Collins v. Hendrickson

• Decision Date: 26 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 8:02 CV 1438 T 27MSS.,8:02 CV 1438 T 27MSS.
• Citation: Collins v. Hendrickson, 371 F.Supp.2d 1326 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
• Parties: Anthony COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. Brian K. HENDRICKSON; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

371 F.Supp.2d 1326

Anthony COLLINS, Plaintiff, v.Brian K. HENDRICKSON; et al., Defendants.

No. 8:02 CV 1438 T 27MSS.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

January 26, 2005.

Anthony Collins, Lake Butler, FL, pro se.

Beverly Brewster, Judy A. Bone, General Counsel's Office, Department of Corrections, Bradley R. Bischoff, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT is Petitioner's pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(Dkt. 13).Upon consideration, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.The Florida Parole Commission is accordingly ORDERED to forthwith release PetitionerANTHONY COLLINS, a/k/a EDWARD KING, DC # 072597, under the terms and conditions of its July 9, 1991 Control Release Agreement.

This cause was referred to the Honorable Mary S. Scriven.United States Magistrate Judge.(Dkt. 58).Judge Scriven, in a thoughtful, well reasoned and detailed analysis of the factual and procedural history relevant to Petitioner's claims and after correctly applying federal law, has rendered her Report and Recommendation, concluding that the Florida Parole Commission("FPC"), in its July 26, 2000 revocation of Petitioner's Control Release, failed to comply with the procedures mandated by Fla. Stat. § 947.141(4) for revocation of Control Release, violating Petitioner's 14th Amendment due process rights, as recognized by Florida and federal law.¹

On July 9, 1991, Petitioner, while serving concurrent 20 and 15 year sentences for strong armed robbery, armed robbery, armed burglary and aggravated battery, was granted control release pursuant to a Florida law authorizing the early release of Florida inmates to control the rising prison population.The FPC administered the program, acting as the Control Release Authority.SeeFla. Stat. § 947.146.²In 1994, Petitioner was arrested for violation of the conditions of his release.After a hearing, he was restored to supervision.(Dkt. 7, Ex. E).In July, 1999.Petitioner had an argument with his girlfriend, resulting in his arrest on and conviction of domestic battery.As a result, the FPC issued an arrest warrant and, based upon Petitioner's conviction, revoked his supervision, notwithstanding the hearing officer's recommendation that Petitioner be restored to supervision (Dkt. 7, Ex. H).

After Petitioner successfully moved to vacate his un-counseled guilty plea to the domestic battery charge, the FPC vacated its earlier revocation order and restored Petitioner to supervision.(Dkt. 7, Ex. I).The next day, however, the FPC issued an arrest warrant based on Petitioner's "behavior", rather than his domestic violence conviction.(Dkt. 7, Ex. J).While Petitioner's revocation proceeding was pending, the State Attorney nolle prossed the domestic battery charge.(Dkt. 39).A revocation hearing was conducted by Parole Examiner Cooper on June 13, 2000.P.E. Cooper found Petitioner not guilty and recommended that Petitioner be released on control release supervision.(Dkt. 1, Ex. Fat 8).

On July 26, 2000, in the decision Judge Scriven found violated Petitioner's 14th Amendment due process rights, the FPC revoked Petitioner's supervision and returned him to custody, effectively rejecting P.E. Cooper's factual finding that Petitioner did not violate the conditions of his release in the incident involving his girlfriend.(Dkt. 7, Ex. L).³

A parolee enjoys a liberty interest protected by the 14th Amendment's due process clause.Ellard v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles,824 F.2d 937, 942(11th Cir.1987), cert. denied,485 U.S. 981, 108 S.Ct. 1280, 99 L.Ed.2d 491(1988)(quotingMorrissey v. Brewer,408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484(1972))("Once an individual has been released into society under the constraints of either parole or probation, however, the resulting freedom, `although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty' and thus inherently `falls within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.'")The parolee's due process rights are implemented when that liberty interest is subject to revocation.Id.In Florida, revocation hearings are governed by due process considerations.SeeGillard v. State,827 So.2d 316(Fla. 1st DCA2002)(citingMorrissey,408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484(1972)).

