Collins v. State, No. 1082S399

• Docket Nº: No. 1082S399
• Citation: 464 N.E.2d 1286
• Case Date: July 02, 1984
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

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464 N.E.2d 1286 Andre Larue COLLINS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee. No. 1082S399. Supreme Court of Indiana. July 2, 1984.

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Paul D. Stanko, Hammond, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

Defendant-appellant, Andre Larue Collins, was convicted by a jury of arson, Ind.Code Sec. 35-43-1-1, a class A felony, and was sentenced to serve a twenty-five year term of imprisonment. In this direct

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appeal, he raises several issues for our consideration:

(1) Whether the verdict of the jury is supported by sufficient evidence.

(2) Whether the trial court committed error by denying defendant's challenge for cause of a prospective juror.

(3) Whether the trial court committed error by denying defendant's motion in limine concerning evidence of his prior convictions.

(4) Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motions for mistrial.

Stella Dixon testified that she lived with the defendant and her four children in a Gary house owned by her father. On August 29, 1981, while attempting to repair the muffler on Dixon's car, the defendant punctured a hole in her gas tank. Dixon placed a bucket underneath the car to catch the dripping gasoline. She testified further that she went to bed at 10:00 p.m. on August 29 and that the defendant woke her up early the next morning when he returned home. They began an argument which lasted two hours. Defendant then walked out of the house, remarking to Dixon that he would "get even" with her, and returned with the bucket of gasoline that had been under her car. He threw the gasoline on the kitchen floor. Dixon stabbed the defendant with a paring knife in the chest three times in an attempt to stop him, but he pushed her against a wall, lit a match and ignited the gasoline.

Michael Dixon, the ten year old son of Stella Dixon, testified that he saw the defendant and his mother arguing and saw the defendant throw the gasoline on the kitchen floor and start the fire with a match. He testified that he received burns on one of his ankles for which he received treatment at the hospital. This testimony was corroborated by a nurse at Gary Methodist Hospital who also stated that she treated the defendant for stab wounds. She related that the defendant left the hospital, against the advice of treating personnel, when Stella and Michael Dixon arrived there. Two Hammond police officers testified that they were sent to guard the defendant when he appeared at St. Margaret's Hospital in Hammond. They stated that he attempted to leave the hospital, but was apprehended before he left the area.

The defendant testified in his defense that he and Dixon began arguing in the evening of August 29 and that when he threatened to leave early the next morning, Dixon began stabbing him with a knife. As he was being stabbed, he tripped over the tub of gasoline which had been under Dixon's car, spilling it and a fire ignited spontaneously. He postulated that the fire was started by a pilot light on one of the kitchen appliances.

I.

Defendant first contends that there was not sufficient evidence presented to support the verdict of the jury. Indiana Code Sec. 35-43-1-1 defines arson and provides in part:

"(a) A person who, by means of fire or explosive, knowingly or intentionally damages: (1) A dwelling of another person without his consent ... commits arson, a class B felony. However, the offense is a class A felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant."

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility, but look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. If from that viewpoint there was evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that a defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. Taylor v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 64, 291 N.E.2d 890; Glover v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

Defendant cites Ellis v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 472, 250 N.E.2d 364, and Fox v. State, (1979) 179 Ind.App. 267, 384 N.E.2d 1159, for the proposition that there is a presumption in Indiana that a fire accidentally resulted

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from some providential cause rather than from a criminal cause, unless the State proves otherwise. Since he presented evidence tending to show that the accelerant was spread by accident and was ignited by means unknown to him, he argues, the presumption that the fire was accidentally started was not overcome.

The language of this presumption, however, is no more than reflective of the burden the State bears in an arson case to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fire was knowingly or intentionally set by some person. It serves no special evidentiary purpose. Here there was direct testimony that the defendant knowingly damaged the dwelling place of another by fire without her consent resulting in bodily injury. The jury was not compelled to believe the...