Collins v. State, 94-KA-00565-SCT

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Writing for the Court: SMITH; DAN LEE
• Citation: 691 So.2d 918
• Parties: James Lee COLLINS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Docket Number: No. 94-KA-00565-SCT,94-KA-00565-SCT
• Decision Date: 30 January 1997

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691 So.2d 918 James Lee COLLINS
v.
STATE of Mississippi. No. 94-KA-00565-SCT. Supreme Court of Mississippi. Jan. 30, 1997.

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David L. Walker, Batesville, for Appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Pat S. Flynn, Asst. Attorney General, Jackson, for Appellee.

En Banc.

SMITH, Justice, for the Court:

James Lee Collins was convicted in the Circuit Court of Tate County of capital rape and sentenced to life in prison. Collins appeals from the jury verdict and argues that as a matter of first impression before this Court that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to consider "mistake of age" as a defense to capital rape nor did the trial court instruct the jury on the offense of statutory rape. Collins also raises a Batson claim and argues the trial court erred in accepting reasons articulated by the State. Collins further argues the trial court erred in accepting reasons articulated by the State in violation of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). We decline to recognize the mistake of age defense. We also hold that there is no error in the trial court's acceptance of the State's

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articulated reasons for striking certain jurors. Therefore, we affirm Collins' conviction and sentence. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 7, 1993, LaQuita Sessom received a telephone call from James Lee Collins. LaQuita testified that Collins requested that she meet him outside her house. Although LaQuita's mother had instructed LaQuita not to leave the house while her mother was at work, she agreed to meet Collins, whom she frequently saw while visiting her aunt, Linda Lewis. LaQuita was thirteen years of age.

LaQuita testified that Collins told her they would ride in his truck and talk. After riding for approximately one mile, Collins and LaQuita turned into a vacant lot beside the Springfield Church in Tate County. LaQuita testified that she struggled with Collins initially, however, after being forced back into Collins' truck, she was raped.

Collins was twenty-four years of age at the time of the incident. Collins admitted having sexual relations with LaQuita, however, he consistently maintained that the sexual activity was consensual and that LaQuita had told him that she was nineteen years old. LaQuita, however, testified that she told Collins during their first telephone conversation that she was thirteen years old.

Collins drove LaQuita home after the rape and called her later that night. LaQuita testified that Collins instructed her to drink vinegar to prevent pregnancy. Although Collins admits to telephoning LaQuita that night, he denied telling her to drink vinegar. Rather, Collins testified that LaQuita stated she was scared of getting pregnant, and that if she did become pregnant, she would tell her parents that Collins raped her.

On August 8, 1993, the day after the rape, LaQuita told her aunt, Linda Lewis, that she had been raped by Collins and then phoned her father to explain what had occurred. LaQuita's father, Blount Sessom testified he accompanied LaQuita to the Sheriff's Department to report the rape. LaQuita testified that she was scared to tell her mother because she would get into trouble for leaving the house while her mother was at work.

Following an investigation, formal charges were filed and Collins was indicted on October 23, 1993 for capital rape, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1). Collins rejected all plea negotiations and went to trial on May 4, 1995. Following voir dire, the State and defense exercised their respective peremptory challenges. The State used two of their peremptory challenges to strike Juror Number 24, Erma Elaine Wright, and Juror Number 87, Ruth Jackson. Collins raised a Batson challenge as both potential jurors were black females. The State articulated the following reasons for the challenges. As to Juror Wright, the State indicated that it was privy to information that Wright was formerly employed either with law enforcement or the Crime Lab but was terminated following an incident where Wright was accused of taking "dope" out of the crime laboratory. Assistant District Attorney Michael Horan stated to the Court that the District Attorney's office may have been involved in that matter, and that law enforcement was involved. Horan continued, "[b]ut for that bit of information, she certainly would have been chosen."

