Collins v. State, 2-1078A364
| Decision Date | 13 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-1078A364,2-1078A364 |
| Citation | 394 N.E.2d 211,182 Ind.App. 95 |
| Parties | Donald Charles COLLINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Ihor N. Boyko, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant-defendant.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Terry G. Duga, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee-plaintiff.
Donald Collins appeals from the denial of his Petition for Post Conviction Relief by which he sought to withdraw his plea of guilty to second degree burglary. We think Collins' plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because of the court's failure to comply with Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3 1 and Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-4 2 and reverse.
On September 16, 1976, Collins appeared in court, withdrew his previous not guilty plea, and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of second degree burglary. At that time, the court informed Collins of various constitutional rights. However, the court failed to comply with the strict mandates of Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3 and Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-4. Specifically, before his plea was accepted, Collins was not informed that by pleading guilty he was admitting the truth of all facts alleged in the information (§ 3(b)); he was not told the court was not a party to, nor was it bound by, any plea agreement (§ 3(e)); the court did not ask Collins if his plea was voluntary, or if it was obtained by the use of promises, threats or force (§ 4(a)). Collins argues this failure by the court dictates a reversal. We agree.
Like Justice Hunter, we find the language of Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3 and Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-4 to be mandatory. Turman v. State (1979) Ind., 392 N.E.2d 483. The statutes say the court Shall inform the defendant of his various rights and the consequences of his plea before the plea is accepted. There is no latitude allowed; the clear statutory language requires strict compliance. See Neeley v. State, (1978) Ind., 382 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Prentice, J., dissenting) (); Williams v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827 n. 1 3 (Hunter, J.); Norfrey v. State, (1976) Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 202. Failure of strict compliance equals a failure to meet an absolute prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea. We therefore order a reversal because of the court's failure to comply with the mandates of Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3 and Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-4.
We think our insistence on absolute adherence to the statutes is more than justified. These two statutes, strictly construed and enforced, promote two equally laudable goals. First, they establish an absolute, uniform procedure for the acceptance of guilty pleas. Trial courts are put on notice that all the requirements of the statutes must be complied with. Second, our interpretation of the statutes makes appellate review of guilty plea cases much less subjective. All we need determine is whether the statute has been complied with, thereby allowing for summary disposition in many cases. The result is an absolute assurance that defendants' pleas will be accepted only when they are truly knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and a speedy administration of justice on the appellate level. Thus, by our decision, we do not place form over substance; rather, we require strict, formal compliance only as a means of assuring substantive compliance and promoting sound judicial policy.
Our firm resolve in the correctness of the above holding and rationale does not allow us the luxury of ignoring existing precedent. Therefore, we must look to the entire record to determine if Collins was fully advised of and understood his rights. Turman v. State, supra; Neeley v. State, supra. In this regard, the State strongly argues we should consider the record of Collins' sentencing hearing, held on October 1, 1976. 4 At that hearing Collins was told that by pleading guilty he admitted the truth of all facts alleged, and the court asked Collins if his plea was voluntary and whether force or threats had been used to obtain the plea. We do not think these efforts by the court satisfied the requirements of the statute. For a determination of voluntariness to be made after the plea is accepted 5 is akin to closing the gate after the horse has fled. A determination of voluntariness can be meaningful only if it is made Before the plea is entered and accepted. A guilty plea is a "grave and solemn act" and should be accepted only when the defendant has a "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747. The acceptance of a guilty plea "demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable . . . ." Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. We can stress the importance of a guilty plea and the need for a timely, full advisement and determination of voluntariness no more eloquently than Justice Hunter:
Only when the defendant is seriously considering entering a guilty plea will the advisement be meaningful to him and for the trial judge in determining an intentional and intelligent waiver of known rights. This is not an undue burden to place upon the trial court. The defendant is on the verge of committing years of his life to confinement. The little time necessary for the trial judge to advise the defendant At the time of his plea is a modicum relative to the significant consequences to a defendant.
Maleck v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 604, 358 N.E.2d 116, 118 (emphasis supplied).
Finally, we note the court never told Collins it was not a party to, nor bound by, any plea agreement, and Collins was never asked if promises had been used to obtain his plea. The first omission, though a failure to comply with the statute, may not be critical because the court apparently followed the recommendations by the State in the plea agreement. The failure to inquire whether promises had been made, however, is of a much more serious nature. In Watson v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 97, 300 N.E.2d 354, our Supreme Court discussed the highly sensitive role promises by police officers and prosecutors play in plea bargain agreements, and said "the trial judge . . . should . . . make every effort to ascertain whether or not such promises have, in fact, been made . . . ." Id., 300 N.E.2d at 355. See Dube v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 398, 275 N.E.2d 7; Gibson v. State, (1974) 162 Ind.App. 337, 319 N.E.2d 661. By failing to ask Collins if his plea was made in response to promises by the police or prosecutor, the court failed to comply with both the Supreme Court's Watson decision and the mandates of Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-4(a). This alone requires our reversal.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to...
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