Collins v. Navicent Health, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5:18-cv-00416-TES |
| Citation | 499 F.Supp.3d 1307 |
| Parties | Darrell COLLINS and David Ingle, Plaintiffs, v. NAVICENT HEALTH, INC., d/b/a Navicent Health Medical Center and/or Navicent Health Baldwin, and Quentin Jude, Chief of Police, Navicent Health Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Hee Won Choi, Regina S. Molden, Todd Orlando Pearson, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.
Walter H. Bush, Amanda D. Proctor, Jason A. Morris, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt PA, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case concerns whether Defendants Navicent Health, Inc., and the Chief of Police for the Navicent Health Police Department, Quentin Jude, engaged in discriminatory employment actions when they did not promote the two white male plaintiffs. Like many discrimination cases, the parties have created and submitted an exceptionally dense record. Both sides have argued their case well and have submitted evidence that they believe supports their case. However, to jump straight to the lede, the Defendants, in this employment discrimination case, simply didn't improperly base their employment decisions on sex, age, or race. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed at length below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 20].
Plaintiffs Darrell Collins and David Ingle work for the Navicent Health Police Department, which is currently comprised of 16 dispatchers, a communications director, 35 police officers, two sergeants, two lieutenants, one captain, and one chief. [Doc. 29-1, ¶¶ 1, 3]. Generally, when an employee seeks a promotion within the Department's hierarchy, they are interviewed before a promotional board and, once an interview is completed, each member of the board provides his or her top three candidates for the position to the Department's chief—Defendant Quentin Jude. [Id. at ¶¶ 2, 7–8]. Even though the promotional board members rank applicants, Chief Jude makes the final promotional decision and is not bound by the board's recommendations. [Id. at ¶ 9].
Before getting too deep, let's lay out some of Defendants’ employment actions as well as some important factors about our Plaintiffs and their proffered comparators. Demographically speaking, Darrell Collins, is a 47-year-old white male, and he began working for the Department in February 2000 as a police officer. [Doc. 39-2, ¶¶ 1, 20]. David Ingle is a 55-year-old white male, but he didn't become a police officer for the Department until November 2009. [Id. at ¶¶ 5, 21]. In June 2009 and May 2012, respectively, Defendants hired two more police officers—Dana Petit and Charles Richardson. [Id. at ¶¶ 24, 28]. Petit is a 35-year-old white female, and Richardson, an African-American male, is 50. [Id. ].
On January 30, 2013, Collins applied for and received a promotion for a vacant sergeant position. [Id. at ¶¶ 36–37]. Eight months later, around September 2013, the Department announced another vacant sergeant position that (as both sides agree) required "four ... years [of] law enforcement experience." Compare [id. at ¶ 38] with [Doc. 29-2, ¶ 38]. Ingle and Petit applied for this position, but Petit received it. [Doc. 39-2, ¶¶ 39, 43]. We'll call this the "Petit Sergeant Promotion." Fast forward to Spring 2017, when the Department announced a vacant lieutenant position that required a minimum of eight years of law enforcement experience with four years of supervisor experience. [Id. at ¶ 46]. Collins, Ingle, and Petit applied for this position; however, by June 30, 2017, Collins "knew that he had not been promoted." [Doc. 29-1, ¶ 32]; [Doc. 39-2, ¶¶ 47, 49]. Petit received this promotion too—which we'll call the "Petit Lieutenant Promotion." [Doc. 39-2, ¶ 49].
Later in 2017, the Department announced another vacant sergeant position for which Ingle and Richardson applied. [Id. at ¶¶ 58–59]. However, in September 2017, Richardson received that promotion, which, of course, we'll call the "Richardson Sergeant Promotion." [Id. at ¶ 60]. Then, "[o]nly months after" the Richardson Sergeant Promotion, the Department sought to fill another vacant lieutenant position. [Id. at ¶ 61]. Ingle, Richardson, and others applied, but, in November 2017, Richardson "assumed" this promotional opportunity—the "Richardson Lieutenant Promotion."1 [Id. at ¶ 63].
These four promotions, for the most part, lay the general basis for Plaintiffs’ claims, and, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants took certain, specific actions regarding these promotions that make their sex-, age-, and race-discrimination claims viable. Normally, it is the Court's practice to provide a detailed factual background before conducting its analysis. However, to detail the allegations of the specific actions and employment decisions and how they allegedly affected each promotion this early on could create unnecessary confusion. Therefore, purely for the sake of clarity, the Court delays introduction of these allegations since some of Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred and because many of these employment actions and decisions—although they arise from time-barred claims—are used to support timely claims. That said, in an effort to streamline the essence of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court will introduce these specific employment actions and decisions only when necessary—when laying the factual foundation for their timely-filed discrimination claims.
A court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on the evidence presented, " ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta , 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. , 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) ); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion." Four Parcels , 941 F.2d at 1437. The movant may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, including, " ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).2 "When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim[ ]’ in order to discharge this ‘initial responsibility.’ " Four Parcels , 941 F.2d at 1437–38 (quoting Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Rather, "the moving party simply may show—that is, point out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. (quoting Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ) (cleaned up). Alternatively, the movant may provide "affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial." Id.
Sconiers v. Lockhart , 946 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted).
Stated differently, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "The evidence of the [nonmovant] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. And "if a reasonable jury could make more than one inference from the facts, and one of those permissible inferences creates a genuine issue of material fact, a court cannot grant summary judgment"; it "must hold a trial to get to the bottom of the matter." Sconiers , 946 F.3d at 1263.
In this case, Plaintiffs assert sex- and race-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C....
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