As for Juror Jackson, the State explained that Jackson lived in the community where this crime took place and that she was related to an individual currently being prosecuted by the District Attorney's office for two counts of murder. Moreover, Jackson did not reveal this information when asked during voir dire whether any family members had been prosecuted.

Collins also raised a gender-based challenge to the exclusion of Juror Smart. Smart revealed during voir dire that he had been sued by Defense Attorney Walker. However, Smart indicated to the court that he believed he could be fair and impartial in this case. Mr. Horan stated that Smart was excluded because he believed, in light of his experience, that "a person put in that position will go over and above to be fair to show that they're not prejudiced." The State indicated that no challenges were exercised against several other males and therefore

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Collins had failed to establish a pattern of discrimination.

The trial court upheld the peremptory challenges and proceeded with trial where the jury returned a guilty verdict for the crime of capital rape. The defense proffered two instructions which would allow the jury to consider "mistake of age" as a defense. After entertaining argument by the State and the defense, the trial court refused the instructions. On June 6, 1995, post-trial motions were denied and Collins was sentenced to life in prison. Collins now appeals his conviction to this Court.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

Collins argues that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the "mistake of age" defense. Specifically, Collins assigns as error the trial court's failure to give the following instructions to the jury: Instruction D-4

The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence that James Collins engaged in sexual intercourse with Laquita Sesson (sic) who advised him that she was greater than eighteen (18) years of age, then you shall find James Collins not guilty of seduction of a child under age eighteen.

Instruction D-5

The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence presented in court that James Collins engaged in or committed capital rape upon Laquita Sesson (sic) who advised him that she was greater than eighteen (18) years of age, then you shall find James Collins not guilty of capital rape of Laquita Sesson (sic).

This Court's standard of review in reviewing jury instructions is as follows:

In determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. (citations omitted).

Hickombottom v. State, 409 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss.1982). In the case at bar, the jury was substantively instructed as to the offenses of capital rape, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1) and seduction of a child under age eighteen, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-21. Collins was convicted of capital rape.

Our task is therefore to determine whether the instructions, when read as a whole, accurately set forth the applicable law. While Collins does not object to the instructions actually given by the court, his complaint lies with the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the "mistake of age" defense. Collins argues that this defense is a modern trend recognized by at least seventeen states as well as a view adopted by the Model Penal Code, §§ 213.1, 213.6(1). Collins admits that those states which recognize this defense do so pursuant to the crime of statutory rape. However, Collins argues that this Court should recognize mistake of age as a defense to both statutory and capital rape.

This is an issue of first impression before this Court. Further complicating the issue is the sparse legislative intent to supplement the relevant statutory provisions, §§ 97-3-65, 97-3-67, 97-5-21. However, prior decisions by this Court, case law from sister states and legal commentary aid in our analysis.

A review of both the capital and statutory rape statutes reveals that age is a critical element of each crime. "Crimes such as statutory rape and sexual assault, in the instant case are defined by the ages of the persons involved." Washington v. State, 645 So.2d 915, 919 (Miss.1994). "The age of the victim makes or breaks the conviction." Id. This Court recently held that the age of the accused was "a sine qua non of the crime of capital rape requiring proof by the state at trial." Fisher v. State, 690 So.2d 268 (Miss.1996).

The difference between statutory and capital rape in Mississippi is first one of age. Capital rape requires rape of a child under age fourteen. If the perpetrator is over the age of eighteen, a sentence of death or life imprisonment may be imposed. However, if the perpetrator is between the ages of thirteen

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and eighteen years, the court in its discretion may determine an appropriate sentence. However, statutory rape requires carnal knowledge of an unmarried person of previously chaste character younger than himself or herself and over fourteen and under eighteen years of age.

Thus, while age serves as a line of demarcation for purposes of the potential penalty for capital rape, age is the defining characteristic of statutory rape, be it forcible or not. See Lewis v. State, 184 So. 53, 183 Miss. 192 (1938). The legislative intent of § 97-3-67 is contained in General Laws of Mississippi, 1914,...