Collins v. Kidd Dairy & Ice Co.

Decision Date08 December 1942
Docket NumberNo. 10214.,10214.
PartiesCOLLINS v. KIDD DAIRY & ICE CO.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Fred K. Newberry, of Texarkana, Tex., for appellant.

Wm. V. Brown, of Texarkana, Tex., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

The Kidd Dairy & Ice Company is a partnership engaged in the manufacture and sale of artificial ice in Texarkana, a city lying partly in Texas and partly in Arkansas. This is an action by employees of the company for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, damages, and attorney's fees, alleged to be owed them by reason of the failure of the company to comply with Sections 6 and 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 Decision turns upon the questions: Were these employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce; and, if so, was the company a retail or service establishment within the exemption of Section 13(a) (2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a) (2)?

The problem presented by the first question is whether commerce of an ordinarily local character is subject to regulation as interstate commerce because the transactions take place across the state line in a city so located. The company was located in Texarkana, Texas, and a substantial percentage of its production was manufactured for, and was transported to, customers in Texarkana, Arkansas.2 Section 3(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(b), defines interstate commerce to include trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several states or from any state to any place outside thereof. That so broad a definition includes the business of this partnership is clear, and no basis is afforded for engrafting an exception applicable to the circumstances of this case.3

The alternative contention that the partnership enterprise was a retail establishment under Section 13(a) (2) of the Act is predicated upon these facts: The company manufactured artificial ice in 300-pound blocks, and operated sufficient equipment and machinery to maintain a maximum production of ice daily of between 40 and 50 tons. It maintained ten trucks for the delivery of ice along regular consumer-routes, and elsewhere; and owned over forty retail ice houses scattered about the city, which were operated by independent dealers for profit. Large quantities of ice regularly were supplied to business houses; transport trucks were refrigerated; and some customers purchased ice at the plant for resale at a profit. The price was based upon the quantity sold, and varied from 40¢ per 100 pounds on small purchases to 25¢ per 100 pounds to retail dealers.

These facts demonstrate that the company did not discriminate with regard to the disposition of its ice; it readily adopted every means of distribution available to it, as its emphasis was upon the profit incident to the manufacture of ice in volume. Though its business consisted in part of wholesale and retail sales, it was predominantly a manufacturing establishment. A retail establishment under Section 13(a) (2) is one that sells goods in small quantities for profit,4 and a manufacturer engaged primarily in the production of goods does not come within the terms of the exemption.5

Upon the record before us, we shall not undertake to classify...

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15 cases
  • Cannon v. Miller
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • January 26, 1945
    ... ... v ... Walling, supra; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra; ... Collins v. Kidd Dairy & Ice Co., 5 Cir., 132 F.2d ... 79; Walling v. Peoples Packing Co., 10 Cir., ... ...
  • General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 7, 1956
    ...and accessory to that business. Wellesley College v. Attorney General, 313 Mass. 722, 732-733, 49 N.E.2d 220; Collins v. Kidd Dairy & Ice Co., 5 Cir., 132 F.2d 79; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. City of Broken Bow, 184 Okl. 362, 87 P.2d 319. Neither can the plaintiff be deemed a retailer because......
  • Fountain v. St. Joseph Water Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 6, 1944
    ... ... Goetz Brewing Co., Western Dairy and Ice Cream Co., Douglas ... Candy Co., and others engaged in bottling ... [180 S.W.2d 30] ... purchased commodity." (Our italics.) The [352 Mo ... 823] same court in Collins v. Kidd Dairy & Ice Co ... (U.S.C.C.A., 5th Cir.), 132 F.2d 79 said "A retail ... establishment ... ...
  • General Electric Company v. Hess Brothers, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • August 19, 1957
    ...Co. v. Womack, 9 Cir., 1942, 132 F.2d 101; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Keen, 8 Cir., 1946, 157 F.2d 310; and Collins v. Kidd Dairy & Ice Co., 5 Cir., 1942, 132 F.2d 79. 13 See discussion below concerning opportunity granted defendant 60 days after July 22, 1957 to prevent evidence on t......
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