Collins v. McDaniel
| Decision Date | 02 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-00255-RCJ-WGC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
| Parties | RONALD COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. E.K. MCDANIEL, et. al., Defendants. |
This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Robert C. Jones, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Local Rules of Practice, LR 1B 1-4. Before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 172.)1 Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 179 and exhibits at ECF Nos. 180, 181), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 192).
After a thorough review, the court recommends that Defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), proceeding pro se with this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 14.) The events giving rise to this action took place while Plaintiff was housed at Lovelock Correctional Center (LCC). (Id.) Defendants are LCC Warden Robert LeGrand and Correctional Officers Jethro Parks, Jonathan Ball (erroneously named as Officer Bail) and Joseph Baros. (Id.; Screening Order, ECF No. 11.)
On screening, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with retaliation claims in Count II against Ball, Parks, Baros and LeGrand; an Eighth Amendment claim against LeGrand in Count III; andretaliation and access to courts claims against Baros and LeGrand in Count IV. (ECF No. 11.) These claims will now be summarized in more detail.
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that on February 26, 2012, he was taken to the segregation unit for an alleged rule violation, and his property was searched by Officer Kassebaum and sent to Unit 7. (ECF No. 14 at 9 ¶ 1.) At that time, his stereo was not deemed altered or broken. (Id.) On March 1, 2012, he was taken from Unit 7 to the segregation Unit 4A, where defendant Parks demanded he hand over his watch, claiming it was unauthorized. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff gave Parks his watch and asked for an unauthorized property form for the watch, to which Parks responded: "What watch?" (Id. ¶ 3.) That same day, Officer Deich searched Plaintiff's property and gave Plaintiff all of the property he was allowed to have in Unit 4A, and placed all of the property he could not have in the Unit4A property room. (Id. ¶ 4.) His stereo and other appliances were not deemed altered or broken at that time. (Id.) He contends that between February 26, 2012 and March 1, 2012, his property had been inventoried and searched by four other officers, none of whom deemed Plaintiff's stereo or other appliances altered or broken. (ECF No. 14 at 10 ¶ 5.)
On March 7, 2012, Plaintiff went to his disciplinary hearing and was found guilty of a rule violation. (ECF No. 14 at 10 ¶ 6.) Appliance restrictions were not part of his disciplinary sanction; nevertheless, Ball and Parks went into his cell and took all of his appliances. (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently asked them for an unauthorized property notification form, but Ball denied his request. (Id. ¶ 8.) He was eventually given the form the following day. (Id. ¶ 9.)
On March 8, 2012, he filed an inmate grievance regarding the taking his watch and electric razor, and gave it to Ball to put in the grievance box. (ECF No. 14 at 10-11 ¶ 10.) The caseworker responded to the grievance and ordered that the watch and razor be returned. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that this caused Parks and Ball to engage in retaliatory acts against him. (Id. ¶ 12.) They commented to him that he better enjoy his watch and razor because those were the only property items he would be getting back. (Id.)
Then, as a result of filing the grievance, Plaintiff avers that Ball went into the Unit 4 property room where his property was being stored and ripped open his plastic property bag andremoved Plaintiff's personal work boots, and told Plaintiff what he did in order to taunt him. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding Ball removing his work boots from his property bin. (Id. ¶ 15.) After he filed this grievance, Plaintiff claims Parks told him: "Keep complaining and you will keep losing more of your property." (Id. ¶ 18.)
On June 7, 2012, Plaintiff's disciplinary time expired and he asked Parks for his stereo back, and Parks responded: (Id. ¶ 20.) Parks came back two hours later with a two-page unauthorized property notification form which listed all of Plaintiff's property that was in the Unit 4A property room as unauthorized because it was altered or broken. (Id. ¶ 21.) Parks also told Plaintiff he was going to write Plaintiff up due to the altered and broken property. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff maintains that his stereo and other appliances were not broken or altered before he filed his grievances against Ball and Parks, and they broke or altered them in retaliation against Plaintiff for filing grievances. (Id. ¶ 24.)
When Plaintiff moved to another unit away from Ball and Parks, he filed a grievance regarding his stereo being broken by Ball and Parks. (Id. ¶ 25.) As a result of filing this grievance, he contends that LeGrand ordered Baros to go from the unit Plaintiff had just left and deem twelve of his compact discs (CDs) unauthorized, stating that he had no CD player. (Id.) He alleges that it is LeGrand's policy for his staff to retaliate against inmates for filing grievances. (Id. ¶ 26.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with retaliation claims against Ball, Parks, Baros and LeGrand. (ECF No. 11 at 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that in 2010, LeGrand created a policy directing his officers to conduct five-minute door calls every hour for Units 3A and 3B. (ECF No. 14 at 15 ¶ 1.) Inmates were required to stand in front of their cell doors with their hands up, and the doors would open. (Id. ¶ 2.) He claims the procedure took twenty or more minutes. (Id.) During this process, only one inmate in a two-inmate cell would be able to use the toilet, causing Plaintiff and others to urinateor defecate in their pants. (Id. ¶ 4.) He also alleges that the officers working his unit would not open his cell door for him to use the toilet if it was not during door call, which also resulted in Plaintiff urinating or defecating in his pants. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff contends that he suffers from an untreated medical condition in his lower back, and if he stands up for more than three to five minutes, his lower half falls asleep and if he cannot make it to a toilet in time he will urinate in his pants. (ECF No. 14 at 16 ¶ 6.) He told the officers about his condition and asked them to let him into his cell to use the toilet, and claims he was told: "Warden LeGrand told us no exceptions." (ECF No. 14 at 16-17 ¶ 10.) There was no toilet on the recreational yard or in the housing unit for the inmates to use when their cell doors were closed. (ECF No. 14 at 17 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff filed grievances concerning the policies and the officers' actions of not letting him in his cell to use the toilet, and LeGrand responded that the policy was not unconstitutional. (ECF No. 14 at 17-18 ¶¶ 15-16.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with an Eighth Amendment claim against LeGrand. (ECF No. 11 at 5-6.)
Here, Plaintiff alleges that on January 15, 2013, he was ordered by Officer Vallister and defendant Baros to pack his property to be searched, but he was not allowed to be present during the search. (ECF No. 14 at 19 ¶ 3.) He then alleges that in retaliation for filing grievance 20062952246 (which was related to the twelve CDs being deemed unauthorized), Baros disposed of several of Plaintiff's legal papers and exhibits (Id. at 20 ¶ 5.) He asserts that he missed the deadline to file his claim seeking injunctive relief regarding the twelve CDs that were sold to him as one, but that were counted as two by NDOC. (Id. ¶ 6.) In addition, he contends that Baros took his legal crime scene photos as well as photos of his wife. (Id. at 20-21 ¶ 7.) He further states that Baros took and disposed of Plaintiff's personal boots. (Id. at 21 ¶ 8.) He avers that LeGrand created an unconstitutional policy/custom directing his officers to search inmate property outside of theirpresence in order to take inmate's legal documents concerning LeGrand and his officers. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with First Amendment retaliation and access to courts claims against Baros and LeGrand. (ECF No. 11 at 6.)
Plaintiff previously moved for summary judgment as to his Eighth Amendment claim in Count III, but his motion was denied. (See ECF Nos. 183, 187.)
Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims. The court will address each of the counts, and the parties' arguments, in turn.
"The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court." Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On the other hand, where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson v. Liberty...
To continue reading
Request your trial