Collier v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 30 May 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–1790 RMC
• Citation: 46 F.Supp.3d 6
• Parties: Owen Collier, et al., Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

46 F.Supp.3d 6

Owen Collier, et al., Plaintiffs

v.District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–1790 RMC

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed May 30, 2014

Lawrence Searle Lapidus, The Lapidus Law Firm, PLLC, Geoffrey D. Allen, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Steven J. Anderson, Office of Attorney General for DC, Patrice A. Sulton, Sulton Law Offices, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge

PlaintiffsAnthony Smart and Owen Collier, Jr. worked as security guards at Stadium Nightclub.Last June, they were involved in a middle-of-the-night fracas when tasked with escorting unruly customers out of the nightclub.When they reached the club's parking lot, the customers began fighting with the security officers.Officers with the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department(MPD), who happened to be nearby, came running to break up the fight.Plaintiffs allege that they were injured: one of the Stadium Nightclub guests, LaQuan Williams, punched Mr. Smart in the jaw, and MPD Officer Marques McRae struck Mr. Collier in the eye with a baton.Plaintiffs sued Mr. Williams, Officer McRae, and the District of Columbia; Mr. Williams and the District of Columbia have moved to dismiss.As explained below, Defendants' motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

I.FACTS

In the early morning hours of June 23, 2013, Messrs. Collier and Smart were working security at Stadium Nightclub, located at 2127 Queens Chapel Rd., N.E., Washington, D.C.At around 2:30 a.m. in the early morning of June 23, LaQuan Williams and his entourage of around thirty people were smoking marijuana and other illegal substances inside the club.¹Second Am. Compl.[Dkt. 23]¶ 9.As a result, club management asked them to leave.Id.Messrs. Collier and Smart escorted the group outside to the parking lot.Once outside, Mr. Williams allegedly socked Mr. Smart in the jaw and battered other parts of his body.Id.¶¶ 9, 38.Mr. Smart asserts that he suffered serious injury including “multiple bruises and contusions over many parts of his body.”Id.¶ 39.

Mr. Smart's fellow security officers attempted to help him.But then, members of Mr. Williams' entourage responded by attacking the security officers.Id.¶ 9.MPD officers observed what was happening and rushed to the scene wielding their batons.Id.Officer McRae allegedly hit Mr. Collier in the eye with his baton, causing eye and traumatic brain injuries.Id.¶¶ 9, 23–24.

Messrs. Smart and Collier filed suit in D.C. Superior Court.The case was removed here.SeeNotice of Removal[Dkt. 1].The complaint has been amended twice, and the current operative version is the Second Amended Complaint, which sets forth seven counts.Mr. Collier asserts Counts I through VI, and Mr. Smart asserts Count VII, as follows:

Count I—Negligence (against the District of Columbia);

Count II—Assault and Battery (against the District of Columbia);

Count III—Assault and Battery (against Officer McRae);

Count IV—Violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983(against Officer McRae);²

Count V—Violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment pursuant to42 U.S.C. § 1983(against the District of Columbia);

Count VI—Assault and Battery (Mr. Collier against Mr. Williams); and

Count VII—Assault and Battery (Mr. Smart against Mr. Williams).

SecondAm. Compl. ¶¶ 14–39.

In support of the claims against the District of Columbia, Mr. Collier asserts that the District had a custom of failing to require officers to file “use-of-force incident reports,” known as PD914(e) forms, citing the case of a man named Troy Richardson as an example.Id.¶ 11.Mr. Richardson suffered injury to his wrists when he was arrested, handcuffed, and dragged by police.Mr. Collier alleges that a PD914(e) form was not filled out “even though it was clearly required by the Police Department's own regulations” and that due to the failure to file the form, there was no referral to the Department's Internal Affairs Division for an investigation.Id.Mr. Collier reasons that “[t]he failure to investigate incidents involving excessive force by officers was tolerated by policy makers in the Police Department and created a situation where officers knew they could exercise excessive force with minimal risk of adverse consequences.”³Id.

