Collette v. Sig Sauer, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 December 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-11392-FDS
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
• Parties: WALTER COLLETTE, JR., Plaintiff, v. SIG SAUER, INC., Defendant.

WALTER COLLETTE, JR., Plaintiff,
v.
SIG SAUER, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-11392-FDS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

December 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

F. DENNIS SAYLOR, IV CHIEF JUDGE

This is a case arising out of an alleged defective discharge of a police officer's service pistol. Plaintiff Walter Collette, Jr., a Somerville police officer, alleges that he was walking into his motorcycle club for dinner when his pistol unexpectedly fired, wounding him in the leg. He has sued the pistol's manufacturer, Sig Sauer, Inc., for violations of state and federal law.

Sig Sauer has moved to dismiss Counts 1, 4, 7, and 8 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, that motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are as alleged in the complaint.

A. The Parties

Walter Collette, Jr., has been a Somerville police officer for approximately 20 years. (Compl. ¶ 1). According to the complaint, he has substantial experience with firearms and has received numerous awards and commendations from the Somerville Police Department. (Id. ¶ 19).

1

Sig Sauer, Inc., manufactures, markets, and distributes firearms throughout the world. It has a principal place of business in Newington, New Hampshire. (Id. ¶ 18). It manufactures a pistol known as the P320.

B. The Discharge of the Pistol

The complaint alleges that on July 23, 2019, Collette was working an eight-hour shift when he decided to take his dinner break at a motorcycle club to which he belonged. (Id. ¶ 20). He removed his gun belt and secured his service-issued P320 by wrapping it in a cloth and stowing it in his gym bag. (Id.). He slung the strap of the gym bag over his right shoulder and walked toward the club. (Id. ¶ 21). According to the complaint, as he was walking, the P320 unexpectedly fired without Collette or any item in the gym bag touching the trigger. (Id. ¶ 22). The bullet entered the back of Collette's left calf and exited the front of his left leg, causing serious injury. (Id.).

The complaint alleges that an inadequate sear-striker connection, inadequate internal striker safety, and other defects internal to the gun's slide rendered the gun unreasonably dangerous. (Id. ¶¶ 69-70). The defective design and manufacture of the gun has allegedly led to an extensive history of defective discharges. (See id. ¶¶ 71-121).

C. Background of P320

In January 2014, Sig Sauer introduced the P320 to the North American market. (Id. ¶ 5). According to the complaint, it was Sig Sauer's first “strike-fired” pistol, which differs from traditional pistols in that the P320 has no external hammer that must be pulled back to “cock” the gun. (Id. ¶ 4 & n.1). Instead, an internal, spring-loaded “striker” is used to fire the weapon. (Id.). Sig Sauer used the same frame and fire control unit that it had designed for the P250, an earlier hammer-fired model. (Id. ¶ 33).

2

Before the July 2019 incident that wounded Collette, Sig Sauer stated in its marketing materials:

Safety Without Compromise

We've designed safety elements into every necessary feature on this pistol. From the trigger, to the striker and even the magazine, the P320 won't fire unless you want it to

(Id. ¶ 23). In other marketing materials, Sig Sauer stated that the P320's safety prevents the striker from releasing unless the trigger is pulled. (Id. ¶ 24). However, in the P320 owner's manual, Sig Sauer warned that the P320 could fire if dropped. (Id. ¶ 25).

In 2016, Sig Sauer competed for a $580 million contract to supply the U.S. Army's new service pistol. (Id. ¶ 34). According to the complaint, the prototype P320 exhibited more than 200 malfunctions during military testing. (Id.). Defects noted in the P320 included a failure to eject shell casings, a failure to fire, and the possibility that the pistol could discharge when dropped. (Id.). The complaint alleges that the Department of Defense notified Sig Sauer of the malfunctions and required that it fix the design flaws in the P320 by replacing the internal firing system. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 61-62).

The complaint further alleges that incidents of unintentional discharge across the country were also noted by law-enforcement personnel using the P320. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 41, 48). In 2016, a police department in Florida warned Sig Sauer that the P320 could fire without a trigger pull. (Id. ¶ 36). In February 2017, Sig Sauer sent an employee to Roscommon, Michigan, to investigate a possible defective discharge. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43). On August 4, 2017, a police officer from Stamford, Connecticut, filed suit against Sig Sauer alleging that his P320 discharged and shot him in the knee after falling to the ground. (Id. ¶ 48).

According to the complaint, Sig Sauer issued a press release that reaffirmed the safety of the P320 on August 4, 2017. (Id. ¶ 50). However, the press release did warn that exposure to

3

“acute conditions, ” including “shock, vibration, [or] heavy or repeated drops, ” could negatively impact the P320's safety mechanisms, causing them “to not work as designed.” (Id. ¶¶ 50-51).

The complaint further alleges that on August 14, 2017, Sig Sauer announced a “Voluntary Upgrade Program” that would alter the weight of the trigger, sear, and striker, as well as add a mechanical disconnector. (Id. ¶ 53). Sig Sauer said these improvements had “nothing to do with drop safety” and represented an “alternate design” of the P320. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 56).

In 2017, Sig Sauer also revised the P320 owner's manual to incorporate the press-release language that the P320 could fire when exposed to “shock, vibration, [or] heavy or repeated drops.” (Id. ¶ 66).

D. Procedural Background

Collette initiated this lawsuit on August 25, 2021. The complaint alleges claims for strict product liability; negligence; breach of implied warranty of merchantability; breach of implied warranty of fitness; negligent infliction of emotional distress; intentional infliction of emotional distress; violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 2, 11; and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a). Sig Sauer has moved to dismiss Counts 1, 4, 7, and 8 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For a claim to be plausible, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When

4

determining whether a complaint satisfies that standard, a court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)).

III. Analysis

A. Strict Liability (Count 1)

Count 1 alleges an action in strict liability. Defendant contends that Massachusetts does not recognize causes of action in strict liability. Instead, Massachusetts law mandates that the exclusive cause of action for injuries caused by allegedly defective products is breach of implied warranty. Because the pleadings here allege claims for both strict liability and breach of warranty, defendant contends that the strict-liability claim should be dismissed as a matter of law.

Plaintiff does not appear to disagree. He contends that liability under a theory of strict liability, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, is subsumed by the expansive scope of Massachusetts's warranty protections.

In any event, “[t]here is no independent claim of ‘strict liability in tort' under Massachusetts law, and the sole remedy for strict liability is provided under the U.C.C.” Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 992 F.3d 44, 59 (1st Cir. 2021). However, “[u]nder applicable Massachusetts law, warranty liability is ‘a remedy intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict liability theory of recovery [of many other] jurisdictions.'” Osorio v. One World Techs. Inc., 659 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 2011)

5

(quoting Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 639 (1978)) (alteration in original). Thus, liability under the implied warranty of merchantability is “congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.” Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 22 (1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 425 Mass. 650, 653-54 (1997)). Nevertheless, claims alleging strict liability for defective products must be brought “under the Massachusetts law governing warranties.” Jackson v. Johnson & Johnson & Janssen Pharms., Inc., 330 F.Supp.3d 616, 627 (D. Mass. 2018).

Because there is no cause of action under Massachusetts law for strict liability, the motion to dismiss Count 1 will be granted.

B. Breach of Implied Warranty-Fitness for Particular Purpose (Count 4)

Count 4 alleges a breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. (Compl. ¶¶ 143-48).^[1] Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-315, a warranty of...