Collins v. Bazan, A02A0539.
| Decision Date | 13 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. A02A0539.,A02A0539. |
| Citation | 256 Ga. App. 164,568 S.E.2d 72 |
| Parties | COLLINS v. BAZAN. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lohmeier & Lohmeier, Gregory J. Lohmeier, Decatur, for appellant.
Spruell, Taylor & Associates, Melinda D. Taylor, Atlanta, for appellee.
The trial court entered a permanent protective order under OCGA § 16-5-94(d) that in part prohibited an alleged stalker from publishing or discussing with any person his former girlfriend's private medical condition. We hold that the statute does not authorize such a prohibition and therefore reverse that portion of the order. The remainder of the order is affirmed.
Following a breakup with Jeani Bazan, Michael Collins repeatedly contacted her over her objection, leading to a consent temporary protective order that in part prohibited such contact and further prohibited him from publishing or discussing a private medical condition of Bazan with any person. Before the TPO expired, Bazan moved to have Collins held in contempt and further asked that the TPO be converted into a permanent protective order. Following a hearing, the trial court held Collins in contempt and, over objection, entered a permanent protective order that incorporated the terms of the TPO, specifically including the prohibition against publishing or discussing Bazan's medical condition with others. Challenging only that specific prohibition, Collins on appeal argues that the prohibition violates constitutional principles concerning freedom of speech and overbroadness and further is not authorized by the controlling statute, OCGA § 16-5-94(d).
1. In the trial court, Collins failed to raise any constitutional objections to the proposed order. Norman v. State, 197 Ga.App. 333, 334(3), 398 S.E.2d 395 (1990); see Shaw v. State, 225 Ga.App. 193, 194(2), 483 S.E.2d 646 (1997); Johnson v. Hames Contracting, 208 Ga.App. 664, 666(3), 431 S.E.2d 455 (1993).
2. Collins's objection below that the prohibition exceeded the scope of the statute was well founded. The statute authorizing the permanent protective order is OCGA § 16-5-94(d), which provides in pertinent part:
Subsection (d)(1) allows a court to prohibit a party from stalking the other party. Stalking is defined as when a party "follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person." OCGA § 16-5-90(a)(1). Publishing or discussing a person's medical condition with others obviously does not constitute following, placing under surveillance, or contacting that person.
The question therefore is whether the court's power in subsection (d)(2) to prohibit a party from "harassing or interfering" with the other party authorizes a prohibition against publishing or discussing the...
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Chan v. Ellis, S14A1652.
...a particular person does not mean necessarily that it is directed to that person. This principle is reflected in Collins v. Bazan, 256 Ga.App. 164, 568 S.E.2d 72 (2002), and Marks v. State, 306 Ga.App. 824, 703 S.E.2d 379 (2010), two cases in which our Court of Appeals addressed questions a......
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Kace Investments, LP v. Hull, No. A03A1012
...Supremacy Clause and federal postal regulation arguments since they were not raised nor ruled upon below. See Collins v. Bazan, 256 Ga. App. 164, 165(1), 568 S.E.2d 72 (2002) ("Constitutional issues not raised below are not preserved for appeal.") (citations and punctuation Moreover, even i......
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Bruno v. Light
...‘harassing or interfering’ with the other party authorized a prohibition against [residing in one's own home]." Collins v. Bazan , 256 Ga. App. 164, 165 (2), 568 S.E.2d 72 (2002). We hold that it does not. In Johnson v. State , 264 Ga. 590, 449 S.E.2d 94 (1994), the Supreme Court of Georgia......
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Garnsey v. Buice., A10A1339.
...lawsuit, and victim did not testify that appellant's other behavior caused him to fear for his safety). 11. See DeLouis, supra. 12. 256 Ga.App. 164, 568 S.E.2d 72 (2002). 13. Id. at 165(1), 568 S.E.2d 72. 14. Id. at 165–166(2), 568 S.E.2d 72. 15. See id. at 165(1), 568 S.E.2djobs, and belit......
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Local Government Law - R. Perry Sentell, Jr.
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