Collins v. State

Decision Date04 August 2003
Docket NumberNo. 70,70
Citation829 A.2d 992,376 Md. 359
PartiesMichael Darnell COLLINS v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Diane E. Keller, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

WILNER, Judge.

Following a trial in the Circuit Court for Talbot County, which he chose not to attend, petitioner, Michael Collins, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and hindering a police officer in the performance of his duties. With two prior felony convictions under the Controlled Dangerous Substance laws, Collins was sentenced as a recidivist offender to 25 years without parole for the drug violation and was given a concurrent sentence of one day for the hindering. After that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals, we granted certiorari to consider whether (1) there existed probable cause for petitioner's arrest and the search that was conducted pursuant to that arrest; (2) there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charge of hindering; and (3) petitioner was properly tried in absentia.1 We shall affirm.

BACKGROUND

Between 10:20 and 10:25 p.m. on January 19, 1999, the Easton Police department was alerted to an armed robbery of a High's convenience store. Sheriff's Deputy Scott Kakabar was the first to arrive on the scene. Upon exiting his patrol car, he looked around and, seeing no one, entered the store and conversed briefly with the clerk. Detective Shayne McKinney of the Easton Police Department then arrived and obtained a description from the clerk.

The clerk described the robber as an African-American male, approximately 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighing about 160 pounds, and wearing a black "nubbie" hat and a long-sleeved gray shirt or sweatshirt with a black stripe or stripes.2 The clerk reported that the robber said that he was armed, and that he had "just left" on foot. Detective McKinney promptly broadcast that description to other members of the Easton Police Department.

Officer John Jones heard about the broadcast and drove to the area near the store. About eight to twelve minutes after the broadcast, he saw Collins in the parking lot of a Burger King store located across the six-to-eight lane U.S. Route 50 and about 200 yards from the High's store, walking away from the direction of the High's store. Collins, who was somewhat larger than the person described in the broadcast—six feet tall and 180 pounds—was wearing a black coat, a gray sweatshirt, and a black nubbie. Jones said that, as he entered the Burger King parking lot, Collins saw his patrol car and "quickly walked to [a] payphone to get on the phone as if he was going to make a call." Jones added that, when he first saw Collins, he was not walking toward the phone.

Officer Jones drove to the payphone, exited his car, identified himself, and conducted a field interview, in the course of which he obtained Collins's name, address, and date of birth. While obtaining this information, Jones learned from a radio dispatch that the robber fled the store with $200. Jones asked Collins how much money he had, to which Collins responded by pulling out a twenty dollar bill and stating that was all he had. Jones informed Collins that he matched the description of a robbery suspect who was reportedly in possession of two hundred dollars, and he asked if Collins had more than twenty dollars, to which Collins replied in the negative. Jones then asked Collins if he could check, whereupon Collins "fled." Although Jones intended to hold Collins until the clerk could be brought to the scene to determine whether Collins was, in fact, the robber, he never advised Collins of that intent. Nor, to that point, had he used any force or show of force, as Collins had been entirely cooperative.

When Collins ran, Officer Jones, joined by two other officers who had just arrived at the parking lot, pursued, shouting for Collins to stop. After what he described as a "pretty lengthy foot chase," Jones was able to grab Collins and force him to the ground. Collins continued to resist, however, refusing to bring his hands out from under his waist. Aware that the robber was reportedly armed, Jones and the other officers struggled to free Collins's hands, finally using pepper spray. Not until other officers arrived were they able to place handcuffs on Collins. One of those officers found a vial or bag of crack cocaine in Collins's possession.

There was no evidence that Collins was the robber, and he was never charged with that offense. He was, however, charged by criminal information with possession of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute that substance, and obstructing and hindering a police officer. Collins responded with a motion to suppress all objects or items seized from his person, all statements made by him, and all in-court and out-of-court identifications of him. The gravamen of the motion seemed to be that, at the time Collins fled, the police had no reasonable ground to detain him, and that he had a right to leave. The court denied the motion. It concluded that, based on the description of the robber, the initial stop was appropriate and that the suspicion was heightened into probable cause when Collins ran.

A jury trial was set for September 2, 1999. When it became evident that Collins, who was free on bond, was not present in the courtroom that day, defense counsel informed the court that her office's last contact with him was two days earlier, that he had failed to appear for an appointment the day before that contact, that Collins knew the trial date, and that he had inquired about a continuance because his daughter was facing surgery. Counsel said that she told him that, unless he brought her a letter from the hospital, a continuance was not feasible and "that he had to be here."

In an effort to locate Collins, the court instructed officers and sheriff's deputies to search for him in the circuit court building, the district court building, and at his home. While that was being done, the court proceeded with jury selection. After the jury had been selected, sworn, and sent to the jury room, the court was informed that Collins was still not present. Counsel advised the court that a sheriff had gone to the last two known addresses of Mr. Collins and had spoken with his mother, who attempted to locate him, that counsel had confirmed with her office that Collins had not called, and that she had called the hospital and the last two places of his employment, all with no success. She said that she had no explanation for her client's failure to appear. When she informed the court that Collins had a daughter who was severely handicapped and was set to undergo surgery at Kennedy Krieger Institute sometime during the month, the court took a recess so that counsel could call that institution in an effort to locate her client. After the recess, counsel informed the court that the daughter was not at Kennedy Krieger. She added that her office had spoken with the mother of the child, who confirmed (1) that the child was in school that day, and (2) that Collins was aware of the trial date because they had discussed the case several days earlier. Counsel paged Collins with her office number, to no avail.

Notwithstanding all of this, counsel asked for a two-week continuance, which the court denied. The judge stated that, in addition to counsel's efforts, his office had called the local hospital and ascertained that Collins was not in the emergency room and had not been admitted as a patient. The judge noted that, when Collins appeared for a pretrial hearing on August 6, he was informed that trial would be on September 2. The court concluded that it had followed the directives of this Court in Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 658 A.2d 239 (1995) and found that Collins was aware of the trial date and had voluntarily chosen to absent himself from the trial. It denied the motion for continuance, noting that it would not be proper to keep the jury together for two weeks in the hope that Collins might appear, especially as their service as jurors would likely end before then.

At counsel's request, the court informed the jury, prior to opening statements, that Collins had chosen not to appear for trial. Counsel thanked the court and said "that the Court has bent over backwards to accommodate our efforts to locate him. The Court has bent over backwards, metaphorically, to accommodate all of our requests from this side of the trial table as well as sua sponte efforts to locate Mr. Collins to proceed today." When Collins appeared for sentencing—nearly two years later—he offered no explanation for his absence from trial. In pleading for a sentence permitting parole, he said that he had a daughter who was totally dependent on him and a father who was afflicted with cancer, but he did not indicate that either of those circumstances caused or necessitated his absence from trial.

DISCUSSION
Validity of the Arrest

Collins urges that the cocaine seized from his person was inadmissible in evidence because it was taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. That is so, he says, because his arrest was unlawful. The arrest was unlawful, in his view, because it was effected without probable cause. In presenting this argument, Collins maintains that (1) Officer Jones had no reasonable articulable suspicion that he was the robber, and therefore no basis upon which to stop and detain him; (2) in order to avoid the prospect of an unlawful search of his person by Officer Jones, he was entitled to flee and, because his flight was justified, it cannot be considered in assessing probable cause; and (3) accordingly, there was no lawful basis for the arrest.

We agree...

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