Collier v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | EAGLE-PICHER,No. 577,577 |
| Citation | 86 Md.App. 38,585 A.2d 256 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,868 Helen COLLIER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Loid Collier, et al. v.INDUSTRIES, INC., et al |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Patricia J. Kasputys (Peter G. Angelos, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellants.
Richard P. Kidwell, Stephen J. Hughes and Miles & Stockbridge, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellant, Corhart.
Stephen J. Hughes (Richard P. Kidwell, Miles & Stockbridge, Baltimore, Dennis Whelley, Mann & Whelley, John W. Geldmacher and Parks, Hansen & Ditch, on the brief), Towson, for appellees.
Peter G. Angelos, Patricia J. Kasputys, Baltimore, on the brief for appellees, Floyd, Chappel, Parto, Morosko and Wilkens.
Argued before WILNER, C.J., ALPERT, JJ., and JAMES S. GETTY, Judge (Retired), Specially Assigned.
The appeals now before us arise from consolidated proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County in which several plaintiffs sued several defendants to recover for injuries resulting from the plaintiffs' exposure to asbestos-containing products. Each of the defendants was alleged to have manufactured, sold, or supplied such a product to which the plaintiffs were exposed while employed at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation plant in Sparrows Point, Maryland. 1
We are concerned, most immediately, with eight of the plaintiffs and three of the defendants, although the status of several other defendants is also relevant. One aspect of this proceeding--the appeal by the plaintiffs and a cross-appeal by the three defendants--concerns the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act (Md.Ann.Code art. 50, §§ 16-24) and the way in which the Circuit Court applied it. A second aspect--a separate appeal by defendant Corhart Refractories Company (Corhart)--touches on an evidentiary issue and challenges whether the plaintiffs produced legally sufficient evidence that they were exposed to an asbestos-containing product supplied by Corhart. A third, preliminary, aspect is whether, by reason of petitions filed by the other two defendant-appellees/cross-appellants under Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, we may even proceed to decide these appeals.
The first and third aspects are especially related, and so we shall start with them. They involve five of the plaintiffs--Collier, Wilkins, Regula, Pilachowski, and Morosko--and the three defendant-appellees/cross-appellants--Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. (Eagle-Picher), The Celotex Corporation (Celotex), and Corhart.
The appeals and cross-appeals challenging the manner in which the court dealt with the Uniform Act are presented to us through an agreed Statement of the Case and one exhibit, and so we do not have a record extract containing the pleadings and relevant motions or documenting all that occurred in the Circuit Court with respect to these matters.
Each of the five plaintiffs had initially sued other defendants in addition to Eagle-Picher, Celotex, and Corhart, apparently on the theory that they too had manufactured, sold, or supplied asbestos-containing products to which the plaintiffs were injuriously exposed. The plaintiffs eventually settled with those defendants, however, entering some settlements prior to trial and some during trial. In addition to the more-or-less standard language effecting a release of liability, the form of release given to each of those defendants stated, in relevant part, that:
(Emphasis added.)
The parties had agreed that the defendants who settled before trial would not appear at trial and that those who settled during trial would thereafter cease to participate. Through a general pre-trial order, each of the defendants was deemed to have filed cross-claims against all other defendants, and it was further agreed that those cross- claims, which we assume were for contribution, would not be submitted to the jury but would instead be resolved by the court in a post-trial proceeding. The defendants, but not the plaintiffs, had also agreed that, at that proceeding, the evidence admitted at the jury trial bearing on the liability of the settling defendants could be considered in determining the cross-claims.
After rendition of the jury's verdicts in favor of the five plaintiffs, the court conducted a proceeding to resolve the cross-claims. What actually occurred is not clearly reflected in the agreed Statement of the Case, but it appears that (1) the initial phase of the proceeding was to determine which of the settling defendants were joint tortfeasors, (2) the plaintiffs, over their objection, were excluded from participating in that phase on the ground that they had no interest, and therefore no standing, in the matter, and (3) no additional evidence was presented to the court as to who was, or was not, a joint tortfeasor. The defendants presented memoranda to the court explaining their respective positions, to which were attached excerpts from the evidence admitted at trial.
After considering the memoranda, the court determined, in some form and manner not clearly reflected in the Statement of the Case, which of the settling defendants were joint tortfeasors with Eagle-Picher, Celotex, and Corhart. Following that determination, the court addressed what, if any, reductions should be made to the verdicts by reason of the various settlements and releases. The plaintiffs were permitted to participate, and did participate, in that phase of the proceeding.
A number of different views were presented to the court. Eagle-Picher, Celotex, and Corhart moved that the verdicts be reduced by all amounts or pro tanto shares paid by all of the settling defendants, whether or not they were joint tortfeasors. The court rejected that motion. The issue then became the amount of credit that ought to flow from a joint release that each of the plaintiffs had separately entered into with three defendants--GAF, Inc. (GAF), Quigley Company, Inc. (Quigley), and Keene Corporation (Keene)--who were part of a group known as the Center for Claims Resolution. A single, aggregate sum was paid to each of the plaintiffs on behalf of all three of those defendants in exchange for the joint release. The release did not indicate what, if any, contribution to that sum was made by the respective defendants.
The dispute between the parties arose from the fact that, in the first phase of the post-trial proceeding, the court had determined that two of the three defendants so released--GAF and Quigley--were not joint tortfeasors in these cases; only Keene was found to be a joint tortfeasor. The question, then, was whether, for purposes of the Uniform Act, the entire amount paid for the joint release or only the amount contributed by Keene was to be regarded as the "consideration paid for the release." The relevance, and importance, of this determination is evident from one section of the Act--s 19 of art. 50--and from the language of the release itself.
Section 19 provides:
"A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid."
The release, as noted earlier, provides for a reduction of any recovery against the "other alleged tortfeasors or other person or entity to the extent of the pro-rata share recoverable by law from Releasees, in accordance with [the Uniform Act]" but made clear that the "reduction effected hereby shall not be construed to affect the recovery in any suit, cause of action or claim to which the said Releasees shall not have been adjudged legally liable for contribution."
The plaintiffs offered evidence that the parties to the releases intended to consider each of the three released defendants as having paid "equal proportional shares of the consideration" and thus urged the court to consider, as the "consideration paid for the release," only the contribution by Keene--the sole joint tortfeasor among the three releases. That would have made Keene's pro rata share greater than the actual dollar consideration in the Collier, Regula, and Morosko cases, thus causing the judgments to be reduced by the former rather than the latter. Eagle-Picher, Celotex, and Corhart, on the other hand, insisted that the full amounts paid to the plaintiffs be regarded as the consideration for the respective releases, in which event it would exceed Keene's pro rata share and therefore become the credit to be applied against the judgments. The results flowing...
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