Collier v. State )., 1091327.

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: LYONS, Justice.
• Citation: 64 So.3d 1045
• Parties: Ex parte Lee M. COLLIER.(In re Lee M. Collierv.State of Alabama).
• Docket Number: 1091327.
• Decision Date: 03 December 2010

64 So.3d 1045

Ex parte Lee M. COLLIER.(In re Lee M. Collier
v.
State of Alabama).

1091327.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 3, 2010.

[64 So.3d 1046]

Lee M. Collier, pro se.Troy King, atty. gen., and William D. Little, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.LYONS, Justice.

Lee M. Collier filed in the trial court a motion pursuant to Rule 29, Ala. R.Crim. P., that he entitled “Motion to Correct Clerical Error in Calculation of Credit Toward Sentence for Time Spent Incarcerated Pending Trial.” The trial court summarily denied the motion without requiring a response from the State. Collier appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals treated Collier's motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and it affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the basis that Collier did not verify his petition and therefore did not properly commence his action. Collier v. State (No. CR–09–0657, May 21, 2010), ––– So.3d –––– (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (table). Collier then petitioned this Court for certiorari review. We granted Collier's petition to review two issues: (1) whether a motion to correct a clerical error in the calculation of pretrial-incarceration credit should be treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and, if so, (2) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that Collier's petition was defective because it was not verified conflicts with Smith v. State, 918 So.2d 141, 154 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). We affirm.

Collier alleged in his motion that he was entitled to 231 days' credit in each of 6 cases based upon his incarceration before he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree receiving stolen property, breaking and entering a vehicle, attempted theft of property, third-degree burglary, and first-degree theft of property. Collier signed his motion but did not verify under oath that the statements in it were true to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

Citing Breach v. State, 687 So.2d 1257 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), and Swicegood v. State, 646 So.2d 158 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unpublished memorandum, treated Collier's motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because, it said, “a writ of habeas corpus is the proper method by which to review whether the State has properly calculated an inmate's jail credit.” The Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that § 15–21–4, Ala.Code 1975, provides that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “ ‘must be verified by the oath of the appellant to the effect that the statements therein contained are true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.’ ” The court held:

“ ‘The failure to verify a petition for writ of habeas corpus is not a “nicety of pleading” that can be disregarded.’ Pruitt v. State, 509 So.2d 258, 259 (Ala.Crim.App.1987).... Because Collier did not verify his petition, he did not properly commence his action, and there was no evidence before the circuit court.”

We first address whether a motion to correct a clerical error in the calculation of pretrial-incarceration credit should be treated as a motion pursuant to Rule 29, Ala. R.Crim. P., or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This issue presents a material question of first impression requiring decision by this Court.

Rule 29 states:

“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal or thereafter,

[64 So.3d 1047]

such mistakes may be so corrected by the trial court.”Collier argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon outdated law when it treated his Rule 29 motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Collier acknowledges that Boutwell v. State, 488 So.2d 33 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), and its progeny hold that the proper way for an inmate to challenge the calculation of his or her pretrial-incarceration credit is by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but, he argues, those cases no longer apply because they were decided before Rule 29, Ala. R.Crim. P., was adopted. With the adoption of Rule 29, Collier argues, this Court established a procedure by which a defendant claiming that a clerical error occurred in the trial court could seek to have that error corrected. Collier argues that §§ 15–21–1 through –34, Ala.Code 1975, dealing with habeas corpus petitions apply only if this Court has not adopted a different procedure. Collier maintains that the adoption of Rule 29 by this Court displaced the use of a habeas corpus petition to correct errors made by the trial court in calculating a sentence and that a motion pursuant to Rule 29, rather than a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, is the proper avenue for an inmate to challenge the sentencing court's calculation of the time spent incarcerated pending trial.

In response, the State maintains that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus continues to be the proper avenue for a defendant who questions his or her pretrial-incarceration credit.

“It is well established that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper procedure to determine whether the appellant has been credited with the correct amount of actual time spent incarcerated pending trial for the offense for which he was eventually sentenced. See, e.g., Hardy v. State, 534 So.2d 328 (Ala.Cr.App.1988); Smith v. State, 504 So.2d 1224 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); Boutwell v. State, 488 So.2d 33 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).”

Taunton v. State, 562 So.2d 614, 614 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). That holding has been consistently reaffirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See, e.g., Sundberg v. Thomas, 13 So.3d 43 (Ala.Crim.App.2009); Culbreth v. State, 966 So.2d 912 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); and Ware v. State, 807 So.2d 594 (Ala.Crim.App.2001). Neither this Court nor the Court of Criminal Appeals has considered the specific question Collier raises—whether a motion under Rule 29 has superseded a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as the proper vehicle for challenging the calculation of pretrial-incarceration credit.

Credit for incarceration before trial is authorized by § 15–18–5, Ala.Code 1975, which provides:

“Upon conviction and imprisonment for any felony or misdemeanor, the sentencing court shall order that the convicted person be credited...