Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich.

• Decision Date: 13 March 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. 200333
• Citation: 579 N.W.2d 435,228 Mich.App. 560
• Parties: , 12 NDLR P 57 Irma COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 435

579 N.W.2d 435

228 Mich.App. 560, 12 NDLR P 57

Irma COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 200333.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 3, 1997, at Detroit.

Decided March 13, 1998, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication June 17, 1998.

Nelson S. Chase and William L. Fischel, Farmington Hills, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kienbaum Opperwall Hardy & Pelton, P.L.C. by Theodore R. Opperwall and Noel D. Massie, Troy, Frank W. Jackson, Detroit, of Counsel, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and YOUNG and J.M. BATZER ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

While plaintiff was on psychiatric disability leave from her employment with defendant, plaintiff expressed homicidal ideation regarding her immediate supervisor to a psychiatrist assigned to evaluate her disability claim. After she returned to work, plaintiff was terminated as a result of those statements. Plaintiff claimed discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act (HCRA), M.C.L. § 37.1101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.550(101) et seq. The matter was submitted to binding arbitration and, following a hearing, the arbitrator ruled in plaintiff's favor. Eventually, an order confirming the arbitrator's ruling was entered by the circuit court. ¹ Defendant now brings this appeal, and we vacate the arbitrator's decision.

I

In 1985, plaintiff began working for defendant as a secretary, and in 1989 she was promoted to administrative analyst. Plaintiff generally received positive performance reviews until she was promoted to the position of technical writer in 1992. Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Marjorie Jacobson, criticized plaintiff's substandard work and plaintiff became very sensitive to this criticism. Todd Harrison, a human-resources specialist who was brought in to address the problem, concluded that plaintiff had been promoted beyond her skill level and that she "would not be a good candidate for reassignment within the company as her performance/interpersonal skill deficiencies precede her." Shortly after receiving her performance appraisal from Derek Knight, her manager, plaintiff began a medical leave of absence for job stress. Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Rosalind Griffin, who concluded that plaintiff suffered from major depression/adjustment disorder and was disabled from work.

To confirm plaintiff's continued eligibility for disability benefits, defendant's benefit plan administrator arranged for plaintiff to be examined by another psychiatrist, Dr. Jolyn Welsh Wagner. At the interview, plaintiff was angry because Dr. Wagner arrived twenty-five minutes late and because she believed defendant had disseminated information to her co-workers that she was undergoing psychiatric care. In an interim report sent to defendant's plan administrator on the same day as the examination, Dr. Wagner opined that plaintiff presented as an "angry hypervigilant, and extremely paranoid woman who made various threatening statements about her supervisor." Plaintiff attributed her problems at work to racism perpetrated by Jacobson, who she described as a "white bitch," and stated that she felt unsupported by Knight, her "Uncle Tom black manager." The report further stated that plaintiff said Jacobson was "living on borrowed time" and warned that plaintiff's comments should be taken seriously. In a more detailed report, Dr. Wagner indicated that plaintiff stated she "had killed [Jacobson] a thousand times in [her] mind," and that she talked about "taking a .38 and blowing [Jacobson] away." Plaintiff further indicated to Dr. Wagner that "she had thought of killing her supervisor prior to the [company] strike and had decided not to when the department was dispersed to other areas to meet the demands of the strike."

Defendant forwarded a copy of Dr. Wagner's interim report to plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Griffin, and asked if she believed plaintiff posed a threat to Jacobson or others in the workplace. Dr. Griffin responded that she did not feel plaintiff had the ability to carry out her homicidal thoughts referenced in Dr. Wagner's report, that plaintiff had not expressed similar thoughts during their sessions, and that she did not feel plaintiff was a danger to herself or others in the workplace. Dr. Griffin added that defendant should safeguard plaintiff's confidentiality and that plaintiff's prognosis for returning to work was uncertain because of plaintiff's belief that her co-workers had been informed of her psychiatric treatment. Dr. Griffin ultimately determined that plaintiff had recovered from her disability. When plaintiff returned to work she was terminated. Defendant had made the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment after receiving Dr. Wagner's report, but delayed firing plaintiff until she returned to work.

Plaintiff filed a request for binding arbitration pursuant to her employment agreement with defendant. Hearings were held before an arbitrator with regard to plaintiff's claims that her discharge violated the ADA and the HCRA. During the hearing, defendant acknowledged that plaintiff's statements to Dr. Wagner were the sole reason for plaintiff's termination. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she did not recall making most of the statements attributed to her in Dr. Wagner's report; although she did acknowledge calling Jacobson a liar and a bitch. Dr. Wagner testified in a deposition that she would not characterize plaintiff's statements as "threats," but rather as expressions of plaintiff's thoughts. Dr. Wagner also stated that she would defer to the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Griffin, with respect to whether plaintiff had recovered from her disability or whether she posed any actual threat to Jacobson. Dr. Griffin testified in her deposition that she never reported plaintiff's homicidal ideation because she did not believe that plaintiff would act on it or that she otherwise posed any threat to Jacobson.

The arbitrator ruled in plaintiff's favor with regard to both claims and ordered that plaintiff be reinstated with back pay to a "comparable, but not identical, position" under a different supervisor and at a different work site if possible. The award added that defendant had the right to satisfy itself that plaintiff did not present a threat to other employees by requiring plaintiff to be examined by another psychiatrist and to continue treatment if necessary. Specifically, the arbitrator found that plaintiff's statements to Dr. Wagner were products of her psychiatric disability. The arbitrator also found that defendant was aware when it decided to terminate plaintiff's employment that she suffered from a psychiatric disability that manifested itself in homicidal ideation. Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that defendant's termination of plaintiff was a violation of both the ADA and the HCRA because defendant was not justified in considering plaintiff to be an unqualified person and did not have a nondiscriminatory basis for termination. On judicial review, the circuit court confirmed the arbitrator's ruling.

II

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in affirming the arbitrator's award because it was premised on an error of law. We agree.

A

The parties' arbitration agreement included a provision for limited judicial review of the arbitrator's decision:

The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding; however, that limited judicial review may be obtained in a Michigan federal district court or Michigan circuit court of competent jurisdiction (a) in accordance with the standards for review of arbitration awards as established by law; or (b) on the ground that the arbitrator committed an error of law.

We find this judicial review provision to be consistent with the provisions of M.C.L. § 600.5001 et seq.; M.S.A. § 27A.5001 et seq., and MCR 3.602, which govern "statutory arbitration" awards. See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc. v. Spence Bros., Inc., 438 Mich. 488, 495, 475 N.W.2d 704 (1991). Under the court rule, a statutory arbitration award may be vacated in limited circumstances, such as where an arbitrator evidences partiality, refuses to hear material evidence, or exceeds powers. MCR 3.602(J)(1); Gordon Sel-Way, supra at 495-497, 475 N.W.2d 704. Arbitrators exceed the scope of their authority "whenever they act beyond the material terms of the contract from which they primarily draw their authority, or in contravention of controlling principles of law." DAIIE v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 434, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982); Gordon Sel-Way, supra at 496, 475 N.W.2d 704. A reviewing court may vacate an arbitration award where it finds an error of law that is apparent on its face and so substantial that, but for the error, the award would have been substantially different. Gordon Sel-Way, supra at 497, 475 N.W.2d 704. Given these foregoing principles, we find no merit to plaintiff's argument that the parties' arbitration agreement was invalid to the extent that it allowed judicial review for errors of law. As our Supreme Court stated in Gavin, supra at 433, 331 N.W.2d 418, "If the appellate judiciary has any proper function at all, it is to correct material error."

B

The gravamen of this appeal requires us to determine whether the arbitrator committed an error of law in ruling that plaintiff was discharged because of her disability, rather than for her homicidal ideation toward her supervisor. Although we do not dispute the arbitrator's finding of fact that plaintiff's homicidal ideation was a product of her psychiatric condition, we conclude that the arbitrator committed an error of law in ruling that defendant's discharge of plaintiff constituted discrimination under the ADA and the HCRA. We hold that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or the HCRA because her homicidal ideation left her unqualified for...