Collins v. State

Decision Date31 January 1990
Docket NumberNo. 84A01-8906-CR-210,84A01-8906-CR-210
PartiesJames F. COLLINS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

John A. Kesler, Sr., Kesler & Kesler, Terre Haute, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

The defendant-appellant James F. Collins appeals his conviction by a jury of the Class C felony of possession of cocaine in the amount of more than three grams.

We affirm.

A review of the facts favorable to the judgment shows that on April 11, 1986, Linn Carlyle Ruel came upon an automobile accident on Bolton Road in Vigo County. Ruel observed an automobile that had apparently struck a utility pole. The pole had been sheared off by the impact, and the vehicle was severely damaged. Ruel also saw Collins sitting behind the wheel of the car and saw that Collins was somewhat dazed, but was eventually able to exit the vehicle. He had a jacket with him at that time, although Ruel could no longer describe or identify it. Ruel, being concerned for Collins' well being, offered him a ride, which was accepted. Ruel then took Collins to a nearby house and let him out. The house belonged to an acquaintance of Collins. After calling the authorities, Ruel returned to the scene of the accident to await their arrival.

When a deputy arrived on the scene, he met Ruel who explained what he had seen and done. The deputy, having observed the apparent violence of the accident, and having heard Ruel's description of the possibly injured Collins, proceeded with Ruel to the residence in question. When he arrived, the deputy observed that the front door was ajar several inches and that Collins was reclining on the couch. When he knocked and identified himself, Collins only moaned. Believing that Collins might be seriously injured, based upon Collins' response, the condition of the car, and Ruel's statement, the deputy entered the residence and attempted to rouse Collins.

Rousing Collins proved to be difficult, but he was eventually able to respond that he was not injured and he denied having been in an accident. However, he recanted the denial after Ruel identified him. When Collins admitted to being the driver of the vehicle, the deputy advised him of the implied consent statute, and Collins agreed to be transported to the jail for a breath test. The deputy believed that Collins had been driving while intoxicated based upon a strong odor of alcohol, the presence of a half-full bottle of whiskey, slurred speech and unsteady walking.

When Collins arose from the couch, he picked up a black leather jacket. When they got outside, the jacket was placed in the front seat of the patrol car and Collins was frisked. While inside the residence, and while at the car, Collins stated that the jacket was his.

When they arrived at the jail, the deputy, as was the standard procedure, placed the jacket on the counter and took Collins to a room for an intoxilyzer test. Collins, however, asked to be taken to the hospital because he was in pain, and the deputy took him there. The blood alcohol test that was done at the hospital showed a B.A.C. of .20%.

With the refusal to take the intoxilyzer test at the jail, the jail's chief matron performed an inventory search of the jacket, as was standard procedure. 1 In an inside pocket, she found a plastic bag that contained two clear plastic bags of white powder. The contents of these bags were subsequently tested at the Indiana State Police laboratory. The larger of the two bags contained 26.5 grams of 49.5% pure cocaine.

Collins raises seven issues on appeal.

I.

Collins states his first issue as:

Whether the search of the defendant's jacket at the jail, done without a warrant on the ground that it was an inventory search in connection with his book-in to the jail, was an unconstitutional search because the whole procedure was a sham undertaken prior to defendant's arrest, and defendant was not in fact booked into the jail.

Initially, and in connection with this issue, Collins argues that he was never placed under arrest. The record would show that the deputy never uttered the "magic words" and that the deputy testified that he hadn't arrested Collins as of the time they arrived at the jail.

IND.CODE 9-4-1-134 allows a law enforcement officer to arrest without a warrant on the occasion of a driving under the influence violation where there has been an accident and the driver has left the scene of the accident. The facts of this appeal substantiate the application of that statute.

Additionally, I.C. 9-11-4-2, which deals with the offering and requirement of sobriety tests, authorizes transportation for the administering of the test.

In either instance we are of the opinion that Collins was, in fact, under arrest, or in the alternative, was in lawful custody of the deputy when they were at the jail. That being the case, coupled with the fact that Collins' jacket was placed in the care and possession of the matron pursuant to established procedure, there was sufficient reason to proceed with the inventory search.

In reliance upon cited federal authorities, the case of Dearing v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 432, 393 N.E.2d 167 (Hunter, J., dissenting) gave approval to inventory searches. Dearing observes that a case-by-case examination is appropriate and also stated that, all other things being equal, such searches will be upheld so long as they serve a proper governmental purpose and do not amount to an excessive intrusion. See also Equia v. State (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 559. More recently, our supreme court in Paschall v. State (1988), Ind., 523 N.E.2d 1359, at 1361, adopts the statement of the Chief Justice as it appears in Colorado v. Bertine (1987), 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739:

In the present case, as in [South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000] and [Illinois v. Lafayette (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65], there was no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. In addition, the governmental interests justifying the inventory searches in Opperman and Lafayette are nearly the same as those which obtain here. In each case, the police were potentially responsible for the property taken into their custody. By securing the property, the police protected the property from unauthorized interference. Knowledge of the precise nature of the property helped guard against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence. Such knowledge also helped to avert any danger to police or others that may have been posed by the property.

Dearing says that the interests which support inventory searches are protection of the police from danger, protection of the police against claims and disputes over lost or stolen property, and protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody. Collins' individual interest in privacy must be balanced against the foregoing interests.

The Lafayette case addresses some of Collins' contentions and is worthy of consideration within the factual framework of this case. Lafayette was arrested for disturbing the peace and taken to the station house where he was ordered to empty his pockets and place the contents on a counter. Lafayette was also carrying a purse-type shoulder bag which he also placed on the counter. Among the contents of his purse-type shoulder bag, ten amphetamine pills were found which resulted in Lafayette's arrest for possession of a controlled substance. In due course, Lafayette's case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. There it was decided, among other things, that it is reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as a part of the routine administrative procedure at a police station house incident to booking and jailing the suspect, that the type of search does not rest on probable cause and that the absence of a warrant is immaterial.

In reversing the state court's decision that less intrusive means could have been used in searching the purse-type bag, such as sealing it in a plastic bag or box or other secured place, the Supreme Court stated:

The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative "less intrusive" means. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), for example, we upheld the search of the trunk of a car to find a revolver suspected of being there. We rejected the contention that the public could equally well have been protected by the posting of a guard over the automobile. In language equally applicable to this case, we held, "[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable." We are hardly in a position to second-guess police departments as to what practical administrative method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees and preserve the security of the station house. It is evidence that a station house search of every item carried on or by a person who has lawfully been taken into custody by the police will amply serve the important and legitimate governmental interests involved.

* * * * * *

... we hold that it is not "unreasonable" for police, as a part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures. (Citations and footnote omitted.)

103 S.Ct. at 2610, 2611.

Notwithstanding Collins' arguments to the contrary, the evidence shows that the inventory search in this case closely comports with Paschall and Lafayette, for the reason...

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