Collins v. Kimberly-Clark Pa., LLC

• Decision Date: 27 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 12–2173
• Citation: 247 F.Supp.3d 571
• Parties: Muriel COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. KIMBERLY–CLARK PENNSYLVANIA, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

247 F.Supp.3d 571

Muriel COLLINS, Plaintiff,

v.KIMBERLY–CLARK PENNSYLVANIA, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12–2173

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed March 27, 2017

Filed March 28, 2017

Muriel Collins, Linwood, PA, pro se.

Alan B. Epstein, Jennifer Myers Chalal, Spector, Gadon & Rosen, PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Aiten M. McPherson, Christopher P. Galanek, Bryan Cave LLP, Atlanta, GA, Lee C. Durivage, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Jones, II, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Muriel Collins, a long-term employee of Kimberly–Clark Paper Company, commenced this action against her employer, alleging agents of the company violated her civil rights during the final years of her employment. In particular, Plaintiff claims Defendant Kimberly–Clark, by and through its agents, unlawfully discriminated against her on the bases of her race¹ and sex,² and unlawfully retaliated against her when she complained of this discrimination.³ In response to Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which is now ripe for this Court's review. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion shall be granted.

II. Factual Background

The undisputed facts⁴ establish that Plaintiff was employed by Defendant in the Pulp Department at its Chester, Pennsylvania facility from May 1967 until March 20, 2012. (SUF ¶ 1; RSUF ¶ 1.) The Chester facility produces paper products, including toilet paper and paper towels. (SUF ¶ 2; RSUF ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was a member of the United Steelworkers Local Union 10–488, served as Shop Steward for many years, was Divisional Vice President in 2001, and was the only African American female Chief Shop Steward from 2009 until the end of her employment. (RSUF ¶ 3; RCMF ¶ 3.) As a union member, Plaintiff's employment was subject to the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") in effect between Defendant and the union. (SUF ¶ 4; RSUF ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was familiar with the CBA. (SUF ¶¶ 5–6; RSUF ¶¶ 5–6; Pl.'s Dep. 50:2–51:9.)

In January 2010, Defendant commenced an investigation regarding allegations of angry and otherwise inappropriate behavior by one of Plaintiff's coworkers, Joel Horne ("Horne"). (SUF ¶¶ 8–9; RSUF ¶¶ 8–9.) Plaintiff witnessed some of the events that prompted Defendant's investigation of Horne. (SUF ¶ 10; RSUF ¶ 10.) At the conclusion of its investigation, Defendant decided to terminate Horne's employment. (SUF ¶ 11; RSUF ¶ 11.) Since Horne was also a union member, he was entitled, under the CBA, to a grievance and arbitration process prior to his termination. (SUF ¶ 12; RSUF ¶ 12.) Plaintiff initially recommended that Horne be terminated but subsequently attended Horne's "second step" grievance meeting as his union representative. (CMF ¶ 9–10; RCMF ¶ 9–10.) Defendant remained steadfast in its decision to terminate Horne. (SUF ¶ 14; RSUF ¶ 14.)

On November 4, 2010, Plaintiff received a subpoena directing her to appear at Horne's arbitration hearing on November 9, 2010. (SUF ¶ 15; RSUF ¶ 15; Pl.'s App. Ex. 12.) The subpoena was delivered by Ron Schultz ("Schultz"), a level 6 employee of Defendant. (CMF ¶ 13; RCMF ¶ 13; Pl.'s Dep. 415:8–10, 416:3; Flynn Dep. 33:3–5.) Other employees at the Chester facility received similar subpoenas to attend the Horne arbitration hearing. (SUF ¶ 16; RSUF ¶ 16.) The CBA permits employees who are subpoenaed to take leave from work to fulfill witness duty and Plaintiff was familiar with this policy. (SUF ¶ 20; RSUF ¶ 20; Pl.'s Dep. 50:2–51:9; Langdon Decl. ¶ 15.) Although Plaintiff was unaware of anyone else failing to attend an arbitration when issued a subpoena, she elected to not attend the Horne arbitration hearing and instead, report to work. (SUF ¶¶ 17, 20, 24; RSUF ¶¶ 17, 20, 24.) Plaintiff maintains she did not attend because she believed the subpoena to be "fake"; however, she did not ask management or the union about the validity of the subpoena. (SUF ¶ 18; RSUF ¶ 18.) The other employees who received subpoenas did appear at the arbitration hearing. (SUF ¶ 19; RSUF ¶ 19.) John Flynn ("Flynn"), the Chester facility labor relations manager at the time, spoke with Plaintiff by phone about her presence at the arbitration hearing. (SUF ¶ 21; RSUF ¶ 21.) Flynn advised plaintiff that she had, in fact, been subpoenaed. (CMF ¶ 17; RCMF ¶ 17.) Despite Flynn's representations, Plaintiff still did not attend the arbitration hearing and as a result, on November 30, 2010, received a five-day suspension for insubordination. (SUF ¶¶ 22–23; RSUF ¶¶ 22–23; Pl.'s App. Ex. 28.)

