Collins v. City of Bridgeport, 25626.

Citation206 W.Va. 467,525 S.E.2d 658
Decision Date06 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. 25626.,25626.
PartiesRoy COLLINS, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, Defendant Below, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia

John F. Dascoli, Esq., Andrew J. Katz, Esq., The Segal Law Firm, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Appellants.

Norman T. Farley, Esq., West & Jones, Clarksburg, West Virginia, Attorney for the Appellee.

WILKES, Acting Justice:1

This is an appeal by a group of police officers of the City of Bridgeport from a final order of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, entered on June 23, 1998. In that order, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the Bridgeport Civil Service Commission that merit pay increases are not illegal promotions in violation of the police civil service act, W.Va.Code §§ 8-14-6 to 8-14-24.2 The circuit court also entered declaratory judgment in favor of the City of Bridgeport, declaring that, inter alia, the long-held practice of including holiday compensation time in the calculation of overtime pay did not rise to the level of a contractual obligation that could not be unilaterally modified by the city, and the implementation of a citywide pay scale did not violate the appellants' previously established contractual rights. Finally, the appellants challenge the amount of attorney fees awarded to them after prevailing on two issues in the circuit court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

I. FACTS

The appellants are a group of police officers employed by the City of Bridgeport (hereinafter "the city" or "Bridgeport"). On March 15, 1996, the appellants filed a complaint with the Bridgeport Civil Service Commission (hereinafter "the commission") in which they alleged that pay increases granted to individual police officers on the basis of merit constitute a violation of the police civil service act, W.Va.Code §§ 8-14-6 to 8-14-24. After a hearing before the commission on July 30, 1996, the commission ruled that the merit pay increases do not violate the police civil service act.3

The appellants appealed this ruling to the Circuit Court of Harrison County. The appellants combined with this appeal a declaratory judgment action in which they raised several additional issues. Specifically, the appellants challenged the following actions by the city: (1) the compensation of police officers who drive to police training seminars but not those who travel as passengers; (2) the modification of the long-held practice of including officers' holiday compensation in the calculation of their overtime pay; (3) the institution of a personnel policy limiting officers to four weeks of annual vacation; (4) the promulgation of new discipline and termination policies; and (5) the implementation of a new citywide pay scale.

In its order of June 23, 1998, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the appellants, finding that the city's practice of compensating those officers who drive to training seminars but not those who travel as passengers is violative of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-261. The circuit court also found that the city's reduction of maximum annual vacation time to four weeks violated the Codified Ordinances of Bridgeport which state that all city employees, including police officers, are entitled to five weeks of vacation after completing twenty-five years of service.4 Because the appellants prevailed on these two issues, the circuit court awarded them attorney fees in the amount of $175.00 and an award of costs in the amount of $115.00. On the remaining issues, the circuit court found for the City of Bridgeport.

The appellants now appeal to this Court the issues concerning merit pay, the modification of the long-held practice of including holiday compensation in the calculation of overtime pay, the implementation of a new citywide pay scale, and the amount awarded in attorney fees and costs.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before discussing the issues before us, a few words concerning the appropriate standards of review are in order. As noted above, the merit pay issue was originally decided by a civil service commission. In Syllabus Point 1 of Appeal of Prezkop, 154 W.Va. 759, 179 S.E.2d 331 (1971), we held that "[a] final order of a police civil service commission based upon a finding of fact will not be reversed by a circuit court upon appeal unless it is clearly wrong or is based upon a mistake of law." In In re Queen, 196 W.Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483 (1996), we elaborated upon this standard of review in an appeal originating with a decision of the Correctional Officers' Civil Service Commission. There we explained that "our review of the circuit court's decision made in view of the Commission's action is generally de novo. Thus, we review the Commission's adjudicative decision from the same position as the circuit court." In re Queen, 196 W.Va. 442, 446, 473 S.E.2d 483, 487 (1996). We concluded in Syllabus Point 1,

An adjudicative decision of the Correctional Officers' Civil Service Commission should not be overturned by an appellate court unless it was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Review under this standard is narrow and the reviewing court looks to the Civil Service Commission's action to determine whether the record reveals that a substantial and rational basis exists for its decision.

Further,

An appellate court may reverse a decision of the Correctional Officers' Civil Service Commission as clearly wrong or arbitrary or capricious only if the Commission used a misapplication of the law, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the Commission, or offered one that was so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of Commission expertise.

Syllabus Point 2, In re Queen. These standards of review are proper in the instant case.

Concerning this Court's review of those issues raised in the declaratory judgment action, we have stated,

Therefore, because the purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to resolve legal questions, a circuit court's ultimate resolution in a declaratory judgment action is reviewed de novo; however, any determinations of fact made by the circuit court in reaching its ultimate resolution are reviewed pursuant to a clearly erroneous standard.

Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608, 612, 466 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1995). With these standards in mind, we now consider the issues before us.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Issue 1: The Merit Pay Plan

The first issue is whether the merit pay plan complained of by the appellants violates the police civil service act. On January 1, 1989, the City of Bridgeport enacted what it called a "Merit Compensation Plan" to govern the compensation of employees of the city including the police officers involved in this case. The plan basically consisted of a twenty-two-step program of salary increases in which police officers could progress laterally from the entry level rate of pay to the maximum salary for his or her job classification. The plan established minimum standards required for merit advancement as well as provisions for additional merit increases.

Specifically, each new police officer was required to serve a probationary period of six months. Upon successful completion of this period, and with the recommendation of the officer's supervisor, the officer was upgraded to step one of the wage schedule. The officer was upgraded to step two after completion of the first year of employment. To be eligible for an annual increase between steps three and twenty-two of the wage schedule, the officer had to receive a satisfactory overall rating on his or her performance appraisal conducted by the officer's supervisor. The city manager then had final approval of the wage increase.5 If the wage increase was approved by the city manager, the officer received a salary increase of one wage step above his or her current pay effective June 16 of each year. Also, an officer could receive an additional wage step increase upon recommendation of his or her supervisor and with the approval of the city manager.

Effective December 1, 1995, the City of Bridgeport instituted a new salary schedule for city employees based on longevity. This plan consists of a ten-step lateral scale of salary increases. Each employee is assigned a grade based on job description and placed on the scale according to current salary. Employees serving in steps one, two or three of any grade must serve twelve months in each step prior to attaining eligibility for advancement to the next step. Employees serving in steps four, five or six of any grade are eligible for advancement to the next higher step after serving twenty-four months in the step from which advancement is anticipated. Employees serving in steps seven, eight or nine of any grade must serve thirty-six months in each step prior to attaining eligibility for advancement to the next step. Besides longevity, employees may also receive raises in pay through annual cost of living increases, promotions or job enhancement.

The Bridgeport Civil Service Commission upheld the legality of the merit pay plan in effect from 1989 to 1995 and found that pay increases "were given in recognition of performance of an officer for meeting or exceeding basic standards[ ]" and "were not given in lieu of promotions." The circuit court affirmed the commission's decision. Although the circuit court found that certain criteria used in determining merit were subjective, it concluded that no provision of the police civil service act prohibits the granting of merit pay raises based on subjective performance evaluations.

The appellant police officers now challenge the...

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