Collins v. Evansville State Hospital, 19916

• Citation: 134 Ind.App. 471,189 N.E.2d 106
• Decision Date: 04 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 19916,19916,1
• Parties: Golden Ruth COLLINS, Appellant, v. EVANSVILLE STATE HOSPITAL, Appellee
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 106

189 N.E.2d 106

134 Ind.App. 471

Golden Ruth COLLINS, Appellant, v. EVANSVILLE STATE HOSPITAL, Appellee.

No. 19916.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

April 4, 1963.

Robert D. Schuttler, Evansville, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Paul H. Frazier, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

COOPER, Chief Justice.

This matter comes before us for a judicial review from a decision of the Full Industrial Board of Indiana, wherein said Board found against the appellant and in favor of the appellee upon the appellant's application for compensation benefits resulting from an alleged occupational disease which the appellant alleged she sustained while in the employ of the Evansville State Hospital.

The record now before us reflects that this matter was initiated by the appellant filing with the Industrial Board for application of a disabled employee for compensation under the provisions of the Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act.

It appears that after the issues were closed, this matter was heard by a Hearing Member of the Industrial Board of Indiana; that said Hearing Member found for the appellee and against the appellant on said application. Thereafter, the appellant filed her application for review of the award by the Full Board, and, after said hearing, the Full Board entered their finding and award, the pertinent parts read as follows:

'It is further found that plaintiff herein was not exposed to and did not contract an occupational disease while performing duties for the defendant herein, that her affliction, if any, is wholly unrelated to her employment with the defendant herein.

'Said Full Industrial Board of Indiana now finds for the defendant and against the plaintiff on plaintiff's Form #115 Application of disabled employe for compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act of Indiana, filed with the Industrial Board of Indiana on January 8, 1960.

'AWARD

'IT IS, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Full Industrial Board of Indiana that plaintiff take nothing as against the defendant on plaintiff's Form #115 Application of disabled employe for compensation under the provisions of the Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, filed with the Industrial Board of Indiana on January 8, 1960.'

The appellant made the following proper assignment of error: '1. That the Award of the Full Board is contrary to law'.

It has been well stated, in substance, that any decision or verdict is contrary to law if any statute, constitutional provision, legal principle or rule of substantive or procedural law has been violated. See Pub. Ser. Comm. of Ind. v. C., I. & L. Railway Co. (1956), 235 Ind. 394, 399, 132 N.E.2d 698, 134 N.E.2d 53. The foregoing rule also applies to judicial reviews from administrative boards. Mills v. Princeton Mining Company (1962), Ind.App., 183 N.E.2d 359.

In reviewing the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, we find § 40-2206, Burns', provides:

'(a) As used in this act [§§ 40-2201-40-2231], the term 'occupational disease' means a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where such diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section.

'(b) A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment, only if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all of the circumstances, a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease, and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment and which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause, and which does not come from a hazard to which workmen would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. The disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease need not have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.'

It is a general rule of law that the burden of...