Collins v. State

Decision Date09 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 49A02-0312-CR-1044.,49A02-0312-CR-1044.
Citation822 N.E.2d 214
PartiesWilliam COLLINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Jeffrey A. Baldwin, Baldwin & Dakich, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Stephen Tesmer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

William Collins appeals his convictions for Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon and Possession of Cocaine following a jury trial. He presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence obtained following a warrantless residential entry.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.

We affirm and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 2:30 a.m. on August 30, 2003, Collins, Wyneka Blount, Demetrius Tate, Brandon Spinks, and Blount's sister, were all inside a house located at 3030 North Gladstone Avenue in Indianapolis. Police received an anonymous tip that someone at the residence had been shot. Police first went to the location of the payphone that was used to call in the tip, but they did not find the tipster. Police then approached the residence, saw someone peek through a window blind, and heard that person yell "Police!" Transcript at 83. At that point, police heard a commotion inside, as people began running throughout the house.

One of the officers ran toward the back of the house, but stopped to look into a kitchen window when he saw two men inside. The two men were crouched near a kitchen cabinet, and the officer saw that one of the men had a stack of cash and a gun in his hands. The officer yelled at the man to drop the gun and ordered both men to lie on the floor, but the men got up and tried to exit the house through the back door. When the men were unable to open that door, they returned to the kitchen and complied with the officer's commands. At that point, the officer yelled at the other officers to force their way into the house.1 Once inside, officers saw Collins sitting on a couch in the living room, and they ordered him to lie on the floor. Officers subsequently found a handgun on the couch where Collins had been sitting.

After each of the occupants was secured, police obtained a search warrant for the house. Officers found cocaine, marijuana, a digital scale, plastic baggies, guns, and money in the course of their search. When officers searched one of the two bedrooms, they found women's clothing, large-sized men's clothing,2 an envelope addressed to Collins,3 and some Polaroid photographs that belonged to Collins. In that bedroom, officers also found, in plain view, an SKS rifle leaning up against a wall and a black semi-automatic handgun sitting on top of a cabinet. During a pat-down search, officers found several sets of keys in Collins' pockets, including a key to the Gladstone Avenue residence and keys to two vehicles parked outside the residence. During a subsequent search of Collins at a detention center, officers found a baggie containing cocaine on the floor next to him.

The State charged Collins with possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, possession of cocaine with a firearm, possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana. Collins moved to suppress the evidence obtained after police forced their way into the house without a warrant, but the trial court denied that motion following a hearing. A jury found Collins guilty of all of the charges except for the possession of marijuana charge.4 The trial court entered judgment of conviction on the possession of firearm by a serious violent felon and possession of cocaine charges5 and sentenced Collins to twenty years, with five years suspended. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Issue One: Warrantless Entry

Collins contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence. Specifically, Collins maintains that the evidence was obtained pursuant to a warrantless entry, which violates his rights under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The State asserts that the warrantless search was justified under the circumstances and was, therefore, consistent with both the federal and state constitutions.6 We agree with the State.

Although Collins originally challenged the admission of the evidence through a motion to suppress, he appeals following a completed trial and challenges the admission of such evidence at trial. "Thus, the issue is ... appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial." Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). We have indicated that our standard of review of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by trial objection. Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. However, we must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. See id.

Fourth Amendment

The trial court found that the State had demonstrated that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. There are limited exceptions to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. See Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)

. The State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement exists when a warrantless search is conducted. Id. A well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is when exigent circumstances exist. Id. Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may enter a residence if the situation suggests a reasonable belief that someone inside the residence is in need of aid. Id.; Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ind.2001).

Collins maintains that the State has not met its burden to show that exigent circumstances existed at the time officers forced their way into the house.7 In particular, Collins asserts that the police failed to corroborate the anonymous tip. But we agree with the State that the evidence supports a determination that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry.

The evidence shows that the officers were investigating whether someone inside the Gladstone residence was in need of aid. Detective Shaffer testified that when the officers approached the residence, someone inside alerted the others to the police presence, and he heard people running toward the back of the house. Detective Shaffer then followed a sidewalk that led to the back of the house to see if the occupants were exiting through the back door. See, e.g., Divello v. State, 782 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ind.Ct.App.2003)

(noting "those coming on truly pressing or emergency matters could reasonably be expected to seek out residents through areas other than the front door."). On his way to the back door of the house, he observed, through a kitchen window,8 a man holding a gun. At that point, Detective Shaffer's observations corroborated the tip that someone may have been shot and justified the warrantless entry on the basis of exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Sayre, 471 N.E.2d at 715 (holding warrantless entry justified where police saw people leaving room carrying drug paraphernalia after alerted to police presence; police reasonably believed evidence was being removed or destroyed justifying "prompt action"). As such, the officers' entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Article I, Section 11

Collins also contends that the warrantless entry violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We have previously held that Article I, Section 11 must be liberally construed to protect Hoosiers from unreasonable police activity in private areas of their lives. State v. Stamper, 788 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. Rather than looking to federal requirements such as warrants and probable cause when evaluating Section 11 claims, we place the burden on the State to show that under the totality of the circumstances its intrusion was reasonable. Id.

Collins maintains that the "police were trespassing when they entered the property without reasonable suspicion [or] probable cause, as demonstrated by the admittedly uncorroborated anonymous call." Brief of Appellant at 6. In support of that contention, Collins cites to Indiana case law regarding the reasonableness under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution of police searches of garbage left outside residences. In those cases, namely, Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind.1994), Stamper, 788 N.E.2d at 862, and Bell v. State, 626 N.E.2d 570 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied, our courts focused on the homeowner's reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his garbage. In Moran and Bell, our courts held that where the officers did not trespass onto the homeowners' properties when they seized the garbage, the homeowners had no reasonable expectation of privacy and the search was reasonable. But in Stamper, this court held that a homeowner had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to two garbage bags "located on his own property such that police had to enter his property" to seize the bags. 788 N.E.2d at 867.

But Collins ignores our conclusion in Stamper, namely, that "absent exigent circumstances, the police will need a search warrant based on probable cause" before searching garbage located on private property. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, our case law is clear that, like the Fourth Amendment, there is an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement under Article I, Section 11 of the...

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