Collins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: VICKERS
• Citation: Collins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N.E. 542 (Ill. 1908)
• Decision Date: 07 February 1908
• Parties: COLLINS v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

232 Ill. 37

83 N.E. 542

COLLINS

v.METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 17, 1907.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1908.

Error to Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; L. C. Ruth, Judge.

Action by Hugh Collins, as executor of the estate of Robert Kilpatrick deceased, against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for defendant, affirmed by the Appellate Court, plaintiff brings error on a certificate of importance. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Pattison & Shaw (William H. Holly, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Hoyne, O'Conner & Irwin, for defendant in error.

This is an action on a life insurance policy issued by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company on the life of Robert Kilpatrick. The provisions of the policy are set out in the declaration, one of which is that the policy should be incontestable after two years except for the nonpayment of premiums or for fraud. Two defenses are set up in the pleas of the insurance company: First, that Kilpatrick was indicted, tried, convicted, and executed for murder; second, that in 1903 the plaintiff commenced a suit in the court of common pleas of Philadelphia against the insurance company on the same policy declared on in this suit; that a rule was entered upon the defendant by that court to file its affidavit of defense; that the defendant filed its affidavit, setting up the indictment, trial, conviction, and execution of Kilpatrick on the charge of murder, and that it was adjudged and decided by said court that on the ground of public policy, the insured having been executed for a crime, the plaintiff could not recover; that the plaintiff took an appeal to the superior court of Pennsylvania, and upon such appeal the superior court decided that the facts alleged in the affidavit constituted a good defense to said suit, and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal at the cost of the plaintiff, but without prejudice. The plea setting up the latter defense contained averments of facts showing jurisdiction of the court over the parties and subject-matter. The plaintiff below demurred to the pleas. The demurrer was overruled, and, the plaintiff electing to abide his demurrer, the court gave judgment against him for costs. Upon an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county was affirmed. The case comes to this court on a certificate of importance, the amount involved being less than $1,000.

VICKERS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Whether the legal execution of the assured for a crime committed by him constitutes a defense to an action by his legal representative on a life insurance policy is a question of first impression in this siate. Where this defense has been sustained, it is generally upon the ground that it is contrary to public policy to permit a recovery where the death is in consequence of a violation of the law. This is the basis of the decision of this case by the Appellate Court, and is the main reason urged here in support of the judgment below.

It is said by the defendant in error that to permit a recovery on this policy would be contrary to the public policy of this state, as it would tend to remove a restraint thrown around persons who are tempted to commit crimes. The argument rests upon the same grounds that were urged centuries ago in support of the now obsolete doctrine of attainder and corruption of blood. In the earlier history of the common law various consequences other than the punishment of the offender followed conviction for felony, and in some instances the causing of a death by mere misadventure or negligence was visited with certain forfeitures and penalties. Without attempting historical accuracy, the law of England provided that all the property, real and personal, of one attainted should be forfeited and his blood so corrupted that nothing could pass by inheritance to, from, or through him. He could not sue, except to have his attainder reversed. Thus the wife, children, and collateral relations of the attainted person suffered with him. As said by Bishop: ‘When the tree fell, it brought down all its branches.’ 1 Bishop on Crim. Law, § 968. As further illustrating the rigor of the old English law, it was provided that, if a man be indicted for felony and flees, he forfeits by flight his goods, and ‘he that committeth nomicide by misadventure shall forfeit his goods; and so shall he which doth kill a man in his own defense forfeit his goods; and likewise he that killeth himself and is felo de se shall forfeit his goods; and he that being indicted to felony shall stand mute and not answer directly, or challenge peremptorily above twenty persons, shall forfeit his goods.’

These ancient doctrines, whether resting upon grounds of public policy or upon the other reason which is sometimes put forth, that the government is entitled to the goods of the felon as compensation for the injury done and the expense occasioned, have failed to satisfy the conscience and judgment of courts of later periods in England, and have never had a potential existence in American jurisprudence. The Constitution of the United States provides that ‘no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted,’ and by an act of Congress passed in 1790 all corruption of blood and forfeitures, whether for treason or felony, as to convictions under the federal law, were abolished. This doctrine never had any existence in Illinois, even in the modified form which seems to be recognized in the federal Constitution. In all the Constitutions adopted in this state a provision similar to the one found in section 11 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1870 is to be found. Thus, the Constitution of 1818 provided: ‘No ex post facto law, nor any other law impairing the validity of contracts, shall ever be made, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.’ The Constitution of 1848 contained the same clause, while the Constitution of 1870 deciares: ‘All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate; nor shall any person be transportedout of the state for any offense committed within the same.’ There are in these several constitutional provisions clear and unequivocal declarations of the public policy of this state, to the effect that no forfeiture of property rights shall follow conviction for crime. This public policy is further manifested by our statute in regard to descent of property in case of intestacy, and the general power of disposition of property by will, conferred by our statute of wills. In none of these statutes is the right conferred in respect to property made to depend on the manner of cause of the death of the owner. To hold that the property of one who was executed in this state for a crime was not subject to the same law of descent and devise as property generally would be nothing less than judicial legislation by ingrafting exceptions in statutes where none exist by the language of the law. Statutes of descent and devise are legislative declarations of the public policy of the state on the subjects to which they relate. The rules of the common law on these subjects have been wholly superseded by our statutes. Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122, 47 N. E. 321,41 L. R. A. 446;Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 54 N. E. 185,72 Am. St. Rep. 211;Sayles v. Christie, 187 Ill. 420, 58 N. E. 480;In re Mulford, 217 Ill. 242, 75 N. E. 345,1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 341, 108 Am. St. Rep. 249. Statutes of descent and devise similar to ours have generally been held not to exclude an heir or devisee from the benefits of these statutes on the ground that the heir or devisee had feloniously and intentionally destroyed the life of the person from whom the legacy or inheritance was expected. The Court of Appeals of New York, in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, 5 L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 819, by a divided court decided against the right of a devisee who had murdered the testator to take under the will; but this case has not generally been regarded as sound by the other courts. In a well-considered case in Nebraska the Supreme Court of that state retracted its first opinion in the case, and upon a rehearing held that, under a statute of descent similar to ours, the fact that the father had feloniouslymurdered his child did not prevent the operation of the statute of descent, and that the felon inherited the estate of his victim. Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 641, 59 N. W. 935,25 L. R. A. 564. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794, decided that the fact that the wife had been convicted of being an accessory before the fact for the murder of her husband furnished no legal reason for denying her a dower in her husband's real estate. Another case in point is found in Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 357. In this case the heir had murdered the ancestor, and it was held that he was entitled to inherit. The case of Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637, 29 L. R. A. 145, 50 Am. St. Rep. 765, holds that one who kills his ancestor for an estate that would naturally come to him under the statutes of descent and distribution may take it under a Constitution prohibiting attainders working corruption of blood and forfeitures of estates and under statutes providing no penalty for murder except by hanging. We cite these cases, but not for the purpose of approving them. The question decided in them is not involved here. We refer to these cases merely to show that the courts refused, in the face of a plain statutory declaration of the public policy of the state, to interpolate, by construction, an exception thereto.

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