Collins v. Day

• Decision Date: 14 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-9110-EX-449,93A02-9110-EX-449
• Citation: 604 N.E.2d 647
• Parties: Eugene COLLINS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Glen DAY, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 647

604 N.E.2d 647

Eugene COLLINS, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Glen DAY, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 93A02-9110-EX-449.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fourth District.

Dec. 14, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1993.

Nancy Hale, amicus curiae, Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Inc., Indianapolis.

Pamela K. Thompson, Sandra L. Heeke, Smith Bartlett Heeke & Carpenter, Jeffersonville, for appellee-defendant.

CHEZEM, Judge.

Case Summary

Plaintiff-Appellant, Eugene Collins (Collins), appeals from the dismissal of his request for worker's compensation benefits. We affirm.

Issue

Collins presents one issue for our review, which we restate as follows:

Does the exclusion of agricultural employees from the coverage of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act (Act) violate the equal privileges and immunities clause of Article I, Section 23, of the Indiana Constitution, or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

Facts and Procedural History

The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. At the time and date of the accident, February 11, 1989, Collins was an agricultural employee of Defendant-Appellee, Glen Day (Day), whose farming operation is an agricultural enterprise. Collins broke his right leg in the accident.

The parties also stipulated that Day has not waived the exemption of agricultural employees from worker's compensation coverage. Furthermore, Day denies that any compensable injury occurred, and therefore has not paid any worker's compensation benefits to Collins.

Day moved to dismiss because Collins was an agricultural employee, and as such not covered by worker's compensation, and because Day had not waived this exemption. The hearing judge granted the Motion to Dismiss.

Shortly thereafter, Collins requested that the matter be reviewed by the Full Worker's Compensation Board (Board). After conducting a hearing, the Board upheld the dismissal.

Discussion and Decision

Collins argues that the exemption of agricultural employees from worker's compensation coverage is unconstitutional. He contends it violates the equal privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution, ¹ and the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. ² In particular, he argues the exemption is unconstitutional because it treats workers who are similarly situated in an unequal fashion. Collins cites the fact that many agricultural employees now do mechanized and other work similar in nature to that performed by factory employees who are covered by the Act.

We first note that the purpose of worker's compensation is to financially compensate employees by holding employers strictly liable for injuries incurred by the employees in the course of their employment. Associated Insurance Companies, Inc. v. Burns (1990), Ind.App., 562 N.E.2d 430, 433. The employee is given a statutory right to compensation, regardless of fault, and liability is limited to that provided by the Act. The basic policy is to shift the economic burden for employment related injuries from the employee to the employer and the consumers of its products. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427; Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co. (1983), Ind.App., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151.

We also note that certain classes of employees are "exempt" from worker's compensation coverage under the Act, as follows (a) IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 shall not apply to casual laborers (as defined in IC 22-3-6-1) nor to farm or agricultural employees, nor to domestic servants, nor to the employers of such persons.

(b) An employer who is exempt under this section from the operation of the compensation provisions of this chapter may at any time waive such exemption and thereby accept the provisions of this chapter by giving notice as provided in subsection (c).

Ind.Code Sec. 22-3-2-9 [emphasis supplied].

Therefore, "farm or agricultural employees" are one of the groups excluded or "exempted" from coverage. The question to be resolved is whether this exclusion is constitutionally permissible, which is an issue of first impression in Indiana.

In addressing an equal protection challenge, we must first determine which level of scrutiny is applicable: the traditional "rational basis" analysis or the more stringent "strict scrutiny" analysis. We apply a rational basis analysis except where the classification is suspect or involves fundamental rights. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, strict scrutiny applies only if the classification "impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Examples of fundamental rights are voting, procreation, interstate travel, presenting a defense in a criminal action; while examples of suspect classes are race, gender, national/ethnic origin and alienage. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. (1980), 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 597.

No court has ever recognized the existence of a fundamental right to worker's compensation; nor is there a suspect class from the Act. Accordingly, the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply is the rational basis analysis, which merely requires the classification to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest or goal. As stated in Sobieralski v. South Bend (1985), Ind.App., 479 N.E.2d 98, 100, reh. denied, trans. denied:

The rational basis test is an inquiry which involves a relatively relaxed standard, reflecting the judiciary's awareness that there can be no perfection in legislative classification, and that the drawing of lines creates unavoidable distinctions. Under the rational basis standard, the statute is presumptively valid and will not be struck down as long as the classification is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest. This presumption operates despite the fact that, in practice, the law results in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. Finally, a statutorily based classification alleged to be discriminatory will not be overturned 'unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purpose that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational.'

[Citations omitted.]

In other words, equal protection requires only that the classification resulting in unequal treatment bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state goal. Indeed, a classification will be set aside "only if [it is] based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State's goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify [it]." Andrews v. State (1987), Ind.App., 505 N.E.2d 815, 822; see also, McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104, 6 L.Ed.2d 393.

Therefore, the legislature may create classifications which treat one group differently from another, and we will sustain the classifications if they bear some rational relationship to legitimate state interests. As stated in State ex rel. Indiana Youth Center v. Howard Juvenile Court (1976), 264 Ind. 371, 344 N.E.2d 842, 845, "[t]he legislature is not precluded from indulging in classifications which treat one group differently from another. Generally if a classification is rationally related to a legitimate purpose, it will be sustained." See also, State ex rel. Thrasher v. Hayes (1978), 177 Ind.App. 196, 378 N.E.2d 924, 928.

However, before beginning our analysis, we must address Collins' claim that the equal privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution is "not the same and should not be interpreted as being identical in intent" as the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. ³ He cites the fact that the clauses were enacted at different times in our history and employ different language. Collins concludes that the intent underlying each clause is different (with the equal privileges and immunities clause having broader application in certain cases), and for this reason, we must apply a different and stricter standard or analysis to his claim under the equal privileges and immunities clause. He first argues "there is no rational basis" for the exclusion, ⁴ but later argues the appropriate standard is that the exclusion does not violate the equal privileges and immunities clause if there are "distinctions [which] make one class so different from another as to necessitate different legislation with respect to each." Collins also argues "the exemption and right of election of agricultural employers under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act, should not be permitted in the absence of a compelling state need to grant such privileges and immunities."

Collins also maintains that "[t]he framers of Indiana's Constitution were infused with a strong spirit of Jacksonian democracy and egalitarian principles." He cites one framer, John Pettit of Tippecanoe County, who, at the Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850, stated "[Sec. 23] applies to the future action of the Legislature. It declares that the Legislature shall not hereafter place one class of citizens upon a pedestal of fame and wealth, and trample another in the dust of ignominy and poverty. [applause.]" Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, Vol. II, 1401 (1850). Pettit also stated that "[Sec. 23] is a plain, simple, unequivocal declaration of equal rights and privileges." Id.

We are not persuaded by these arguments. We have reviewed the different language of the two clauses, the framers' comments, and the cases cited in support, and conclude the same "rational basis" analysis should be applied in this case to the claim under our state's equal privileges and immunities clause as we apply...