Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, S–15–0098.

Citation366 P.3d 521
Decision Date10 February 2016
Docket NumberNo. S–15–0098.,S–15–0098.
Parties Charley COLLINS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. COP WYOMING, LLC a Wyoming Limited Liability Company and Roger Ross, Appellees (Defendants).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Representing Appellant: Bret F. King of King & King, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees: Raymond W. Martin and Jane M. France of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. France.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.

FOX, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant Charley Collins appeals the order dismissing his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against his employer, COP Wyoming, LLC, and his co-employee, Roger Ross. Charley alleged he suffered emotional injuries after he witnessed the death of his son, Brett Collins,1 who was also an employee of COP Wyoming, and whose death was covered by Wyoming worker's compensation. The district court found that the claims of the father were derivative of the covered death of the son and were therefore barred by worker's compensation immunity. Charley appeals and we reverse.

ISSUE

[¶ 2] Is the father's tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress barred by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Charley and his son, Brett, were both employed by Appellee COP Wyoming, LLC. Appellee Roger Ross was also employed by COP Wyoming, as the job superintendent and supervisor in charge of safety at the same job site. On August 20, 2012, Mr. Ross was operating a large track hoe excavator to excavate inside a trench box at the job site. Mr. Ross instructed Brett to enter the trench box and work there while Mr. Ross was operating the track hoe. Mr. Ross struck Brett in the head with the bucket of the track hoe, severely injuring him. Charley was notified, and he immediately came to the aid of his son and attempted to administer first aid. In spite of those efforts, Brett died. Brett's estate received worker's compensation benefits as a result of his death.2

Charley sued COP Wyoming and Mr. Ross, alleging they negligently inflicted emotional distress upon him.

[¶ 4] COP Wyoming and Mr. Ross filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the suit against them was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27–14–104(a). After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, Inc., 3 P.3d 236 (Wyo.2000) was controlling, and that the father's claim was barred because his injury was derivative of the son's covered death.

[¶ 5] Charley timely filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] When reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We will sustain such a dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief.

Accelerated Receivable Sols. v. Hauf, 2015 WY 71, ¶ 10, 350 P.3d 731, 734 (Wyo.2015) (citations omitted).

[¶ 7] Article 10, section 4(c) of the Wyoming Constitution directs the legislature to establish a fund from which to pay compensation "to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as the result of [workplace] injuries[.]"

The right of each employee to compensation from the fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to the fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of the injuries or death.

Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4 (c).

[¶ 8] The legislature accordingly enacted the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27–14–101 to 27–14–806, "which was the legislative embodiment of a compromise between employers and employees who recognized the need for a new system to compensate employees for employment-related injuries without the employee having to rely upon tort concepts." Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo.1984). "[T]he act creates liability without fault on the part of the contributing employer and likewise provides the employer with absolute immunity from tort actions including the employer's violation of his duty of care whether the negligence is ordinary or culpable." Id. at 888. The legislature codified this "great compromise between employers and employed," Anderson, 3 P.3d at 240 (citation omitted):

(a) The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee ... and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer ... making contributions required by this act[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27–14–104(a) (LexisNexis 2015).

[¶ 9] In Baker, this Court held that "mental disorders are compensable under the various worker's compensation acts of the country." 687 P.2d at 890 ; see also Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 798 P.2d 323, 325–26 (Wyo.1990) (holding that mental injuries are compensable). In 1994, the legislature amended the definition of injury to exclude "[a]ny mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury[.]" 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 86, at 287; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27–14–102(a)(xi)(J) (LexisNexis 2015). We upheld the constitutionality of that amendment in Frantz v. Campbell Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 932 P.2d 750, 754 (Wyo.1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794 (Wyo.2004), and since that time, we have adhered to the rule that mental injuries not caused by a compensable physical injury are not compensable by worker's compensation. Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 15, 126 P.3d 886, 890 (Wyo.2006) ("[C]laims are not covered where the mental injury and resulting suicide were not caused by a compensable physical injury."); Wheeler v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div.,

2010 WY 161, ¶ 20, 245 P.3d 811, 817 (Wyo.2010) (mental injuries not caused by compensable physical injuries not compensable).3

[¶ 10] In Cook, the administrator of the estate and the husband of the deceased employee filed a tort action against the employer, alleging negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2006 WY 13, ¶ 2, 126 P.3d at 887. This Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. at ¶ 44, 126 P.3d at 896–97. But before reaching that question, we addressed the question of whether the employer was entitled to worker's compensation immunity, and we held that the claim arising from the employee's mental injury was not barred by worker's compensation because it was not covered "where the mental injury and resulting suicide were not caused by a compensable physical injury." Id. at ¶ 15, 126 P.3d at 890. See also Sisco v. Fabrication Tech., Inc., 350 F.Supp.2d 932, 943 (D.Wyo.2004) ( "[M]ental injury is not derivative of any physical injury, and not barred by worker's compensation."); 9 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 100.4 (2014) ("[T]he employer should be spared damage liability only when compensation liability has actually been provided in its place[.]");4 101 C.J.S. Workers' Compensation § 1746, at 396 (2013) ("A civil action against an employer for a nonphysical injury is permitted because such injury is not encompassed within the scope of the workers' compensation act[.]").

[¶ 11] Charley's claim for emotional distress is a claim for a mental injury that is not caused by a compensable physical injury to him; therefore it is not compensable under Wyoming worker's compensation, and neither COP Wyoming nor Mr. Ross is entitled to worker's compensation immunity on that basis.

[¶ 12] We turn then to the question of whether Charley's claim is nevertheless barred by worker's compensation because it is derivative of a covered claim, Brett's death. The district court concluded that "the current claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is subsumed by the WWCA [Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act] as it is derivative of the death of [Charley's] son, and the relief provided by the WWCA is the exclusive remedy." The district court relied on Anderson to support its conclusions. There, the parents of a miner killed in the collapse of a trona mine sued the mine for wrongful death and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Anderson, 3 P.3d at 237. The parents were notified of the mine's collapse, and they went there to wait for news about their son. Initially they were told that he was talking and joking with his rescuers, but soon after they were advised that his heart had stopped, and he was pronounced dead. Id. This Court, after reviewing the "great compromise" that resulted in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, concluded that "[r]elief is available to survivors for the death of a worker under Wyoming worker's compensation law, and the remedy is exclusive." Id. at 240. The Anderson court quoted an earlier case, where we said:

[W]e hold, then, that where the employee's injury occurs in a work-related situation, as it did here, and is in all other respects compensable, as it is here, the employer of the injured or deceased employee who is contributing to the compensation fund in behalf of the worker's account is absolutely immune from all common-law tort remedies arising out of the injury to or death of the employee—including causes of action for intentional tort or culpable negligence.

Id. at 239 (quoting Parker v. Energy Dev. Co., 691 P.2d 981, 985 (Wyo.1984) ). We concluded that "in providing the articulated benefits for death, the legislature subsumed the entire prospect of recovery for the death of an employee engaged in covered employment." Id. at 240.

[¶ 13] Charley argues that his case is distinguishable from Anderson for two reasons: First, unlike the parents in Anderson, Charley was at the scene of the accident...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • State ex rel. Dep't of Workforce Servs. v. Hall (In re Hall), S-17-0176
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • March 30, 2018
    ...strong interest in adhering to past precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis. " Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC , 2016 WY 18, ¶ 15, 366 P.3d 521, 525 (Wyo. 2016) (citations omitted). The principle of stare decisis furthers the "evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal prin......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT