Collins v. County of Kern
| Decision Date | 26 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CVF03-6424 AWI TAG.,CVF03-6424 AWI TAG. |
| Citation | 390 F.Supp.2d 964 |
| Parties | Peter COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF KERN, et al., Defendants. AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Donald C. Duchow, Law Offices of Donald C. Duchow, Bakersfield, CA, for Plaintiff.
James H. Thebeau, San Bernardino County Counsel, San Bernardino, CA, Mark Lloyd Nations, Andrew C. Thomson, Office of County Counsel, Bakersfield, CA, for Defendants.
(Document # 19)
This action arises from an incident in which Plaintiff Peter Collins was attacked by other inmates while incarcerated at the Lerdo Pre-Trial Facility. The court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Plaintiff's civil action against the County of Kern, Sheriff Karl Sparks, D.O. Perkins, and D.O. Reynolds.
On October 27, 2003, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. The first cause of action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges a violation of Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights. The second cause of action alleges a conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff's civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c). The third cause of action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges a violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. The fourth cause of action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges a violation of "Due Process."
On March 21, 2005, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendants contend that there are no facts showing that Defendant D.O. Perkins or Defendant D.O. Reynolds were aware of a threat to Plaintiff or that they acted deliberately indifferent. Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish liability for either Defendant County of Kern or Defendant Sparks because Plaintiff cannot show a violation of his rights and there is no evidence of a policy that caused the attack. Defendants contend that there is no evidence of racial discrimination and they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1985(c) claim.
When Plaintiff did not file a timely response to Defendants' motion, the court took the motion for summary judgment under submission. On April 20, 2005, Plaintiff filed a notice of Plaintiff's inability to respond to Defendants' motion. Plaintiff requested additional time to conduct discovery. On May 18, 2005, the court determined that Plaintiff had failed to make the request showing to continue the summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court directed Plaintiff to file any response to the motion within ten days.
On May 25, 2005, Plaintiff filed an opposition. Plaintiff contends that because of head wounds, his memory is impaired. Plaintiff attaches the declaration of Michael Pettisford, another inmate. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Pettisford's statements controvert the facts submitted by Defendants.
On May 27, 2005, Defendants filed a reply. Defendants point out that Plaintiff failed to follow Local Rules and the Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff did not timely oppose Defendants' motion and Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants' undisputed facts. Defendants contend that the declaration of Mr. Pettisford should be disregarded because he is not competent to testify.
Plaintiff was in the custody of the Kern County Sheriff's Department at the Lerdo Pre-Trial Facility of the Kern County Jail on June 30, 2001.
On April 2, 2001, Plaintiff was arrested and booked by the Kern County Sheriff's Department. At the time of his booking, Plaintiff claimed a gang affiliation with the "Crips" and requested that he be kept segregated from other people that claimed a gang affiliation with the "Bloods." Plaintiff denied that there was any other group or person from whom he needed to be segregated.
On June 30, 2001, Plaintiff was transferred to a cell in D-Pod, Unit 5. Plaintiff was transferred out of A-Pod because A-Pod was to be used to house federal inmates.
Neither the Sheriff, Perkins nor Reynolds were involved in the decision to transfer Plaintiff to a cell in D-Pod, Unit 5.
Plaintiff did not inform anyone of any safety concerns or segregation issues at the time that he was transferred to D-Pod, Unit 5.
On June 30, 2001, a fight erupted in D-Pod, Unit 5, between Black and Hispanic inmates. The fight started minutes after Plaintiff arrived in D-Pod. The fight in D-Pod, Unit 5, involved four (4) or more Black inmates and eight (8) or more Hispanic inmates.
Neither the Sheriff, Perkins nor Reynolds had advance information or knowledge that a fight would erupt. Neither the Sheriff, Perkins nor Reynolds had any information that Plaintiff was at risk at being injured in a fight.
Once the fight erupted, Perkins took prompt action to stop the fight, secure the area, and ensure prompt medical treatment for Plaintiff.
Once the fight erupted, Reynolds took prompt action to stop the fight, secure the area, and ensure prompt medical treatment for Plaintiff.
On June 30, 2001, at the time of the fight in D-Pod, Unit 5, Defendant Sheriff Sparks was not present at the Lerdo Detention Facility.
Plaintiff was immediately treated for the injuries he sustained in the fight and was transported to Kern Medical Center Emergency Department where he received immediate medical treatment.
Plaintiff has no information that Perkins and Reynolds acted improperly. According to Plaintiff, the inmates involved in the fight were the people that "were wrong."
Prior to employment as a Detention Officer with the County of Kern all individuals are required to attend a five to seven week academy that includes training on topics such as security of inmates, facility security, inmate classification, gangs, liability, laws of arrest and search and seizure. The curriculum occupies approximately 200 hours of training.
Perkins is employed as a Detention Officer with the County of Kern, has received the academy training and has also received training in the areas of jail standards, jail operations liability, inmate segregation, emergency procedures and planning, and suicide prevention.
Reynolds is employed as a Detention Officer with the County of Kern, is a Detentions Training Officer and has also received training in the areas of jail standards, jail operations liability, inmate segregation, emergency procedures and planning, and suicide prevention. Reynolds has also completed the required training instructor course in order to become an instructor.
Plaintiff provides the declaration of former inmate Michael Pittisford.2 Mr. Pittisford states that he and other black inmates were confined in D-Pod for approximately 60-days prior to June 30, 2001, without incident or conflict with Mexican American inmates. Mr. Pittisford states that:
Immediately before and shortly after inmate Peter Collins entered D-Pod on June 30, 2001, racial insults and threats were loudly made by the Mexican inmates of D-Pod against the personal safety of inmate Peter Collins.
Immediately before and shortly after Peter Collins entered D-Pod on June 30, 2001, he (Peter Collins) myself and all other Black inmates of D-Pod were violently attacked and beaten by the Mexican inmates of D-Pod on June 30, 2001.
I Personally observed no less than 10 correctional officers stood idle for at least 3-4 minutes while inmate Peter Collins was being beaten, kicked, and stompped (sic.) by no less than 6 Mexican American inmates in D-Pod on June 30, 2001.
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir.1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.1984).
Under summary judgment practice, the moving party [A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,...
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