Collins v. Los Angeles County

Decision Date12 April 1966
Docket NumberNo. 29958,29958
Citation50 Cal.Rptr. 586,241 Cal.App.2d 451
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesJames Arley COLLINS and Roy Lee Songer, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political subdivision of the State of California, Defendant and Respondent. Civ.

Roy C. Zukerman and Russell J. Mattier, West Covina, for appellants.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Robert C. Lynch, Asst. County Counsel, for respondent.

LILLIE, Justice.

In a second amended complaint for damages plaintiffs named County of Los Angeles in two causes of action alleging their false arrest and imprisonment by two deputy sheriffs. Plaintiffs appeal from judgment dismissing the action as to the County following an order sustaining without leave to amend its demurrer to the second and sixth causes of action. Other named defendants are not parties to this appeal.

On June 1, 1964, the within action was initiated by the filing of a complaint. On September 16, 1964, in a second amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged in the second and sixth causes of action, that on June 3, 1963, they were falsely arrested and imprisoned by deputy sheriffs acting within the scope of their authority as agents of the County of Los Angeles; that during the course of a trial on the criminal charges on which they were arrested, which commenced October 9, 1963, and terminated on October 24, 1963, they first discovered that their arrest and imprisonment had not been lawful, in that the deputies did not have a valid warrant therefor and did not 'reasonably believe that a public offense had been committed in their presence'; that prior to the trial they were not aware and, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have become aware that their arrest was made by officers who did not then 'reasonably believe that a public offense had been committed in their presence'; and that they filed verified claim for damages with the County of Los Angeles on December 27, 1963, within 100 days from the discovery of the unlawfulness of their arrest. Inasmuch as the filing of such claim was not made within 100 days from the date of the actual arrest and imprisonment (June 3, 1963), the same was rejected by the County; this action followed.

The sole issue is whether plaintiffs presented their claim to the County within 100 days after 'the accrual of the cause of action' as then required under section 715, Government Code. Appellants argue that their cause of action for false arrest and false imprisonment did not accrue until they discovered the falsity of their arrest upon the termination of the trial of the criminal cause (October 24, 1963). The trial court held that the date of accrual of plaintiffs' cause of action was June 3, 1963, thus no verified claim was timely filed with the County under section 715. We conclude that the County's demurrer to the second and sixth causes of action was properly sustained without leave to amend.

The applicable claim statute then in effect, section 715, Government Code (later repealed, and now section 911.2) provided: 'A claim relating to a cause of action * * * for physical injury to the person or to personal property * * * shall be presented as provided in Section 714 not later than the one hundredth day after the accrual of the cause of action. * * *

'For the purpose of computing the time limit prescribed by this section, the date of accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates is the date upon which the cause of action accrued within the meaning of the applicable statute of limitations.'

Section 312, Code of Civil Procedure, introducing the limitation provisions in the Code, provides that civil actions can only be commenced within the specified periods 'after the cause of action shall have accrued.' A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon. (Bainbridge v. County of Riverside, 167 Cal.App.2d 418, 422, 334 p.2d 625; Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal.App.2d 781, 789, 302 P.2d 49; Smith v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 86 Cal.App.2d 581, 590, 195 P.2d 457; Los Angeles Co. v. Metropolitan C. Ins. Co., 135 Cal.App. 26, 28, 26 P.2d 699.) Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed, and the statute of limitations runs from that time; thus, a cause of action in tort arises when the wrongful act is committed, not at the time of discovery of the act. The Supreme Court early declared, 'Cases of hardship may arise, and do arise, under this rule, as they arise under every statute of limitations; but this, of course, presents no reason for the modification of a principle and policy which upon the whole have been found to make largely for good. * * * And so throughout the law, except in cases of fraud, it is the time of the act, and not the time of the discovery, which sets the statute (of limitations) in operation. (Citations.)' (Lambert v. McKenzie, 135 Cal. 100, 103, 67 P. 6, 7.) The statute will begin to run although plaintiff is ignorant of his cause of action, and mere ignorance, not induced by fraud, does not toll the running of the statute. (Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal.App.2d 18, 27, 266 P.2d 163; Sonbergh v. MacQuarrie, 112 Cal.App.2d 771, 247 P.2d 133; Scafidi v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., (2 Cal.App.2d 550, 566, 165 P.2d 260.)

No California case has been cited to us, and an independent research has produced no authority in this state, specifically considering the date of accrual of a cause of action for false arrest and false imprisonment. However, we are not without specific guidance. It appears to be an almost universal rule in other states that the cause of action accrues upon termination of the imprisonment, and not at the time the proceedings under which plaintiff's arrest occurred ended. A leading case decided in 1955 by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d 423, 49 A.L.R.2d 917, reflects the application of this established rule in a situation very similar to the one at bench. The petition for false arrest and false imprisonment therein showed the lapse of more than a year from the date on which plaintiff was released from imprisonment on cash bail. Sometime later the criminal proceedings against plaintiff were dismissed and the cash bail returned to him. Said the court at pages 425--426: 'In an illegal arrest and false imprisonment case, we are convinced that the one year statute of limitations (the same as in California (§ 340, subd. 3, Code of Civ.Proc.)) begins to run * * * at the time plaintiff was released from his alleged illegal restraint and not when the proceedings by which his arrest occurred terminated, * * *.

'We are of the opinion that it is immaterial whether the proceedings under which plaintiff was imprisoned were terminated or not when a suit for the false imprisonment is filed. In Knickerbocker Steamboat Co v. Cusack, 2 Cir., 172 F. 358, it was said at page 359 of the opinion:

"* * * The authorities are practically unanimous to the effect that, in an action solely for false imprisonment, the termination of the criminal proceedings is immaterial. * * *'

See also Davis v. Johnson, 4 Cir., 101 F. 952.

'Since we conclude that the statute of limitations begins to run from the termination of the imprisonment of plaintiff and not from the termination of the proceedings, we think the action of the trial court in sustaining the separate demurrers of defendants and dismissing plaintiff's action upon his election to stand upon his amended petition, was correct.' The Belflower case is also reported in 49 A.L.R.2d 917, following which appears an Annotation (49 A.L.R.2d 922) 'When statute of limitations begins to run against action for false imprisonment or false arrest.' Therein, the writer, citing numerous cases from other states declares that 'the decision in Belflower v Blackshere (1955, Okla) 281 P.2d 423, 49 ALR2d 917, holding that under statutes barring actions for false imprisonment begun more than a specified time after the accrual of the cause of action the limitation begins to run from the termination of the imprisonment and not from the time when the proceedings under which the plaintiff's arrest conclusion of the Annotation, reference is rule on the subject.' (p. 922.) At the conclusion of the Annotation, reference is made to the Oregon case of Lane v. Ball, 83 Or. 424, 163 P. 975, decided in 1917, herein relied upon by appellants. Any statement therein relative to the time of accrual of a cause of action for false imprisonment appears to be no more than dictum, for the case involved only an action for damages for malicious abuse of process; moreover, it seems to be the only pronouncement contrary to the general rule proclaimed in Belflower. Thus, inasmuch as the only allegation as to imprisonment in the second amended complaint is that plaintiffs were imprisoned and detained of their liberty on June 3, 1963, and there is no allegation of any imprisonment after that date, we hold in accord with the established rule of Belflower, that the cause of action herein accrued on June 3, 1963, and the 100 days started to run from that date; and that plaintiffs' claim was not timely presented under then section 715, Government Code.

Actually, under the allegations of the second amended complaint there was no valid reason for plaintiffs to wait until the disposition of the criminal charge before presenting their claim. It is conceded by all parties that the arrest was made without a warrant; at that time plaintiffs could have pleaded a prima facie case and filed their complaint as well as their claim with the City. 'A cause of action for false imprisonment based on unlawful arrest is stated where it is alleged that there was an arrest without process, followed by imprisonment and damages. Upon proof of those...

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    ...and not at the time of the termination of the criminal proceedings underlying the arrest. See Collins v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App.2d 451, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586, 588 (1966). In Collins, the Appellants had filed a claim for damages for false arrest and false imprisonment by two deputy s......
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