Collie v. Tucker

CourtArkansas Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtGEORGE ROSE SMITH; WARD
CitationCollie v. Tucker, 317 S.W.2d 137, 229 Ark. 606 (Ark. 1958)
Decision Date03 November 1958
Docket NumberNo. 5-1650,5-1650
PartiesLewis COLLIE et al., Appellants, v. Clyde TUCKER et al., Appellees.

Lawson E. Glover, Malvern, for appellants.

William C. Gilliam, Malvern, for appellees.

GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice.

Robert Lee Collie died testate on July 22, 1952, and his widow, Sarah F. Collie, died intestate on December 19, 1957. This case requires a construction of the husband's will in order to determine the ultimate disposition of certain real and personal property that Mrs. Collie received from her husband's estate and still held at the time of her own death. The appellants, who are the husband's collateral heirs, contend that Mrs. Collie was given only a life estate with a power of disposition and that at her death the devolution of the property now in dispute was controlled by her husband's will. The appellees, Mrs. Collie's collateral heirs, contend that she was given an estate in fee simple, so that the property should pass to them under the laws of descent and distribution. The trial court, construing Collie's will in connection with petitions filed by the appellants, held that Mrs. Collie had owned the property in fee.

The case turns upon the construction of these two paragraphs in the will of Robert Lee Collie:

'Third. After the payment of my debts, if any, and my funeral expenses I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Sarah F. Collie, all of my property, real, personal and mixed of whatsoever kind of which I may die seized and possessed, including our home place in Malvern, Ark., bank stock, notes and mortgages and all other property of any and all kinds, although not herein specifically mentioned. In as much as I have no children and my said wife has aided me to accumulate what we have I feel that it is only just and right, that should she outlive me, all I have should be absolutely hers, and that is my will.

'Fourth. It is my will in case my wife should not use and dispose of all my property during her lifetime, that whatever she may leave undisposed of, shall be equally divided between her heirs and my heirs.'

The probate court rightly concluded that this case is controlled by our decision, upon very similar facts, in Bernstein v. Bramble, 81 Ark. 480, 99 S.W. 682, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 1028. There the testator devised his residuary estate to his widow 'in fee simple forever,' and, in the next sentence of his will, attempted to provide for the distribution of any of the property that the widow had not disposed of during her lifetime or by her will. It was held that the limitation over was void, being inconsistent with the fee simple devise to the widow. In discussing a number of authorities we pointed out the governing distinction: If the will, construed in its entirety, shows that the testator intended for the first taker to have an estate in fee simple, then any subsequent language attempting to direct the disposition of property remaining undisposed of at the death of the first taker is void. If, however, the will shows that the testator intended for the first taker to have only a life estate with a power of disposition, then the testator may direct the disposition of property remaining undisposed of at the death of the life tenant.

In the present case Collie left all his property to his wife and added the unmistakable direction that it should be 'absolutely hers.' In view of this clear expression of Collie's intention that his widow would own the property outright instead of merely for life, the attempted limitation over must be declared void. We are not willing to set aside the rule of property that was announced in the Bernstein case and that has been adhered to ever since.

The four cases principally relied upon by the appellants are not out of harmony with the Bernstein decision. In two of them, Little Rock v. Lenon, 186 Ark. 460, 54 S.W.2d 287, and United States v. Moore, 197 Ark. 664, 124 S.W.2d 807, the original devise was modified by a codicil to the will, and we stressed the fact that the mere making of a codicil gives rise to the inference of a change in the testator's intention. In the other two, Jackson v. Robinson, 195 Ark. 431, 112 S.W.2d 417, and Piles v. Cline, 197 Ark. 857, 125 S.W.2d 129, the testamentary language was insufficient to create a fee simple estate in the first taker; so the subsequent limitation over was not inconsistent with the first gift.

It is also contended by the appellants that the issue in this case was conclusively adjudicated during the administration of Robert Lee Collie's estate. Sarah F. Collie was the executrix of her husband's will, and in filing her final account she inserted a statement that 'I am the sole legatee of said will and am entitled to all of the assets of said estate for and during my lifetime.' The probate court order approving the account recites that Mrs. Collie is entitled to all the property in her husband's estate, to use and dispose of as she chooses, and that the remainder not disposed of at her death shall descend according to the terms of Collie's will 'to their lawful heirs.'

It is evident that Mrs. Collie misunderstood the legal effect of her husband's will, and that misconception was embodied in the order approving her final account. Since this order was also an order of final distribution, containing all the recitals enumerated in subsection (b) of Ark.Stats.1947, § 62-2902, the appellants insist that subsection (d) of the statute requires that the order be given conclusive effect.

We do not agree with this view. The court was not called upon to determine the validity of the fourth paragraph in...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
6 cases
  • Housley v. Housley
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 1, 1964
    ...1028; Letzkus v. Nothwang, 170 Ark. 403, 279 S.W. 1006; Union Trust Co. v. Madigan, 183 Ark. 158, 35 S.W.2d 349; Collie v. Tucker, 229 Ark. 606, 317 S.W.2d 137. Appellee relies on Lytle, Ex'r v. Zebold, 235 Ark. 17, 357 S.W.2d 20, but in that case there was no doubt whatever that a trust wa......
  • Ahrens v. McNutt
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1971
    ...115 Ark. 400, 171 S.W. 480 (1914)) or there was an 'unmistakable direction that it should be 'absolutely hers',' (Collie v. Tucker, 229 Ark. 606, 317 S.W.2d 137 (1958)) then there would be no controversy. In support of their contention that the will devised only a life estate to Inez with a......
  • Langston v. Hunt, 80-114
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1980
    ...well-established rule of property are Bernstein v. Bramble, supra; Baum v. Fox, 192 Ark. 406, 91 S.W.2d 601 (1936); Collie v. Tucker, 229 Ark. 606, 317 S.W.2d 137 (1958); and Ahrens v. McNutt, 250 Ark. 941, 467 S.W.2d 721 We can think of no good reason why a testator would not clearly limit......
  • Thiel v. Dove
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 3, 1958
  • Get Started for Free