Collins' Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 03 June 1958
• Citation: 142 A.2d 178,393 Pa. 195
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Edith E. COLLINS. Appeal of Barbara P. WADHAMS. Appeal of David C. PERRY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 178

142 A.2d 178

393 Pa. 195

In re ESTATE of Edith E. COLLINS Appeal of Barbara P. WADHAMS Appeal of David C. PERRY.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 3, 1958.

Elkins Wetherill, Henderson, Wetherill & O'Hey, Knox Henderson, Norristown, for appellants.

George C. Denniston, Snyder & Bent, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and MUSMANNO, ARNOLD, BENJAMIN R. JONES and COHEN, JJ.

BENJAMIN R. JONES, Justice.

These appeals present a single question: where a testatrix provides in her will that 'Upon the death of either of my said children leaving descendants * * * her surviving, to pay * * * principal * * * to such surviving descendants' are surviving children adopted by testatrix's daughter 'descendants' within the meaning of the will?

On December 6, 1912 testatrix executed her will. ¹ The pertinent paragraphs of the will are: ² 'Fourth. All the rest and residue of my property, real and personal, and wheresoever situated, I give, devise and bequeath unto [testatrix's two sons and a trust company] In Trust * * *

'(1) To divide and pay over all the net income of my residuary estate equally, share and share alike, to my three children Henry Hill Collins Jr., Alfred Morris Collins and Edith Conrad Collins for the terms of their natural lives respectively * * * '(2) Upon the death of either of my said children leaving descendants him or her surviving, to pay one-third of the principal of my estate, to such surviving descendants, share and share alike, but taking by representation, provided such descendants have then reached the age of twenty-one (21) years; but in case of the minority of any of them, then to accumulate the income of his, her or their proportionate part of said one-third share and to pay the principal together with the accumulations upon reaching the age of twenty-one (21) years; and in case of the death of any such descendants during minority, then to pay over and distribute his, her or their proportionate share of principal to the next-of-kin of the minor or minors so dying, in accordance with the intestate laws of the State of Pennsylvania.

'(3) And in default of descendants surviving my said child so dying as aforesaid, then to hold such one-third part for the benefit, share and share alike, of my surviving child or children, and the descendants of any of my children who may then be dead (such descendants taking their parents share by representation), such accrued shares to be subject in all respects to the estates, proportions, limitations, conditions and restrictions that I have hereinbefore provided with respect to the original shares.

'(4) And upon the death of my last surviving child, without leaving descendants him or her surviving, and in default of the descendants of his or her brothers or sister then living, to pay over the said principal of my residuary estate remaining In Trust to such person or persons and in such estate and estates, as my said last surviving child shall by last will and testament or writing in the nature thereof, limit and appoint; and in default of such appointment to the heirs and next-of-kin of my said last surviving child, in accordance with the Intestate Laws of the State of Pennsylvania.'

On September 25, 1921 testatrix died, her three children being then alive. Alfred M. Collins died in 1951, survived by his wife and one adopted daughter. ³ Henry H. Collins, Jr., died January 1, 1957, survived by his wife and four natural born children. Edith C. Perry--the 'last surviving child'--died January 8, 1957, survived by her husband and two adopted children (the present appellants)--Barbara Wadhams, adopted when four years of age, on October 2, 1930 and David C. Perry, adopted when approximately eight years of age, on March 10, 1933.

Because of the termination of the trusts created under testatrix' will by reason of the life tenants' deaths a first and final account was filed. At the audit of this account the Orphans' Court of Montgomery County, over appellants' objections, awarded the entire principal of the estate to the four children of Henry H. Collins, Jr., deceased, ruling that Edith C. Perry's adopted children were not her 'descendants' under testatrix' will.

Appellants do not base their claim upon the terms of any statute nor upon any contention that the will contains a gift to children, as such, of the life tenants. On the contrary, they claim that by testatrix' use of the word 'descendants' in her will she intended to include therein persons to whom property descends under the laws of Pennsylvania and that, as adopted children, they are within that class.

