Collins v. Hall
| Decision Date | 23 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:96-CV-209RM.,3:96-CV-209RM. |
| Citation | 991 F.Supp. 1065 |
| Parties | Janice K. COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. Kim HALL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Kenneth M. McDermott, Plymouth, IN, Franklin A. Morse, II, South Bend, IN, for plaintiff.
Mary H. Wertz, Indianapolis, IN, Terry G. Duga, Indianapolis, IN, for defendant Kim Hall.
Carmen M. Piasecki, Eugenia S. Schwartz, Nickle and Piasecki, South Bend, IN, Mary H. Wertz, Terry G. Duga, Atty. Gen.'s Office, Indianapolis, IN, for defendant Mark E. Caruso.
In a letter to those who sell alcoholic beverages in Starke County, Indiana, the county prosecuting attorney (Kim Hall) and deputy prosecuting attorney (Mark Caruso) branded Janice Collins an "habitual drunkard" for purposes of an Indiana statute that prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to known habitual drunkards. The letter was withdrawn three days later. Ms. Collins brings this suit for damages and injunctive relief, contending that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecutors' action deprived her of her rights under the federal Due Process Clause. Because the court finds that the plaintiff has not been deprived of any liberty interest recognized by the United States constitution and that she lacks standing to seek injunction against the statute's operation in the future, the court grants the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Indiana's "habitual drunkard statute" provides: "It is unlawful for a permittee to sell, barter, exchange, give, provide, or furnish an alcoholic beverage to a person whom he knows to be a habitual drunkard." IND.CODE § 7.1-5-10-14. Ms. Collins claims that this statute is unconstitutional on its face and that its application to her violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Her name appeared on a list within a letter distributed to numerous alcoholic beverage permittees in Starke County, Indiana. The letter characterizes those on the list as habitual drunkards, and notified its recipients that the seldom-used habitual drunkard statute would be enforced with potentially severe consequences. Former Starke County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Mark Caruso made the decision to draft and distribute the letter; Mr. Hall, the Starke County prosecutor, approved Mr. Caruso's under-taking this project. Mr. Caruso compiled the list of 59 names by researching public records to ascertain who had been arrested for multiple alcohol-related offenses. Ms. Collins had been arrested on two occasions for alcohol related offenses so Mr. Caruso included her name on the list.1
Mr. Caruso believed that enforcing the habitual drunkard statute would reduce crime by preventing those identified as habitual drunkards from becoming intoxicated. While this purpose is clear, much is unclear: no clearly defined criteria determined whose names would appear on the list; there was no established length of time during which one's name would remain on the list; no procedure existed to have one's name removed from the list or to contest an appearance on the list; and no protocol existed as to whether the list would be posted in public view or where only the permittee or its employee could see it. A police officer distributed this letter in February of 1996 to certain permittees in Starke County:
Dear alcoholic beverage licensee:
Under Indiana Code section 7.1-5-10-14 Sales to Habitual Drunkards, it is a class B misdemeanor to serve alcohol to anyone who is in the habit of becoming intoxicated. The following is a list of individuals who have multiple alcohol related arrests, and should be considered "Habitual drunkards" for purposes of this statute.
An establishment selling or serving alcohol to these individuals will be cited, and a copy of the citation will be sent to the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, which may revoke your license if it finds sufficient violations have occurred.
Please post this list in an area where all your employees will see it. Notice to licensee is sufficient to bind his employees.
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Three days after the letter's distribution, Mr. Hall informed the permittees to ignore the letter until further notice. The letter and list no longer are in distribution, and the statute is not enforced in Starke County. The summary judgment record does not reveal the extent to which the statute might actually have been enforced during the three-day period, but it is undisputed that the statute never was enforced with respect to Ms. Collins.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(e) "mandates entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial." "Where the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial ... there can be no `genuine issue of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."
Although the moving party must initially identify the basis for its contention that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party cannot rest on his pleadings, but must produce his own evidence. Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof on an issue allege specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial by his own affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file....
In considering whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, [the court] extract[s] all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. However, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Where a fact is disputed, the nonmoving party must show that the disputed fact is material under the applicable law. The applicable law will dictate which facts are material. Only disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
National Soffit & Escutcheons, Inc. v. Superior Systems, Inc., 98 F.3d 262, 264-265 (7th Cir.1996) (citations omitted).
On November 25, 1997, more than five weeks after the defendants filed their dispositive motions and less than two months before the final pretrial conference and trial, Ms. Collins sought leave to file a third amended complaint. Her motion states that the third amended complaint alleges her due process claim with greater specificity and clarifies some factual allegations related to her arrest record. She does not explain why the amendment is necessary or why justice requires the court to grant her leave to make this filing at this late stage in this litigation.
Ms. Collins twice has previously amended her complaint and the designated time for amending pleadings is long past. This point in time — after deadlines have been extended on several occasions, well after the close of discovery and after the filing of dispositive motions — is too late to file an amended complaint, particularly when the amended complaint would breathe a new factual issue into the case after the close of discovery2 and no arguments have been presented to convince the court of the need for amendment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir.1995). The court denies Ms. Collins's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint.
Turning to the dispositive motions, the defendants argue that Ms. Collins cannot state a claim because she does not specifically allege injury to a constitutionally protected interest, but only generally alleges that her right to due process was denied. Mr. Caruso and Mr. Hall argue that Ms. Collins's claim must fail because she cannot identify a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest of which she was deprived by having her name included on the habitual drunkard list. There can be no procedural due process violation, they continue, because without a constitutionally protected interest, no process is due even if some type of injury results from governmental action.
The liberal notice requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 8 do not require technical precision in pleading, but are grounded in the concept of notice. Ms. Collins's complaint — when read in a light most favorable to her — sufficiently alleges (1) damage to her reputation; and (2) a change in her legal status from one for whom the purchase of alcohol was legal to one for whom the purchase of alcohol was illegal. Ms. Collins argues that under Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971), Indiana's habitual drunkard statute is unconstitutional on its face and that its application to her deprived her of certain liberties without the benefit of procedural due process. She further asserts that under Constantineau, the damage to her reputation, coupled with loss of the right to purchase and consume alcohol, constitutes a legal harm of constitutional magnitude.
Before a government body deprives a person of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property, the Due Process Clause generally requires the governmental body to conduct some type of hearing accompanied by notice and an opportunity to be heard. Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 978 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510...
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Smith v. City of Chicago, 97 C 1865.
...plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim was not cognizable under § 1983 because he suffered only emotional damages); Collins v. Hall, 991 F.Supp. 1065, 1071 (N.D.Ind.1997) (stating that governmental defamation is actionable under § 1983 only when a "liberty interest is implicated by the tan......
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Manning v. Caldwell
...or consume alcohol. There is no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in such a right. See Collins v. Hall , 991 F.Supp. 1065, 1071-72 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (rejecting a Due Process challenge to a habitual drunkard statute because the plaintiff did not "suffer[ ] a deprivation ......