Collins v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 26 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1-19-CV-1097-LY |
| Parties | DR. ROBERT COLLINS, v. TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION GENERAL COUNSEL LYNN ROBITAILLE GARCIA, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court are Defendant Andrew James' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. No. 6); Defendant Mills' Motion to Dismiss with Brief in Support (Dkt. No. 8); Defendants Forensic Science Commissioners Barnard, Budowle, Buzzina, Daniel, Downing, Drake, Johnson, Kerrigan, Parsons, and Forensic Science Commission General Counsel's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16); and all associated responses and replies. The District Court referred the motions to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules.
On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff Robert Collins, proceeding pro se, filed the instant suit against the Commissioners of the Texas Forensic Science Commission,1 Texas DPS Crime Lab Director Brady Mills, Texas Forensic Science Commission General Counsel Lynn Robitaille Garcia, Montgomery County Assistant District Attorney Andrew James, Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge Perrye K. Turner, and "other as-yet unknown state and FBI officials. " Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Collins brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy.
Collins is a self-employed DNA expert who testifies in criminal trials. He has a doctorate in Molecular and Human Genetics from Baylor College of Medicine. In 2019, Collins participated as a court-appointed expert witness in the trial of Fred Dexter Lee, in Montgomery County, Texas. Andrew James acted as the prosecutor in the case. Lee was found not guilty, but Collins asserts that the DNA Technical Leader of the Houston DPS Crime Lab, Andrew McWhorter,2 through his trial testimony, knowingly presented false, degraded, and misleading DNA evidence to the jury in that trial. Collins asserts that the practices of the DPS Crime Lab fail to meet professional and state requirements and that DNA evidence degradation is systemic at the DPS Crime Lab. Collins maintains this degradation may affect hundreds of cases.
Collins filed a complaint with the Texas Forensic Science Commission concerning the actions of the DPS Crime Lab. Collins asserts that after he filed this complaint, the Commissioners conspired to cover up the inadequacies of the DPS Crime Lab; and instead of investigating Collins' actual complaint, conducted a "sham"investigation and investigated a different complaint, which they found had no merit. Collins alleges that the Commissioners held a meeting and presented the results of their investigation of Collins' complaint. Collins asserts he testified after the Commissioners' presentation and findings, and complained that the Commissioners had investigated the wrong issue. He maintains that Commissioner Bodowle defamed him at this meeting by stating he was "wrong" and the Commission found no evidence of DNA degradation. Collins asserts this is "patently false." Id. at 13. He asserts the Commission made these statements in furtherance of the conspiracy to cover up the inadequacies of the DPS Crime Lab.
Collins further asserts that on August 5, 2019, he went to the Houston Field Office of the FBI, which he maintains is tasked with ensuring that every DNA lab meets federally mandated FBI Quality Assurance Standards, to file a complaint against the Commission. Collins maintains that FBI agents/employees, under the direction of SAIC Perrye K. Turner, refused to accept his complaint either in person or by email. Collins asserts that the FBI conspired with Commissioner Bruce Budowle, himself a twenty-six-year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in not accepting his complaint and covering up the Commission's actions. Id. at 15.
Collins complains that he was defamed and falsely discredited by the Commission, damaging his reputation, leading to a dropoff in his expert witness consultation business, and emotional pain and suffering. Pursuant to Sections 1983 and 1985, he asserts violations of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause,3 conspiracy and "failure to intervene." He also makes state law claims of conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Collins alleges all claims against all Defendants. In three groups, Defendants have three moved to dismiss. The Court finds that the Defendants' motions should be granted.
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the Arts, 992 F. Supp. 876, 878 (N.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000). Where a defendant attacks jurisdiction based solely on the allegations of the complaint, as here, the plaintiff's factual allegations are presumed to be true. O'Rourke v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez, 992 F. Supp. at 878. Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate when the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996); O'Rourke, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 534. When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the complaint on its face, without reference to extraneous facts, courts analyze the pleadings under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Myspace, 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court should consider the jurisdictional attack before addressing the 12(b)(6) motion. Rodriguez, 992 F. Supp. at 879.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 (2008). The Supreme Court has explained that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [nonmovant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [movant] is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
Collins sues all Defendants in their individual capacities and asserts that "all acted in the scope of their employment or official duties while engaging in the actions alleged in this Complaint." Dkt. No. 1 at 4. He request compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and fees for his alleged injuries. Dkt. No. 1 at 26.4
First, the FSC General Counsel and Commissioners move to dismiss Collins' Due Process, Fifth Amendment, and federal conspiracy claims against the individual Commission Defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. The Commission Defendants allege that Collins does not have standing to bring his constitutional claims because he cannot establish he has suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the individual Commission Defendants. The Commission Defendants assert that Collins merely disagrees with the outcome of the investigation of his complaint, and this does not qualify as an injury sufficient to secure his claims.
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts can resolve only "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In line with this requirement, a plaintiff must have standing—that is, (1) an injury in fact (2) that is traceable to the defendant's conduct and (3) that can be redressed by the court. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). An injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. An injury is particularized if it "affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. That is, the plaintiff must have "a direct stake in the outcome." See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972). To satisfy this injury-in-fact test, Plaintiffs therefore must allege more than an injury to someone's concrete, cognizable interest; they must "be [themselves] among the injured." McMahon v. Fenves, 946 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Sierra Club 405 U.S. at 734-35) ( that Confederate descendants and historical groups did not have standing to bring First Amendment claims about removal of Confederate monuments because they failed to establish a First Amendment-based stake in the outcome of the litigation).
Collins complains that his complaint to the Texas Forensic Science Commission about the DPS Crime Lab was mishandled. He also asserts he was defamed when, later at a...
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