The determination of this controversy depends upon an interpretation and construction of the fourth paragraph of this will: an evaluation of testatrix' intent as and to the extent such intent may be evident from the language and terms of the instrument. ⁴ The keyword is 'descendants'; by the employment of this legal and technical word what class of takers did testatrix describe? In this connection it is important to note that this will--obviously a carefully drafted documents--refers to five classes of possible takers of testatrix' property: children, grandchildren, descendants (mentioned eight times), next of kin, and heirs and next of kin, the latter two classes to be determined by the intestate laws of Pennsylvania. From the class of 'descendants' testatrix' children are excluded both by her description of the events upon which 'descendants' were to take and the share which they were to take: the reference in the third paragraph to certain named 'grandchildren' did not operate to exclude them as 'descendants' yet the terms of the fourth paragraph indicate that 'grandchildren', while includable in the class of 'descendants', would not necessarily represent the totality of membership in such class. The fact that testatrix directed how 'next of kin' and 'heirs and next of kin' were to be determined--that is, 'in accordance with the intestate laws of the State of Pennsylvania'--may have deep significance, as we shall point out, infra, in determining what decedent meant by 'descendants'.

The meaning of testatrix' designation of certain testamentary distributees as 'descendants' must receive its construction from the context of the will and the law extent at the time the will became effective, to wit, September 21, 1921. 'But, even though testamentary intent is to be construed as of the date of execution of a will, if the words employed to express the intent have a legal or technical meaning, they are to be so interpreted according to the law in effect at the testator's death unless the will contains a clearly expressed intention to the contrary': Farmers Trust Co. v. Wilson, 361 Pa. 43, 46, 63 A.2d 14, 17, and cases therein cited; In re Ashhurst's Estaste, 133 Pa.Super. 526, 3 A.2d 218. ⁵ Particularly does this will speak from the date of testatrix' death since the legal word employed involves the right of inheritance, a right dependent on statutory authorization. 'The right of inheritance is purely statutory, and he who claims a share in the inheritance must point to the law which transmits it to him': In re Boyd's Estate, 270 Pa. 504, 113 A. 691, 692.

Were adopted children 'descendants', under the law in effect when testastrix died in 1921? We have said that: 'At common law adopted children had no right of inheritance whatsoever from their adopting parents. All such rights are purely statutory': In re Howlett's Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 297, 77 A.2d 390, 392. Prior to 1855, adoption arose through special legislative action in individual instances. The Act of May 4, 1855, P.L. 430, was the first general legislation in this Commonwealth relating to adoption; it granted an adopted child 'all the rights of a child and heir of [the] adopting parent, * * *: Provided, that if [the] adopting parent shall have other children, the adopted shall share the inheritance only as one of them in case of intestacy, and he, she or they shall respectively inherit from and through each other as if all had been the lawful children of the same parent.' See In re Carroll's Estate, 219 Pa. 440, 445, 68 A. 1038; In re Thompson's Adoption, 290 Pa. 586, 590, 139 A. 737.

This Act of 1855 has a four-fold significance: its declaration that an adopted child was the 'heir' of its adopting parents, its recognition of the existence of reciprocal rights of inheritance between an adopted child and its adoptive brothers and sisters, its omission to grant reciprocal rights of inheritance to the adopting parents and its recognition that estates of intestates might descend to and be distributed among persons not of the blood of the intestate. ⁶ In the wake of this statute a 'somewhat confused state of judicial expression in regard to this subject * * *' resulted. ⁷ Twelve years later this Court stated: 'Adopted children are not children of the person by whom they have been adopted, and the Act of Assembly does not attempt the impossibility of making them such * * * The right to inherit from the adopting parent is made complete but the identity of the child is not changed. One adopted has the rights of a child without being a child.' ⁸ A review of the decisions under the Act of 1855 and subsequent adoption and inheritance statutes ⁹ prior to the passage of the Wills and Intestaste Acts of 1917 indicates that, even though the legislature expressly declared an adopted child to be both a child and an heir of his adopting parents, our courts in many instances failed to grant such a status to the adopted child. An adopted child was acknowledged to have the right to inherit his adopted parent's estates; ¹⁰ in the absence of adoptive brothers and sisters, a deceased adopted child's estate would go to its nastural, rather than adopting parents; ¹¹ the estate of a deceased adopted child which came from his natural parents, the adopting parents being alive, would go to his natural, rather than...