Collins v. Snow

Decision Date11 September 1914
PartiesCOLLINS v. SNOW et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

218 Mass. 542
106 N.E. 148

COLLINS
v.
SNOW et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 11, 1914.


Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Edward P. Pierce, Judge.

Suit by John P. Collins against Seth P. Snow and others. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed conditionally.


Michael J. Sughrue, of Boston, and Jas. [218 Mass. 546]J. McCarthy, of Worcester, for appellants.

Chas. F. Smith, of Boston, for appellee.


[218 Mass. 543]LORING, J.

The plaintiff, who was a real estate broker, testified that he had a conversation with one of the defendant firm (who for convenience will be spoken of as the defendants), also brokers in real estate, in which (to quote his own words) he said:

‘I told him that I had a valuable proposition that could be worked, and if he would agree to go to the front and do the work and give me one-half of the commission I would give him the information that I had so that he could go ahead. Mr. Snow said that he would agree to that and do the work.’

The plaintiff further testified that he then disclosed to Snow that the owners of an estate then subject to an unexpired lease wanted to let it for 75 years on a ground rent of $70,000 a year. The defendants thereupon applied to the owners to be and were employed by them as their brokers, and succeeded in letting the estate, whereby they became entitled to a commission of $25,000. The defendants denied the contract testified to by the plaintiff, and this bill in equity was brought to reach and apply certain property of theirs in payment of the debt. The judge who tried the case believed the plaintiff and entered a decree in his favor. From this decree the defendants took an appeal; and the case is here on the evidence which was taken by a commissioner.

[1] The first contention made by the defendants is that the arrangement testified to by the plaintiff is too indefinite to amount to a contract. In support of that contention they ask what the damages would have been if the defendants had refused to make [218 Mass. 544]any attempt to negotiate a lease. The fact that there could be no recovery (if there could be none) in that event is not of consequence. The promise sued on was to pay the plaintiff one-half of the commission earned. It is like a promise by a manufacturer to sell to the plaintiff all goods manufactured by him during a specified time.

[2] The second contention is that when the arrangement testified to by the plaintiff and set forth above was made, it was...

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