As the Magistrate Judge correctly observed, Fla. Stat. § 947.141 places substantive limitations on the FPC when it is deciding whether to revoke a person's supervision.In sum, the FPC must make its decision based on the factual findings of its authorized representative, the hearing examiner.The FPC cannot disregard a hearing examiner's factual findings and substitute its own, where the hearing examiner's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and it is a "departure from the essential requirements of law" for a court to affirm a decision of the FPC under those circumstances.Tedder v. Florida Parole Commission,842 So.2d 1022(Fla. 1st DCA2003)⁴;see also, Mabrey v. Florida Parole Commission,858 So.2d 1176, 1183(Fla. 2d DCA2003): Merritt v. Crosby,893 So.2d 598, (Fla. 1st DCA2005)("As we explained in Tedder v. Florida Parole Commission,(citation omitted), the Parole Commission is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence considered by the hearing examiner in order to find a violation where the examiner's finding to the contrary is supported by competent, substantial evidence.")

The Magistrate Judge correctly recognized that liberty interests can arise from state law where, as here, a statute places substantive limitations on official discretion.(Dkt. 70, p. 33: citing Ellard,824 F.2d at 942).It follows that the limitations placed on the FPC's discretion in § 947.141 give rise to due process protections to parolees such as Petitioner who are facing revocation.In Ellard, the Eleventh Circuit observed:

"As the Supreme Court has made clear, where a claimed liberty interest does not arise from the due process clause itself, `[t]he ground for any constitutional claim, if any, must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with exercising' the claimed liberty interest.The due process clause, in short, prohibits the states from negating by their actions rights that they have conferred by their words.The states, of course, may elect not to confer rights, such as parole, that are not inherent in the Constitution.But once a state does choose to confer such a right, the prisoner's interest has `real substance,' and the right can be revoked only under the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause."(citations omitted).

Ellard,824 F.2d at 943.

The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the FPC, contrary to the mandate of Fla. Stat. § 947.141, effectively rejected P.E. Cooper's factual findings in favor of Petitioner and substituted its own findings, rather than making its determination "based upon the findings of fact presented by ... the authorized representative", where the findings of P.E. Cooper were supported by competent, substantial evidence.Further, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the state court's decision denying Petitioner relief was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of federal law,"28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).Finally, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the "FPC's action was contrary to state law and to `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'"(Dkt. 70, p. 38).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1.The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is approved and adopted in all respects and made a part of this order for all purposes, including appeal.

2.Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus(Dkt. 13) is GRANTED.The State of Florida, acting through the Florida Parole Commission and the Florida Department of Corrections, is ORDERED to forthwith release PetitionerANTHONY COLLINS, a/k/a EDWARD KING, DC # 072597 under the terms and conditions of its July 9, 1991 Control Release Agreement, subject to any lawful detainers, if any.

3.The Clerk is directed to close this case and deny any pending motions as moot.

Anthony Collins, a/k/a Edward King, Petitioner,

v.

Brian K. Hendrickson, Charles J. Crist, Jr.,¹ and Florida Parole Commission, Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SCRIVEN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This cause comes on for consideration of Petitioner's amended petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking federal habeas relief from the 2000 revocation of his control release supervision and the subsequent forfeiture of gain time by the Florida Department of Corrections(hereinafter "FDOC")(Dkt. 13).²The Florida Parole Commission(hereinafter "FPC") was added as a respondent on October 18, 2002(Dkt. 9).³Respondents have filed responses to the petition (Dkts. 7; 10; 14; 15).Petitioner has filed a motion for summary judgment(Dkt. 24), and Respondents have filed opposition thereto (Dkt. 35).This matter was referred to the Undersigned for a report and recommendation on the motion for summary judgment and the disposition of the petition (Dkt. 41).

As the United States Supreme Court opined in Harris v. Nelson,"[t]here is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, for it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that he is deprived of his freedom contrary to law."394 U.S. 286, 292, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281(1969).Toward this end, the Undersigned has undertaken the review of Petitioner's request for federal habeas relief, and having considered the...