Collins v. State

Decision Date01 September 1990
Docket NumberNo. 94,94
Citation322 Md. 675,589 A.2d 479
PartiesAntonio W. COLLINS v. STATE of Maryland
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Diane E. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen., all on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW and KARWACKI, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge of the Court of Appeals (retired), Specially Assigned.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

The question presented is whether, in the circumstances, a police officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest for the commission of a felony.

I.

Antonio Collins was charged by criminal information in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County with felonious possession of cocaine and related offenses. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress certain evidence and statements which he made during a custodial interrogation. He claimed that because his warrantless arrest was illegal, this evidence was inadmissible at his trial.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Robert Holmes of the Salisbury Police Department testified that at 3 a.m. on September 20, 1988, he observed a grey Ford Mustang parked in the driveway portion of a car dealership (Tidewater Motors) in Salisbury, Maryland; five black men were standing approximately five feet from the driver's side of the Mustang. It appeared to the officer that the men were looking at vehicles in Tidewater's parking lot. No one was in the Mustang. According to Holmes, he approached the men and asked for the driver of the vehicle; Steven Lewis so identified himself. Holmes asked him what they were doing. Lewis replied that "they" were looking at the BMWs for sale. On cross-examination, Holmes acknowledged that he did not know where Collins was standing either when he arrived on the scene, or when he began to question Lewis.

Officer Steven Ewing arrived at Tidewater Motors to assist Holmes and another officer, who were then in the process of identifying each of the men in the lot. Ewing inspected the inside of the Mustang by shining a flashlight through its partially closed windows. He observed a black plastic 35 mm film container on the rear seat. He said that, in his experience as a police officer, this was a type of container used to conceal controlled dangerous substances (CDS) for sale or use. At this point, Ewing asked Kevin Parker, the suspect closest to him, to retrieve the container from the car. Parker complied. The officer then asked Parker what was inside the container. Parker responded, "I don't know; it is not mine." Ewing directed him to look inside the container and to show him the contents. Parker opened the container and attempted to conceal its contents "by cupping his hand over top of it." He again stated that he did not know what was in the container.

Upon looking into the container, Ewing found over twenty cellophane wrapped packets. He opened one of the packets. It contained a white powdered substance that Ewing suspected to be cocaine packaged for sale. He then arrested the five men for possession of the suspected cocaine.

Collins maintained at the suppression hearing that there was no probable cause for his arrest because there was no evidence that he had been in the car, or that he was in any way linked with the canister that was found in the vehicle. The trial court (Simpson, J.) denied the motion to suppress; it concluded that there was probable cause for the arrest in view of the early hour of the morning at which the CDS was discovered, the proximity of the men to the vehicle, and the suspicious nature of their presence in the closed car lot. At the ensuing court trial, the challenged evidence was admitted, and Collins was found guilty of possessing the cocaine and of the related counts. He appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments in an unreported opinion. Thereafter, we granted certiorari, vacated the judgments, and remanded the case to the Court of Special Appeals for consideration in light of Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 564 A.2d 414 (1989). On remand, the intermediate appellate court affirmed Collins's conviction in an unreported opinion. We again granted certiorari to consider the important issue raised in the case.

II.

Before us, Collins urges that there was no probable cause for his arrest. He maintains that although the police may have had probable cause to arrest Lewis, the admitted driver of the car, as well as Parker, who attempted to conceal the contents of the canister, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause to arrest him. He relies upon our opinion in Livingston v. State, supra, for the proposition that the mere proximity of an accused to an offender, or to incriminating evidence, is insufficient for a finding of probable cause. He asserts that there must be some factual basis to believe that a suspect has committed a crime before the suspect may legally be arrested; that here there was no more than a mere suspicion that Collins had been in Lewis's car, or that he was aware of what was in the opaque film canister on the back seat of the car; and that such suspicion, without more, does not establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest.

The State responds that Collins's proximity to the car, in association with the other men, linked him both to the car and to the drugs in the cannister which was in plain view in the back seat. Moreover, the State suggests that Parker's behavior as he opened the container and attempted to conceal its contents indicated that he was aware of the presence of the contraband. These facts, according to the State, coupled with the early morning hour at a closed business establishment where the men were assembled, gave the police officers probable cause to believe that Collins knew of, and jointly possessed, the cocaine found in the car.

III.

The legality of a warrantless arrest is measured by the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest. Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 594B provides, in part:

"(b) A police officer who has probable cause to believe that a felony or misdemeanor is being committed in the officer's presence or within the officer's view, may arrest without a warrant any person whom the officer may reasonably believe to have committed such offense.

(c) A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed or attempted and that such person has committed or attempted to commit a felony whether or not in the officer's presence or view."

This section is declarative of the Maryland common law governing warrantless arrests. See Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 611, 556 A.2d 236 (1989); Stevenson v. State, 43 Md.App. 120, 127, 403 A.2d 812 (1979), aff'd, 287 Md. 504, 413 A.2d 1340 (1980).

Probable cause, we have frequently stated, is a nontechnical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 403, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988); Edwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131, 136, 220 A.2d 547 (1966). A finding of probable cause requires less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion. Woods, supra, 315 Md. at 611, 556 A.2d 236; Sterling v. State, 248 Md. 240, 245, 235 A.2d 711 (1967); Edwardsen, supra, 243 Md. at 136, 220 A.2d 547. Our determination of whether probable cause exists requires a nontechnical, common sense evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in a given situation in light of the facts found to be credible by the trial judge. State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 379, 568 A.2d 48 (1990); Doering, supra, 313 Md. at 403-04, 545 A.2d 1281. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances taken as a whole would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that a felony had been or is being committed by the person arrested. Woods, ...

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