Collier v. Dickinson, 06-12614.

• Decision Date: 12 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-12614.,06-12614.
• Parties: Mary Ann COLLIER, Arthur L. Wallace, Roy McGoldrick, Robert Pino, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Fred O. DICKINSON, III, Carl A. Ford, Sandra Lambert, Michael D. McCaskill, Boyd Walden, Phillip Shelton, David M. Perryman, Lawrence J. Bilbo, Defendants-Appellees, Florida Department of Financial Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

477 F.3d 1306

Mary Ann COLLIER, Arthur L. Wallace, Roy McGoldrick, Robert Pino, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Fred O. DICKINSON, III, Carl A. Ford, Sandra Lambert, Michael D. McCaskill, Boyd Walden, Phillip Shelton, David M. Perryman, Lawrence J. Bilbo, Defendants-Appellees, Florida Department of Financial Services, Defendant.

No. 06-12614.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

February 12, 2007.

Joel S. Perwin, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jason Vail, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Mary Ann Collier, Arthur L. Wallace, Roy McGoldrick, and Robert Pino, as well as the putative class of all other similarly situated individuals (collectively "Plaintiffs"), appeal the dismissal of their Second Amended Complaint against Fred O. Dickinson III, Carl A. Ford, and Sandra Lambert (collectively "Defendants"). Defendants, who are executive-level officials at the Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV"), were sued in their individual capacity for selling the personal information that Plaintiffs provided to the DHSMV in order to obtain their drivers' licenses and/or vehicle registrations to mass marketers, in violation of the Driver Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721-2725.

In addition to a direct claim under the DPPA, Plaintiffs also sued for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the sale of personal information violated their constitutional right to privacy, in addition to their rights protected by the DPPA. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss all claims in the complaint on the grounds that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity offers protection for government officials, acting within their discretionary authority,¹ who are sued in their individual capacities as long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (citation omitted). We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity de novo and accept well-pleaded allegations as true, construing facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.2000).

To ascertain whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity we must first evaluate whether Plaintiffs' allegations, if true, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Second, if Plaintiffs' allegations, accepted as true, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, we must ask whether "the [federal] right [that was violated] was clearly established" at the time of the alleged conduct. Id. Accordingly, we conduct this two part inquiry as to each of the two claims presented by the plaintiff: those filed pursuant to Section 1983 and the direct claim for the violation of the DPPA.

I. Constitutional Right To Privacy

Plaintiffs first allege that they are entitled to relief under Section 1983 because Defendants violated their constitutional right to privacy when they released their personal information to mass marketers without their consent. We find that, under our precedent, the district court did not err in answering the first Saucier question — whether a constitutional right had been violated — in the negative. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1288 n. 10 (11th Cir.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1111, 120 S.Ct. 929, 145 L.Ed.2d 807 (2000). We are bound by Pryor and cannot, as a panel, revisit this issue. See Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 929 (11th Cir.2003) ("A prior panel decision of this Court is binding on subsequent panels and can be overturned only by the Court sitting en banc.") (citation omitted).

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs' allegations do not establish a constitutional violation under our precedent, there is no need to reach the second Saucier question of whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. The district court did not err in dismissing the constitutional claim under Section 1983 as barred by qualified immunity.

II. Statutory Right To Privacy

Plaintiffs make two claims asserting that their statutory right to privacy was violated by Defendants' conduct. One is a direct claim pursuant to the DPPA. The other is a claim pursuant to Section 1983, which imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of any rights secured by either the Constitution or federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, we must first determine whether the DPPA directly furnishes Plaintiffs with a cause of action. We must also determine whether the rights provided by the DPPA are separately enforceable under Section 1983.

1. Does The DPPA Create A Statutory Right To Privacy In Motor Vehicle Record Information That Is Enforceable Directly Under The Statute?

Count II of the complaint asserts a claim directly under the DPPA, and alleges that Defendants violated the statute when they sold motor vehicle record information to mass marketers without Plaintiffs' consent. The DPPA prohibits the release of personal information contained in individual motor vehicle records unless the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.² The statute provides a two part remedy. First, the statute provides enforcement against the states:

Any State department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance with this chapter shall be subject to a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than $5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance.

18 U.S.C. § 2723(b).

In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 provides a cause of action against individuals as follows:

(a) Cause of action. — A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United States district court.

(b) Remedies — The court may award — (1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500; (2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law; (3) reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and (4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.

18 U.S.C. § 2724 (emphasis added).

We find that the plain language of the DPPA clearly, unambiguously, and expressly creates a statutory right which may be enforced by enabling aggrieved individuals to sue persons who disclose their personal information in violation of the DPPA. Accordingly, if the acts alleged by Plaintiffs are taken to be true — that Defendants sold personal information without their consent — then Count II of the complaint states a cause of action under the DPPA.

2. Is The Statutory Right To Privacy Created By The DPPA Enforceable Separately Under Section 1983?

Plaintiffs also allege that they are entitled to the relief provided by Section 1983 because, by releasing their personal information to mass marketers without their consent, Defendants violated the statutory right to privacy granted to them by the DPPA. Defendants argue that, even if the plain language of the statute grants individuals a right to sue persons who violate it, the DPPA does not also create an enforceable right under Section 1983 because the remedial scheme set forth in the statute is inconsistent with additional relief under Section 1983.

It is settled that "the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law." Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). For a federal statute to be enforceable under Section 1983, three conditions must be satisfied. First, Congress must have intended that the enforcement provisions of the statute focus on benefiting the plaintiff individually, rather than focusing on benefiting a group or making system-wide changes. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). Second, the right "protected by the statute [must not be] so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence." Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (quotation and citation omitted). Third, the provision giving rise to the right "must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States" in that it is "couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms." Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (citation omitted). If all three conditions are satisfied, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the statute is enforceable under Section 1983. This presumption can only be refuted if Congress expressly or impliedly created "a comprehensive enforcement scheme [in the statute in question] that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983." Id.

We have no hesitancy in finding that the plain language of the DPPA clearly satisfies all three conditions to make it enforceable under Section 1983. First, the enforcement provisions of the statute unambiguously focus on benefiting individuals, rather than focusing on benefiting a group or making system-wide changes. The statute makes the official who disobeys the law "liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a civil action in a United States...