Between November 30, 2010 and December 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed three grievances with Defendant's Human Resources Department relating to the circumstances leading up to her five-day suspension. (SUF ¶ 25; RSUF ¶ 25; Pl.'s App. Exs. 17–19.) In Grievance No. 46–10, she alleged "ongoing conspiracy to discriminate, intimidate, harassment by milice [sic], willful misconduct, fraud, and other wrong doings" but did not specify the basis for the alleged discrimination or harassment. (SUF ¶ 26; RSUF ¶ 26; Pl.'s App. Ex. 18.) Debra Tierno ("Tierno"), manager of the Human Resources Department at the Chester Facility, was assigned to investigate Grievance No. 46–10. (SUF ¶ 27; RSUF ¶ 27.) Plaintiff and Tierno had difficulty meeting to discuss the contents of the grievance. (SUF ¶ 28; RSUF ¶ 28; Pl.'s App. Ex. 8.) On February 1, 2011, Plaintiff called the Kimberly–Clark Ethics and Compliance Employee Hotline and reported the allegations included in Grievance 46–10, as well as new allegations, such as age discrimination. (SUF ¶¶ 29–30; RSUF ¶¶ 29–30; Pl.'s App. Ex. 24.) During that call, Plaintiff asserted that Flynn wanted her to commit perjury at Horne's arbitration hearing by testifying that she supported Horne's termination when in fact, she did not support his termination. (SUF ¶ 31; RSUF ¶ 31.) Plaintiff also reported she did not think Tierno could be fair and impartial in investigating Plaintiff's grievance because she believed, although erroneously, that Tierno had signed her five-day suspension papers. (SUF ¶ 32, 32 n. 7; RSUF ¶ 32; Pl.'s App. Ex. 40.) Subsequently, Kimberly–Clark assigned Lori Ney ("Ney"), a human resources employee at corporate headquarters, to take over Tierno's investigation. (SUF ¶¶ 33–34; RSUF ¶¶ 33–34.) Ney interviewed Plaintiff and received extensive documentation from Plaintiff relating to her claims. (SUF ¶ 35; RSUF ¶ 35.) By April 27, 2011, Ney completed her investigation and concluded there was no evidence to support Plaintiff's allegations that she was asked to commit perjury or that she was a victim of discrimination. (SUF ¶¶ 36–37; RSUF ¶¶ 36–37.) Furthermore, Ney found multiple discrepancies between evidence she discovered and facts alleged by Plaintiff. (SUF ¶ 37; RSUF ¶ 37.) For example, Ney found that the subpoena showed enough detail that Plaintiff could have determined its validity, thereby undermining Plaintiff's claim that she did not appear at Horne's arbitration hearing because she believed the subpoena to be "fake." (SUF ¶¶ 38–39; RSUF ¶¶ 38–39.) Ney also determined that Plaintiff provided various other reasons for not attending the arbitration, including her belief that Flynn wanted her to commit perjury by stating that she supported Horne's termination. (SUF ¶ 41; RSUF ¶ 41.) However, Plaintiff admitted to Ney that Flynn never directed her to commit perjury. (SUF ¶ 42; RSUF ¶ 42.) Based on the discrepancies between Ney's findings and Plaintiff's reports, Ney concluded that Plaintiff had provided false information during the investigation, thereby directly and willfullyviolating Defendant's Code of Conduct.⁵ (SUF ¶ 44; RSUF ¶ 44; Pl.'s App. Ex. 27.) Although Ney's findings constituted grounds for termination, she did not participate in the decision-making process regarding any potential discipline for Plaintiff. (SUF ¶ 44; RSUF ¶ 44.)

As a result of Plaintiff's alleged Code of Conduct violation, on May 25, 2011, Defendant issued Plaintiff a fifteen-day suspension, a demotion of one pay level, and a Last Chance Agreement, which had been negotiated between Defendant and the union. (SUF ¶¶ 45–46; RSUF ¶¶ 45–46, Pl.'s App. Ex. 28.) According to the terms of the Last Chance Agreement, Plaintiff could be terminated for any future violations of the Code of Conduct, mill rules, or the CBA. (SUF ¶ 47; RSUF ¶ 47.) Although Plaintiff was informed that she would be terminated if she did not sign the Last Chance Agreement, she refused to do so and was not terminated. (SUF ¶¶ 48–49; RSUF ¶¶ 48–49.) After her suspension, Plaintiff resumed work and collected pay. (SUF ¶ 49; RSUF ¶ 49.)

On May 26, 2011, Plaintiff filed another charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging gender discrimination, age discrimination and retaliation. (SUF ¶ 50; RSUF ¶ 50; Pl.'s App. Ex. 29.) Plaintiff was absent from work on short-term disability leave from July 18, 2011 through October 17, 2011. (SUF ¶ 51; RSUF ¶ 51.) On November 9, 2011, Plaintiff again called the Code of Conduct Hotline claiming that Defendant's prior disciplinary action towards her was discriminatory and retaliatory, and that Plaintiff had received a voicemail from union vice president Sean Kane ("Kane"), at the end of which Kane could be heard making a statement containing foul language and referring to "her" being on a "list." (SUF ¶ 52; RSUF ¶ 52.) Defendant assigned Chelsea Hinkle ("Hinkle"), a Human Resources representative from corporate headquarters to investigate Plaintiff's November 9, 2011 Code of Conduct Hotline complaint. (SUF ¶ 53; RSUF ¶ 53.) In addition to interviewing Plaintiff, Ney, Tierno, Langdon, Kane, and union representative Bob Amis ("Amis"), Hinkle reviewed Plaintiff's February 1, 2011 Code of Conduct Hotline complaint and the associated investigation. (SUF ¶¶ 54–55; RSUF ¶¶ 54–55.) On February 2, 2012, Hinkle informed Plaintiff that the investigation did not...