Collins v. Kibort, 97-2332

Decision Date01 May 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-2332,97-2332
Citation143 F.3d 331
Parties73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,352, 49 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 330 Charles COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D.J. KIBORT and Educational Therapy Center, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

R. Ronnae Black, Sr., East St. Louis, IL, Laura Robinson (argued), Centreville, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John L. Gilbert (argued), Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Gilbert & Mudge, Edwardsville, IL, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Charles Collins claims that his employer, the Educational Therapy Center ("ETC"), intentionally discriminated against him because of his race when it reduced his employment status from full-time to part-time. To remedy this alleged wrong, he sued ETC and its director, D.J. Kibort, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. A jury found that ETC and Kibort did discriminate against Collins. We affirm the judgment for Collins and against ETC, vacate the judgment against Kibort, vacate the jury's compensatory damages award and the district court's judgment for back pay, and remand for a new trial on damages.

I. HISTORY

ETC is a publicly funded school that serves the needs of students with behavioral disorders. Before 1991, ETC consisted of two buildings on separate campuses: one in the racially mixed area of Madison, Illinois, the other in the predominantly white area of Cottage Hills, Illinois. ETC hired Collins in 1981 as a custodian for the Madison campus, and it hired Jerry Estes in 1991 as a custodian for the Cottage Hills campus. Kibort became the director of ETC in 1990. Collins is black; Estes and Kibort are white.

Before the start of the 1991-1992 school year, ETC decided to consolidate its facilities into the north campus located in Cottage Hills. During that school year, Kibort met with Estes and Collins to establish their respective responsibilities. Kibort assigned Collins the job of cleaning the bulk of the building, including all seventeen classrooms, the gym, the kitchen, and the teachers' lounge. Kibort asked Estes to perform some cleaning but also requested that he drive the bus on all field trips, provide student transportation when necessary, retrieve lunches from the local school district, maintain the buses, and cut the grass.

In planning for the 1993-1994 school year, Kibort decided to downsize the custodial staff to one full-time and one part-time custodian. She believed that the building did not need a full-time cleaning person. To determine whose hours would be reduced, Kibort watched the two men work, considered the length of service of the employees, and reviewed their personnel files. She determined that Estes was the better choice for the transportation and maintenance needs of ETC, a full-time commitment, while Collins was better suited to handle the cleaning responsibilities on a part-time basis. Kibort informed Collins of her decision to reduce him to part-time status on March 3, 1993.

Collins believes that she also considered his race. According to Collins, before Kibort raised the issue of downsizing, he approached her, wondering whether he could help with ETC's transportation and maintenance needs other than cleaning. During this conversation, he offered to get his commercial driver's license. Kibort rejected this request, saying "it would cause a problem." Collins says that Kibort never explained what she meant by that comment. Kibort swears the conversation never occurred.

When Kibort notified Collins that she was reducing his position to part-time, she gave him a written notice and explained that health insurance was available. As a full-time employee, ETC paid for Collins' health insurance. Kibort informed him that part-time employees have an option of paying half of the insurance premium and ETC would pay the other half. Collins elected to go without health insurance. Within a year, Collins was hospitalized and incurred substantial medical bills. He has been unable to pay these bills.

On April 28, 1993, Collins filed a grievance with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On May 31, 1994, the St. Louis District Office of the EEOC provided Collins with "notice of his right to sue" on a charge of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e).

On August 31, 1994, Collins initiated an action against ETC and Kibort for race discrimination arising from his transfer from a full-time to a part-time position. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages for the difference in salary between the full-time and part-time positions, for the loss of his health insurance benefits, and for the medical expenses which he incurred while he did not have health insurance. ETC and Kibort defended the suit by arguing that Collins was not qualified for the full-time position, that he was offered health insurance but refused it, and that legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons supported their employment decision.

A three-day trial ensued before a jury in June 1996. The trial produced a verdict for Collins and against ETC and Kibort for $96,034.80 in compensatory damages. In its judgment on the verdict, the district court ordered Kibort and ETC to pay $471 for court costs and $54,943.75 for attorneys' fees. The court also ordered ETC to reemploy Collins as a full-time custodian with full benefits and privileges, ordered a judgment for the amount of the wages and benefits unlawfully withheld by ETC when it reduced him from full-time to part-time employment, and ordered that ETC and Kibort refrain from other discriminatory acts against Collins and others similarly situated. See Judgment, Collins v. Kibort, No. 94-CV-644, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D.Ill.Dec. 9, 1996).

After the district court denied ETC's and Kibort's post-trial motions, they filed a timely appeal with this Court. ETC and Kibort claim that the district court erred 1) in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law; 2) in becoming an advocate for the plaintiff in its questioning of Kibort; 3) in admitting inadmissible evidence; and 4) in awarding duplicative remedies in its judgment on the verdict.

II. ANALYSIS

Before we reach the questions raised on appeal, we have a matter of judicial housekeeping to resolve. In his original complaint, Collins named as defendants not only ETC but also Kibort "individually and as a managerial employee" of ETC. On October 11, 1994, Kibort moved to dismiss the claim against her in her individual capacity. On November 11, 1995, the district court granted Kibort's motion, noting that employees may be sued only in their official capacities as agents of the employer. See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that a supervisor does not, in her individual capacity, fall within Title VII's definition of employer); see also Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir.1996) (same).

After a series of unrelated procedural steps, Collins filed a second amended complaint on December 14, 1994. According to the caption, the defendants are Kibort, in her official capacity, and ETC. The complaint, however, only states a claim against ETC. It does not include a claim against Kibort. The caption is plainly incorrect. A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including the defendant's name in the caption.

Unfortunately, neither the parties nor the district court reduced the official caption for this suit to list ETC as the only defendant. In fact, according to the caption of subsequent pretrial motions, Collins continued his suit against Kibort, individually and in her managerial capacity, and against ETC. These captions are incorrect.

While an erroneous caption is not fatal to a suit, the caption caused serious problems at trial. It appears that the trial court relied on the caption in drafting the verdict form. The verdict form stated that the jury found "in favor of the Plaintiff, Charles Collins, and against the Defendants, Debra Kibort and The Education Therapy Center." Kibort ceased being a party to the litigation in her individual capacity on November 11, 1995 when the district court dismissed this count and ceased being a party altogether when Collins filed his second amended complaint on December 14, 1995. See Duda v. Board of Education of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir.1998) (reasoning that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect); Wellness Community Nat'l v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46, 49 (7th Cir.1995) (same). Thus, ETC was the only defendant in this suit and the verdict form incorrectly listed Kibort as a defendant. We therefore vacate the judgment against Kibort. 1

A.

ETC claims that the district court erred by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). We review the denial of this motion de novo, see Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir.1996); however, we limit our inquiry to whether the evidence presented, combined with all the reasonable inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. See Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 960 (7th Cir.1996); Tapia v. City of Greenwood, 965 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir.1992). We will overturn a jury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that "no rational jury could have found for the plaintiff." Emmel, 95 F.3d at 630. "We apply this standard stringently in discrimination cases, where witness credibility is often crucial." Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir.1998).

While the parties present this question as whether Collins established that ETC's reasons were pretextual under the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework, this framework falls away once a trial is...

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