Mr. Collier further alleges that the District of Columbia inadequately trained and supervised Officer McRae.Id.¶ 12.Mr. Collier was struck in the head with a baton, a potentially deadly use of force which is permitted only when an officer is faced with deadly force.First Am. Compl.[Dkt. 10], Ex. 2(Decl. of Robert Klotz, Use of Force Expert).⁴Mr. Collier asserts that he was not threatening deadly force against Officer McRae or anyone else, and thus the strike to his head was unjustified.SecondAm. Compl. ¶ 12.Mr. Collier alleges that the District, via its custom and policy, failed to train and supervise its police officers in the “proper manner to intervene in incidents involving multiple assaults occurring at the same time,”id.¶ 30, and due to the lack of training and supervision, Officer McRae “intervened in [the melee] by applying a savage, wholly unjustified and disproportionate use of force by striking plaintiff Collier in the head with a baton,”id.¶ 3 1.Mr. Smart does not make any allegations against Officer McRae or the District of Columbia.

Mr. Williams filed a motion to dismiss Counts VI and VII, and Plaintiffs oppose.SeeWilliams Mot. to Dismiss[Dkt. 11];Pls. Opp'n[Dkt. 13];Williams Reply[Dkt. 16].The District of Columbia filed a motion to dismiss Counts I and V, and Mr. Collier, the only Plaintiff with claims against the District, opposes.SeeDistrict Mot. for Partial Dismissal[Dkt. 15];Collier Opp'n[Dkt. 17];District Reply[Dkt. 18].⁵

II.LEGAL STANDARD AND JURISDICTION

A.Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the adequacy of a complaint on its face, testing whether a plaintiff has stated properly a claim.In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and matters about which the court may take judicial notice.Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao,508 F.3d 1052, 1059(D.C.Cir.2007)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A complaint must “give a defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007)(internal citations omitted).Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, it must include “more than labels and conclusions” and the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”Id.“[A] complaint needs some information about the circumstances giving rise to the claims.”Aktieselskabet Af 21. Nov.2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc.,525 F.3d 8, 16 n. 4(D.C.Cir.2008)(emphasis in original).To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.”Twombly,550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868(2009).A court must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact,”Twombly,550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, but a court need not accept as true legal conclusions set forth in a complaint, Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B.Jurisdiction

The Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Counts IV and V allege violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.All other Counts assert violations of D.C. law.In its discretion, a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over local law claims joined with federal claims.See28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

III.ANALYSIS

A. Owen Collier's Assault and Battery Claim Against LaQuan Williams

Mr. Williams moves to dismiss Count VI, alleging that he did not assault or batter Mr. Collier because he had no physical contact with Mr. Collier.Under District of Columbia law, an assault is “an intentional and unlawful attempt or threat, either by words or acts, to do physical harm to the victim.”Etheredge v. District of Columbia,635 A.2d 908, 916(D.C.1993).To prove an assault, a plaintiff must show that he suffered apprehension of harmful or offensive contact and that a reasonable person in his position would have experienced such apprehension.Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel,526 F.Supp. 523, 529(D.D.C.1981)(discussing D.C. law);see alsoMadden v. D.C. Transit System, Inc.,307 A.2d 756, 767(D.C.1973)(“An essential element of the ancient tort of assault is the intentional putting another in apprehension of an immediate and harmful or offensive conduct.”).To prove a battery, a plaintiff must show that he suffered harmful or offensive bodily contact from defendant's intentional act.Rogers,526 F.Supp. at 529(quotingJackson v. District of Columbia,412 A.2d 948, 955(D.C.1979) ).

Mr. Collier does not allege assault because he does not assert that Mr. Williams intentionally threatened him or attempted to cause him harm.Mr. Collier does not allege battery because he does not claim that Mr. Williams had bodily contact with him.Instead, Mr. Collier relies on a creative, but ultimately unsuccessful, theory of proximate causation.He contends that he was assaulted and battered by Officer McRae and that this was a foreseeable consequence of Mr....