Collins v. Alabama G.S.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 August 1894
• Citation: 16 So. 140,104 Ala. 390
• Parties: COLLINS v. ALABAMA G. S. R. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

16 So. 140

104 Ala. 390

COLLINS v. ALABAMA G. S. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

August 10, 1894

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; James J. Banks, Judge.

Action by James R. Collins against the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company to recover damages for failure to deliver goods shipped. Judgment was rendered for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The 1st, 2d, 3d, and 5th counts of the complaint sought a recovery of the defendant as a common carrier; and the remaining counts, the 4th and 6th, undertook to hold the defendant responsible as a warehouseman. The defendant pleaded the general issue to all of the counts, and to the 4th and 6th counts pleaded the statute of limitations of one year.

The evidence introduced upon the trial of the cause, as is shown by the bill of exceptions, is without conflict, and is substantially as follows: On July 7, 1891, the plaintiff James R. Collins, shipped from New York to Birmingham, Ala a bale of burlaps, consigned to himself, which was valued at $168.58. On the bill of lading there was an indorsement which required the defendant to notify Stollenwerck & Co. in the city of Birmingham of the arrival of the goods. On July 17 1891, the plaintiff again shipped, consigned to his own order, from New York to Birmingham, four bales of burlaps valued at $160. This bill of lading required that one T. H Spencer should be notified of the arrival of the goods in Birmingham, Ala. These bills of lading were issued in the state of New York, and were like other contracts of that kind. The goods which were shipped on July 7, 1891, arrived in Birmingham July 15th, and those shipped on July 17th arrived at Birmingham on the 24th day of July, 1891. Stollenwerck & Co. were notified of the arrival of the goods, and it was shown that a postal card directed to "T. H. Spencer, Birmingham, Alabama," was placed in the post office at Birmingham by one of the employés of the defendant. The goods remained in the freight depot of the defendant at Birmingham until the night of July 30, 1891, on which night the said freight depot was consumed by fire. At the time of said fire there was stored in the said freight depot a large quantity of powder, which exploded and destroyed the goods of the plaintiff which were at that time in the said depot. The depot building in which these goods were kept was described in detail, and it was shown that said depot was built of corrugated iron and covered with tin, and that the railroad company kept a competent watchman there at night for the purpose of guarding the depot. There was no positive evidence introduced showing how the fire occurred, further than a suspicion, which did not amount to proof, that one Ellis, who was an employé of the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, and who was behind with the company in his accounts, had purposely set fire to the house for the purpose of hiding his default. The evidence showed that the powder which exploded in the depot that night had been shipped to Birmingham over the line of the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company to J. B. Morson, and that Morson had been duly notified of the arrival of the powder on the morning of the 30th July; that the powder arrived on the day before the explosion; that is to say, on the 29th day of July; the fire and explosion occurring on the night of the 30th. The evidence further showed that on the same night of the explosion, and a little while prior thereto, the watchman, who was on duty at the depot, made an examination around the building, and found no fire in the building. The evidence showed that at the time of the explosion the watchman was not at the building, but had gone, or had started to the Union Depot for the purpose of getting a cup of coffee or some lunch.

The objections to the evidence, which are ruled upon by this court on the present appeal, are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Upon the hearing of all the evidence the court, at the request of the defendant, gave the general affirmative charge in its behalf, and to the giving of this charge the plaintiff duly excepted. The plaintiff brings this appeal, and assigns as error the rulings of the trial court upon the evidence, and the giving of the general affirmative charge for the defendant.

Lane & White, for appellant.

A. G. Smith, for appellee.

HARALSON J.

1. The first assignment of error is, that the court below erred in overruling plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's fourth plea; but, the record fails to disclose what that demurrer was, and we cannot, therefore, consider this assignment.

2. According to the decisions of this court, without reference to any statute on the subject, the liability of a railroad company as a common carrier of goods transported over its line, does not cease on the arrival of the goods at their destination, and their deposit there in a warehouse, but continues until the lapse of a reasonable time for the removal of the goods by the consignee, and its liability as a warehouseman does not begin, until its liability as a common carrier has ceased. Railroad Co. v. Ludden, 89 Ala 613, 7 So. 471; Railroad Co. v. Ledbetter, 92 Ala. 326, 9 So. 73. As a general rule, the undertaking of a common carrier to transport goods to a particular destination, includes the obligation of a safe delivery of them to the consignee. Railroad Co. v. Wood, 66 Ala. 167. The decisions of this court, however, in the case of railroads have established the rule to be, that when a railroad company receives goods for transportation, safely carries them to their destination, informs the consignee of their arrival, and affords him reasonable opportunity to remove them, its duty and obligation as a common carrier are at an end; and if the goods are left in its custody, its liability for a subsequent loss or damage, is that of a warehouseman only. In that relation, it is bound only to...