( See Docket Nos. 16, 18, 22 & 24).

Defendant raises the defense of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Specifically, they characterize Plaintiff's suit as arising from a Title I claim, which is barred by sovereign immunity, even though it was filed as a Title V retaliation claim. In response, Plaintiff insists that her claim must be addressed as an independent Title V claim for retaliation, unrelated to a Title I claim, although it remains uncontested that the allegedly violative acts occurred at Plaintiff's place of employment. Plaintiff further asserts that neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit have yet decided whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to ADA retaliation claims. Decisions in other circuits on this issue are split. Plaintiff requests that the Court determines whether a retaliation claim, unaccompanied by a Title I claim, is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Following review of the Defendant' motion to dismiss, and the responses and replies thereto, this Court finds that the Defendant' Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the reasons stated below.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 12(B)(1) FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Defendant in the instant case has requested dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) constitutes a challenge to federal subject matter jurisdiction, which includes ripeness, mootness, sovereign immunity and, of course, subject matter jurisdiction. Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362–63 (1st Cir.2001). Where subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under 12(b)(1), the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Skwira v. U.S., 344 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir.2003).

Where, as in the instant case, the Court is presented with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court should address this matter prior to determining whether the complaint of that case “states a cause of action on which relief could be granted.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). “After all, if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, assessment of the merits becomes a matter of purely academic interest.” Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 150 (1st Cir.2002).

In order to rule upon a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court applies the same standard of review which is applicable to motions under Rule 12(b)(6). See Negron–Gaztambide v. Hernandez–Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1994); see

[775 F.Supp.2d 380]

also Caraballo–Melia v. Suarez–Dominguez, Civ. 08–2205, 2010 WL 830958 at *1 (D.P.R. March 4, 2010).

“[T]he general rules of pleading require a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Gargano v. Liberty Int'l Underwriters, 572 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))(internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (establishing the “plausibility” standard). However, in the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court may “take into consideration extra-pleading material.” Wojciechowicz v. United States, 530 F.Supp.2d 421, 424 (D.P.R.2007) (quoting 5B Charles Allan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed.1990) p. 213) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, the Court “may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to (i) documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and (ii) matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir.2008) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, this District Court has previously found that “[w]here movant has challenged the factual allegations of the party invoking the district court's jurisdiction, the invoking party must submit affidavits and other relevant evidence to resolve the factual dispute regarding jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210–11 (1st Cir.1996) (finding that “the court may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as the depositions and exhibits submitted in the case”).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), and Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint[,]” discarding legal conclusions, conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir.2009)(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937)(internal quotation omitted).

Under the second step of the inquiry, the Court must determine whether, based upon all assertions that were not discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint “states a plausible claim for relief.” Id. This second step is “context-specific” and requires that the Court draw from its own “judicial experience and common sense” to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Id. Thus, “[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, [a] plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a plausible entitlement to relief.” Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.2009). “The standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and read in plaintiff's favor” rather than “likely[ness of] success on the merits”. Sepulveda–Villarini v. Department of Educ. of Puerto Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.2010). “A plausible but inconclusive inference from pleaded facts will survive a motion to dismiss” since “it is possible that other, undiscovered facts, may explain the sequence better”. Id.

Accordingly, in the instant case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction

[775 F.Supp.2d 381]

exists within the parameters of the “plausibility” standard established by Twombly and Iqbal when confronted with Defendant's 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

When analyzing a case at the motion to dismiss stage, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.2006)(citing Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir.2004); Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir.1999)).

Between October and November of 2006, Plaintiff was interviewed by Dr. Helena Mendez–Medina for the position of “Mentorship Coordinator” of a federally funded program at the University of Puerto Rico Humacao Campus, Academic Support and Development Center (hereinafter “ASDC”). (Docket No. 1, at ¶ 3.1). During the interview, Plaintiff informed Dr. Mendez about her condition of “Crohn's Disease” and indicated that if she was assigned to an area next to the bathroom and allowed to attend medical appointments, she could adequately perform the duties related to the position ¹. ( Id. at ¶ 3.2). In December of 2006, Plaintiff was hired as a transitory employee under the supervision of Dr. Mendez ( Id., at ¶ 3.4) who never requested any medical documents to confirm the medical condition that Plaintiff expressed having and granted Plaintiff the requested reasonable accommodation. ( Id. at ¶¶ 3.4–3.5).

In August of 2008, Co–Defendant, Marisol Gómez, joined ASDC as Co–Director and became Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. ( Id. at ¶ 3.7). Plaintiff informed Gómez about her medical condition, and, according to Plaintiff, Gómez did not show any objection to, nor request medical documents to verify Plaintiff's condition. ( Id. at ¶ 3.8).

During a meeting on January 22, 2009, a peer named Juan C. Rivera commented that “in this university they continue to bring handicapped people with that thing that they have to give opportunity to everybody”, in the presence of both Gómez and Plaintiff. ( Id. at ¶ 3.10) At...