Collins v. Sullivan Cnty. Tenn.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-CV-88 |
| Parties | KENNETH ANTHONY COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. SULLIVAN COUNTY, TENNESSEE et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff filed a Motion [Doc. 2] to proceed in forma pauperis. The Motion is before the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of this Court. Plaintiff is representing himself in this action.
The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the courts. Adkins v E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). As such, the statute allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of the lawsuit. Denton v Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992).
The Court's review of an in forma pauperis application is normally based solely on the affidavit of indigence. See Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 262-63 (6th Cir. 1990). The threshold requirement which must be met in order to proceed in forma pauperis is that the petitioner show, by affidavit, the inability to pay court fees and costs. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). However, one need not be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of proceeding in forma pauperis. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 342. An affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis is sufficient if its states that the petitioner cannot, because of poverty, afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still pay for the necessities of life. Id. at 339. The decision to grant or deny such an application lies within the sound discretion of the Court. Phipps v. King, 866 F.2d 824, 825 (6th Cir. 1988).
Here Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Petitioner's economic status have been considered and the Court has determined that they support granting leave for Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. The Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees [Doc. 2], therefore, is GRANTED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the complaint without prepayment of costs or fees. Gibson, 915 F.2d at 262-63; see also Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1986). The Clerk shall not issue process, however, at this time.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), the district court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See also Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319.[1] The Court now undertakes its role in screening Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. 1].
On May 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Sullivan County, Tennessee and two of its Sheriff's Department deputies acted to deprive Plaintiff of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff asserts claims against the deputies in their individual and official capacities. The substance of these allegations stems from two interactions by Plaintiff with Deputies Brandon Peters and A. Palekakis, with one occurring on May 29, 2020 and the other on July 8, 2020. On the earlier date, Plaintiff alleges the named deputies arrived at his home between noon and 1 p.m. and “busted” through a glass back door. Plaintiff submits that despite following deputies' commands to raise his hands, the officers “brutalized” him by using a taser, kicking him repeatedly in the legs and roughly handcuffing him. Throughout this process, Plaintiff emphasizes that he was attempting to comply with officers' orders throughout the interaction. After he was in handcuffs, Plaintiff advises that the named officers, with the assistance of other unnamed officers, “stomped down on” his upper, middle, and lower back.
Once Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed on the ground, officers allegedly dragged him down twelve steps and into a police car. Officers then denied Plaintiff medical treatment for his injuries. The officers transported Plaintiff to the Sullivan County Jail where he remained for a week. Upon his arrival at the jail, Plaintiff states that he was placed in a wheelchair and once again deprived of medical attention, this time being left alone in the wheelchair for three hours. Plaintiff further avers that he was never shown a warrant and was even told by an unnamed officer that they did not need one when Plaintiff repeatedly asked why he had been arrested. Plaintiff ultimately posted bond and then conferred with his bail bondsman about the reason for his arrest. While Plaintiff says the bondsman was provided with the reason for Plaintiff's arrest, the bondsman was not provided with documents confirming the reason provided. Rather, Plaintiff was simply provided with a date for his initial appearance in state sessions court, which was June 11, 2020.
When the date came to appear before the state sessions court, Plaintiff claims to have appeared and been advised by both the state court judge and prosecuting attorney that his case was not on the court's docket. Then on July 8, 2020, Defendant deputies came to the residence of Plaintiff's mother and arrested Plaintiff for failure to appear, asserting that Plaintiff had not appeared in state court on June 11, 2020 as directed. Plaintiff was then taken to jail where he remained until the following day. Plaintiff avers that he never received an explanation for this subsequent arrest, particularly given that he says he appeared before the sessions court on June 11.
Despite the lack of explanation, Plaintiff was again ordered to appear before the state court at a future date. Plaintiff contacted the Sullivan County Sheriff's Department seeking clarity about the situation and was told that he was “nothing but a known liar.” Plaintiff advises he reported the actions of Sullivan County and its officers to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
In Plaintiff's complaint, he details multiple injuries he sustained as a result of the officers' actions on May 29, 2020. While Plaintiff acknowledges pre-existing back problems, he says the officers' conduct aggravated these problems and caused further damage to his sciatic nerve, which resulted in temporary paralysis. Plaintiff also alleges that because his handcuffs were too tight, he sustained damage to a nerve ending in his right hand, which was torn. Plaintiff states that he has continued to visit his primary care provider to seek treatment for these injuries, has had x-rays and is scheduled to have MRIs performed.
As a result of his claimed physical injuries and other damages, Plaintiff requests that the Court render a judgment against Sullivan County and its Deputies Brandon Peters and A. Palekakis for the actions taken against him. Plaintiff further requests compensatory and punitive damages in the sum of $1, 500, 000.00 as well as compensation for the glass door and his prescription eyeglasses he claims officers destroyed in the May 29, 2020 incident. Plaintiff also asks that this Court dismiss the state charges pending against him.[2]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal cause of action against any person acting under color of law who causes a plaintiff to be deprived of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” To be successful in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that he or she was deprived of rights under the Constitution or other laws and that a defendant caused the deprivation while acting under color of law. Block v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998). “If a plaintiff fails to make a showing on any essential element of a § 1983 claim, it must fail.” Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Law enforcement actions will also be considered official where they are the result of “acts representing official policy or custom” of the agency. Ferrick v. Winchester Police Dep't, No. 4:12-CV-29, 2015 WL 4563203, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 29, 2015). Here, Plaintiff raises claims against two officers affiliated with the Sullivan County Sheriff's Department and their employer Sullivan County, Tennessee.[3]
Plaintiff asserts claims against Deputies Peters and Palekakis. A Court in this District, when addressing these same types of claims explained that “[m]unicipal (or local government) officers are insulated by the ‘qualified' or ‘good faith' immunity doctrine from exposure to ‘individual capacity' lawsuits anchored in a discretionary official decision if their conduct does not violate clearly established [federal] statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, even if their actions actually violated the plaintiff's federal rights.” Dillingham v. Millsaps, 809 F.Supp.2d 820, 835 n. 12 (E.D. Tenn. 2011). When presented with a claim against an individual officer, the Court may sua sponte review whether the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See Matthews v. City of Collierville, No. 13-2703-JDT-TMP, 2014 WL 69127, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 8, 2014). When screening a pro se complaint in this manner, the Sixth Circuit has cautioned that “a court ‘may [sua sponte] dismiss a [prisoner's] claim on qualified immunity grounds ..., but only if it is clear from the complaint that the plaintiff can present no evidence that could overcome a defense of qualified...
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